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In order to achieve their institutional goals and adapt to the changing 
environment, universities in China have launched a dramatic change in the 
compensation and incentive system since the late 1990s. The mainstream in this 
undergoing reform is the pay-by-position system (gang wei jin tie zhi du) which is in 
nature an incentive structure of tournament. Why are the leading universities opting 
for the toumament-type incentive structure? What is the mechanism of such 
compensation system? More importantly, what is the impact of the incentive change 
on the faculty and does it affect the effort and productivity of the employees? Or, is it 
consistent with what the theory of tournament predicts? These related questions are 
of interest not only to the university policy makers but also to labor economists. 
In an attempt to answer such questions and explore the mechanism and effect of 
the tournament-type incentive system, this study investigates a case, a representative 
top-tier university that has been playing a leading role in such kind of incentive 
reform that seems to be in vogue among universities in China. By using its 
institutional data on personnel, compensation and performance information obtained 
from field survey, this study finds strong evidence that it is the pay structure of the 
pay-by-position scheme that provides effective incentives and has improved the 
faculty productivity and has sorted its faculty on the basis of ability and performance. 
The findings support what the theory of tournament predicts by providing new 
evidence from academics to the still undersized empirical literature. Also, the 
findings provide encouraging results for policy makers to assess their policy and to 





















I wish to express my deep appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Zhang Junsen for 
giving me seasoned guidance, support and encouragement during my research. His 
insightfulness, criticism, and advice kept me in the right direction and helped me 
conquer the difficulties encountered during my part-time studies and thesis writing. I 
also thank Prof. Li Hongbin, who has been like a co-supervisor, for spending his 
precious time in discussing with me, providing me with ideas, and giving me positive 
suggestions. I am grateful to Prof. Liu Pak Wai for giving me insightful comments 
and invaluable suggestions for improvement. I am indebted to leaders and staff of 
Tsinghua University for assisting and supporting the field survey. Especially, I would 
like to thank Prof. Bai Yongyi, Director of the President's Office and member of the 
Task Force for the Pay-by-position Scheme. I would like to acknowledge Ms. Liu 
Wanhua, Deputy Director, Prof. Pei Zhaohong, Director, Mr. Yuan Ruhai, and Ms. 
Chen Juan of the Department of Personnel Affairs; Prof. Li Yanmei, Director, and Ms. 
Feng Wanling of the Center of Teaching Research and Training; and all other 
colleagues who have offered me great support and selfless help. I thank Maureen, 
Graduate Division of Economics, and other staff of the General Office of the 
Economics Department for their kind assistance and help during my studies and 
research. I am also grateful to my friends, Zhou Shaojie, Dr. Wang Youqiang, Dr. 
Linda Yung, and Ah Chun for their patience to listen to me and their enthusiasm to 
discuss with me about my research. Last but not least, I own special thanks and a 
deep sense of gratitude to my family. Without their understanding and support, I 





List of Tables and Figures v 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 2 Pay-by-position System: Incentive Reform at the Case University 
2.1 Background of the Pay-by-position Scheme 6 
2.2 Chronology of the Incentive Change 9 
2.3 Institutional Characteristics of the Pay-by-position System 11 
2.4 Summary 16 
Chapter 3 Analytical Framework and Literature Review 
3.1 A Brief Introduction to the Theory of Tournament 21 
3.2 A Simple Model of Homogeneous Two-contestant Tournament 22 
3.3 Implications under Multi-contestant and Multi-position-level Situation 26 
3.4 Status Quo of Existing Research 28 
3.5 Summary 30 
Chapter 4 Empirical Models and Hypotheses 
4.1 Measurement of Key Variables 33 
4.2 Incentive Effect on Teaching 41 
4.3 Incentive Effect on Research 48 
4.4 Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System 54 
4.5 Summary 56 
Chapter 5 Data Presentation and a Preliminary Analysis 
5.1 Survey and Data Processing 57 
5.2 Description of Data 61 
5.3 A Preliminary Probe into Data 68 
5.4 Summary 74 
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis and Estimation results 
6.1 Incentive Effect on Teaching - Evidence from the Full Instructor Sample 99 
6.2 Incentive Effect on Research - Evidence from the Selected Sample of 106 
Responsible Professors 
6.3 Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System - Ordered Probit Estimation 114 
6.4 Summary 116 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 140 
References 144 
iv 
List of Figures and Tables 
Figures 
Figure 2.1 Positional Levels and Positional Types 19 
Figure 2.2 Structure of the Positional Pay 20 
Figure 3.1 Incentive-maintaining Prize Structure 32 
Figure 5.1 Relationship between Data Sets 91 
Figure 5.2.1 Trend of the Mean Student Rating Score of Teaching 92 
Figure 5.2.2 Number of Articles for Responsible Professors, 1999 and 2003 93 
Figure 5.3.1 Distribution of Total Income in Academic Year 1998 (Box-plot) 94 
Figure 5.3.2 Distribution of Base Salary in Academic Years 1999- 2003 (Box-plot) 95 
Figure 5.3.3 Distribution of Total Income in Academic Years 1999-2003 (Box-plot) 96 
Figure 5.3.4 Distribution of Teaching Output in Positional Level across 1999-2003 97 
Figure 5.3.5 Distribution of Teaching Output in Positional Level 1999-2003(Box-plot) 98 
Tables 
Table 2.1 Chronology of the Pay-by-position Scheme 口 
Table 2.2 Positional Types and Job Responsibilities 
Table 5.1 Definition of Variables 75 
Table 5.2.1 Summary Statistics for Personal and Educational Characteristics Each 79 
Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Table 5.2.2 Summary Statistics for Work Experience Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 80 
Table 5.2.3 Summary Statistics for Professional Characteristics Each Academic Year, 81 
1998-2003 
Table 5.2.4 Summary Statistics for the Distribution of Staff among Academic Units 82 
Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Table 5.2.5 Distribution of Positional Levels during Academic Years 1999-2003 83 
Table 5.2.6 Summary Statistics for Compensation Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 84 
V 
Table 5.2.7 Summary Statistics for Performance Each Academic Year, 1999-2003 85 
Table 5.3.1 Dispersion in Base Salary, Positional Pay and Total Income Each 86 
Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Table 5.3.2 Base Salary, Positional Pay and Total Income of Different Position Levels 88 
and the Pay Spread between Adjacent Levels Pooled across 1999-2003 
Table 5.3.3 Summary Statistics for the Pay Spread and Average Pay Spread Each 89 
Academic Year, 1999-2003 
Table 5.3.4 Frequency of Promotion and Demotion in the Positional Hierarchy, 2000- 90 
2003 
Table 6.1.la Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Time Trend Effect on 118 
Teaching Performance (without Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Table 6.1.16 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Time Trend Effect on 120 
Teaching Performance (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Table 6.1.2a Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 122 
Teaching Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV’ or 
RMD, as measure of Incentives (without Controlling for the Ability 
Variables) 
Table 6A.2b Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 123 
Teaching Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or 
RMD, as measure of Incentives (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Table 6.1.3a Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 125 
Teaching Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional 
Levels as measure of Incentives (without Controlling for the Ability 
Variables) 
Table 6.1.3b Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 127 
Teaching Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional 
Levels as measure of Incentives (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Table 6.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 129 
Research Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or 
RMD, as measure of incentives 
Table 6.2.2a Heckman Two-stage Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 130 
Research Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or 
RMD, as measure of incentives 
vi 
Table 6.2.2b First Stage Results of the Heckman Two-stage Regression of Specification 132 
1 in Table 6.2.2a 
Table 6.23a Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 134 
Research Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional 
Levels as Measure of Incentives 
Table 6.2.3b Heckman Two-stage Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 136 
Research Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional 
Levels as Measure of Incentives 
Table 6.3 Ordered Probit Estimations of the Determinants of Positional Level 138 




In the late 1990s, the universities in China begun to reform their compensation 
and incentive systems, which can be viewed as a response to the trend of rewarding 
the faculty in the international academic world. In fact, finding a way to motivate and 
compensate academics is a worldwide issue that university policy makers have long 
been facing. This issue has been considered to be an important factor in achieving an 
institution's goals (Sutton & Burgerson 2001). In order to achieve their institutional 
goals and adapt to the changing environment, universities in China have launched a 
dramatic change in the compensation and incentive system since 1990s. The 
mainstream in this undergoing reform is the pay-by-position system (gang wei jin tie 
zhi du) which is in nature an incentive structure of tournament. 
The change in the universities' incentive policy has raised a series of questions 
like - Why do the leading universities choose the tournament-type of incentive 
structure? What is the mechanism of such compensation system? More importantly, 
what is the impact of the incentive change on the faculty and does it influence the 
productivity and output of the employees? Or, is it consistent with what the theory of 
tournament predicts? These related questions are of interest not only to the university 
policy makers but also to labor economists. 
The present study examines the incentive effect of the pay-by-position system on 
the academic productivity and the sorting role of such system by using data collected 
from a case university which has been under the compensation reform. The first test 
concerns the effect of the incentives offered in the pay structure on teaching and 
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research. The hypotheses that the study tests are that the increase of pay dispersion 
improves the faculty's efforts and thus boosts the output in teaching and research; 
also, the higher the pay spread in the positional hierarchy, the more productive is the 
faculty. Correspondingly, we use both aggregate and individual measures of 
incentives. The aggregate level measures include gini coefficient, coefficient of 
variation, and relative mean deviation., while the individual level measures comprise 
pay spread, i.e. the pay increase if one would move up one positional level, and 
average pay spread, i.e. the average absolute change in pay if one would consider 
either a promotion or a demotion of one level. In the second test, we employ the 
ordered probit model to examine whether the faculty are sorted by their ability and 
past performance to each positional level. 
The current research fits well into the literature of the tournament theory. In the 
setting of the tournament theory, agents exert effort in order to get promoted to a 
better paid position, where the reward associated with that position is fixed and 
where there is competition among agents for those positions (Lazear 1996; Gibbons 
1996; and Predergast 1999). Also, tournament-type pay structure is viewed to be able 
to "kill two birds with one stone" (Prendergast 1999). It not only sorts talented 
workers to higher ranks but also provides incentives (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 
1988). According to the literature, the tournament theory has three essential features. 
First, prizes in the tournament are fixed in advance and are independent of absolute 
performance but depend on relative performance. Second, a person's promotion to a 
higher positional level is determined by the relative performance compared with 
other competitors or based on some standards for that position, and not by his or her 
absolute performance. Third, incentives come from the pay differential associated 
with the promotion, not from the increase of the pay level. If pay levels of all 
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workers are raised whereas pay spread not changed, there will be no incentives for 
workers to make further endeavors. For the multi-level and multi-player tournament, 
the pay structure will be convex so as to maintain the incentives for competitors to 
inspire for higher positions. 
The incentive reform at the case university provides a natural experiment for us 
to investigate the incentives for academics under the framework of the tournament 
theory. The pay-by-position scheme at the case university resembles a tournament 
depicted by the theory of tournament in the following aspects. First, the pay slots in 
the pay-by-position structure are set ex ante and pay levels are determined by the 
relative position in the job hierarchy. The number of positions in the hierarchy is 
limited and there is a quota for the positional level so that faculty members have to 
compete for higher positions and higher payments. For example, the professors at the 
top two levels account for approximately 17% each year and their pay are amongst 
the highest. Second, in our case, the faculty members are assessed and compared 
according to the criteria for different position levels for the pay-by-position scheme. 
The university sets standards and requirements for different positional level and 
types. The better performers are appointed to higher positions. Third, the 
pay-by-position reform at the case university has fundamentally changed the pay 
structure and the new pay structure manifests explicitly a convex curvature. The level 
of positional pay is increasing with an incremental slope in the positional hierarchy; 
especially, the marginal increment in the inter-level pay spread at the top of the 
positional ladder is as large as three times of that at lower levels. Finally, the policy 
makers at the case university expect the convex pay structure to both deliver 
incentives and to sort faculty according to their ability and performance, which is 
consistent with the logic expressed in the tournament theory. 
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Our findings strongly support the theory of tournament. First, we find that the 
pay-by-position reform has a huge impact on improving teaching performance. The 
teaching evaluation score has increasingly risen since the implementation of the 
pay-by-position reform launched in 1999. In comparison to the implementation year, 
after controlling for fixed effect and other factors that may influence teaching 
performance, the teaching evaluation score rose on average two points in 2001, three 
points in 2002，and four points in 2003. Second, we find that the incentive effect on 
faculty productivity in both teaching and research is significantly positive. More 
dispersed pay structure leads to higher academic productivity in both teaching and 
research. This conclusion is robust for alternative measures of pay dispersion such as 
gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean deviation. We also find 
that the raise in the pay spread between adjacent positional levels results in higher 
output in both teaching and research, which indicates that the tournament-type pay 
structure does provide effective incentives. Finally, we also find strong evidence of 
the sorting function in the pay-by-position system. The ordered probit estimation 
results suggest that being stuck on previous academic ranks for more years, which 
implies lower ability, will lower the probability for the individual to win a position in 
the pay-by-position system and less likely to get the top level. Being selected as a 
pilot-pay receiver before the incentive reform or being promoted to higher positional 
level during the previous academic year, which indicates better past performance, 
will increase the probability to win higher positions. 
This study is one of the few empirical tests of the tournament theory using data 
from academics and provides new evidence supporting the tournament theory. 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1988，1990) briefly discuss in their empirical studies on 
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tournament that college professors can be considered as competitors to get promoted 
and win tenure in the promotion rivalry. They point out that devising ways to 
empirically address the relevance of tournament theory rank high on the research 
agenda of economists interested in the compensation issue. However, empirical 
studies on incentives for academics using tournament model have been quite few so 
far. Our study provides a vivid case to the literature for compensating academics that 
matches well with the design of the tournament theory. 
Our research may also be the first study of incentives in the academy using data 
from a transitional or developing country. Our findings have important policy 
implications for rewarding academics in such countries. Changing the egalitarian and 
compressed pay structure into a tournament-type pay structure can be an effective 
option for universities in a transitional economy to reform their compensation and 
incentive system. Further, the encouraging results provide support for policy makers 
in universities in China to carry forward their ongoing reform. When changing the 
traditional academic rank system at the next reform stage, the university policy 
makers should make efforts to maintain the tournament features in the new academic 
rank system. 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. After the introductory chapter, 
chapter two gives a description of the pay-by-position reform at the case university. 
Chapter three explains the analytical framework and reviews the literature. Chapter 
four presents the empirical models and hypotheses. Chapter five deals with the data 
and makes a statistic analysis. Chapter six reports the estimation results. Finally, the 
last chapter concludes the study. 
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Chapter 2 
PAY-BY-POSITION SYSTEM: INCENTIVE REFORM AT THE CASE 
UNIVERSITY 
2.1 Background of the Pay-by-position Scheme 
The pay-by-position scheme at the case university is an incentive reform owing 
to the new institutional goal and changing environment. A significant increase in 
financing that comes mainly from the appropriation of the central government, 
research grants from national and provincial/ministerial science and R&D funds, and 
revenue from the technology transfer market, may be the most important 
environmental change experienced by the case university like most other top-tier 
universities in China in late 1990s. At the same time, a new organizational goal, to 
build a world-class university, had been proposed in an attempt to set a new vision 
and improve its national and international role in the 21®^  century. For the case 
university, the goal of being established as a world-class university means to serve 
the best the nation for her renaissance in the new century as well as to play an active 
role in the international academy for the peace and development of the world. Under 
such an organizational and environmental background, the case university has 
launched a profound and far-reaching personnel and compensation reform since late 
1990s. 
Reforming the personnel and incentive system is also encouraged and backed up 
by the central government. A guiding document issued by the Ministry of Education 
together with the Ministry of Personnel and the Organization Department of the CPC 
Central Committee in June 2000 says: 
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Higher education institutions should pro-actively try to construct at the 
institutional level a new income distribution system whose main characteristics 
should be pay-by-position. Pay should be determined mainly by position and 
corresponding job responsibilities. Most importantly, such pay structure should 
relatively concentrate on and in favor of key positions and outstanding performers 
(Ministry of Education, Ministry of Personnel, and the Organization Department of 
the CPC Central Committee 2000，p. 6). 
The traditional academic rank hierarchy in many of China's universities has long 
been criticized because it lacks an effective rule to encourage competition and link 
competitors' pay with their position in the relative ranking of performance and talent. 
That is the reason why the university policy makers design and launch the 
pay-by-position system to pave the way to reform the old academic rank system. 
It has been remarkably addressed by policy makers of universities in China that the 
compensation system and the related system of academic rank promotion before the 
reform lacked competition and incentives and, in the meantime, was encumbered 
with all demerits and cumbrances that state-owned enterprises suffered during 
planned economy era (He 2000). 'Iron rice-bowl' (tie fan wan) and 'communal pot' 
(da guo fan), which means no competition and no elimination, and egalitarianism, 
respectively, are basic features of such academic promotion system. An academic 
rank was faculty's life-long identification and its link with academic performance 
became weaker and weaker. The consequence was the loss of incentives in the old 
academic rank system. The defective characteristics of the former academic 
personnel system include that, for instance, faculty are promoted only by seniority 
without serious assessment on their past performance; there is hardly demotion or 
elimination in the promotion game; there is no competition from outside (Zhang 
2003). 
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Pay-by-position system is the core of the personnel and compensation reform at 
the case university. It aims to abolish thoroughly the defects in the old academic 
personnel and compensation system and build up a new compensation system 
encouraging competition, linking positional pay with relative performance, and thus 
providing effective incentives. Policy makers at the case university stressed that the 
reform was not to raise wage across-the-board, but to increase the income 
comparatively in favor of those who were more talented and contributive (The 
President's Office 1999，PartII-4). Apart from that the general pay levels are raised, a 
more remarkable change caused by the pay-by-position reform is that it reshapes the 
compensation structure and enlarges the pay dispersion by sorting faculty along the 
new positional hierarchy according to their talent and ability. The pay dispersion 
across and within former academic ranks begins to vary, which makes the new pay 
structure override the former academic promotion system in influencing faculty 
behavior. With the introduction of positional pay (gang wei jin tie), which accounts 
for the main part of faculty income and is determined exclusively by positional level 
in the new job hierarchy, the level and composition of faculty income is changed 
fundamentally. At the same time, with its incentive role and sorting function in mind, 
the policy makers expect such reform to lead to the increase in faculty performance 
and the betterment in the composition of the faculty team. This is an incremental 
regulation of the pay structure which emphasizes raising the pay level relatively for 
faculty who are promoted to higher jobs in the new hierarchy. 
Consequently, two basic institutional changes have been set in the new system. 
One is to increase the pay variance and spread between different positions; another is 
to compensate comparatively in favor of those faculty members who are more 
capable and more productive by assigning them to higher positions in the new job 
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hierarchy (He 2000). Such kind of compensation and incentive scheme is consistent 
with the pay structure that tournament theory depicts, which will be explained in 
section 2.3. 
2.2 Chronology of the Incentive Change 
The pay-by-position system reform at the case university has so far experienced 
three stages. Table 2.1 shows the chronology of the incentive reform since the 
academic year 1997. 
At the first stage, 1997-1999，a tentative incentive scheme was piloted, which can 
be seen as a pilot scheme of pay-by-position. Several hundreds of key posts for 
teaching and research were set up and qualified full professors (or senior research 
fellow) and associate professors (or associate research fellow) were appointed to 
such posts by the university. 
The second stage went from 1999 through 2002. On the basis of the preparatory 
two-year period of the pilot incentive scheme, in the fall semester of 1999 academic 
year, the pay-by-position scheme was formally launched. Since the reform entered 
into the second stage, each staff member has been involved in the university-wide 
compensation and incentive reform. Everyone is pushed to compete with colleagues 
to win a position in the new job ranking system. Owing to the limitation of available 
higher positions or pay slots, those disadvantageous or incapable individuals will 
become losers in the competition and hence will get only lower positions or even be 
eliminated from the game. 
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The third stage began in the spring of 2002 and exists currently. Beginning in 
March of 2002，schools and departments were allowed to offer extra pay to their 
faculty in order to adapt to disciplinary differences in the academic labor market. As 
a general policy, the level and structure of positional pay is the same for all schools 
and departments. Nevertheless, the extra pay offered at the school or department 
level can serve as a matching pay corresponding to the positional pay stipulated and 
provided by the university authority so that the variation across schools and 
departments in response to the varied disciplinary needs is also incorporated into the 
pay-by-position system. 
In the fall of 2003 academic year, the university made a statement on the reform 
of the old academic rank system. At the same time, the Department of Personnel 
Affairs of the university administration announced a preliminary scenario on the new 
academic rank system. It has not been enacted so far. The university's intention was 
to deliver a clear signal to its faculty that, with the progress of the pay-by-position 
system, the current academic rank system will also be reformed thoroughly when the 
appropriate situation comes. 
The incentive reform has changed the composition of the faculty's income. 
Before the reform, the faculty's income mainly comprised of salary, which consisted 
of quite a few trivial components. However, the total pay level was low and the pay 
spread within and between different academic ranks was compressed. Though bonus 
was also granted at the school or department level, the principle of its standard and 
amount was not so clear and the university policy makers worried that bonuses may 
not be consistent with the organizational goals and may not reflect faculty 
performance. After the introduction of the pay-by-position system, the faculty's total 
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income institutionally consists of three parts- base salary, positional pay (pilot pay in 
the pilot pay-by-position scheme of 1997 and 1998 academic years), and extra pay 
(beginning in March 2002). Positional pay generally accounts for 60% of the total 
income. Nevertheless, extra pay is also an important part of the income. At some 
schools or departments, e.g. School of Economics and Management and some 
engineering departments, extra pay accounts for a considerably large proportion. 
2.3 Institutional Characteristics of the Pay-by-position System 
Table 2.2 presents the positional type and the corresponding responsibilities. 
Figure 2.1 displays the structure of positional level and positional type. The 
pay-by-position system consists of nine positional levels, named as level one through 
level nine attached with increasing job responsibilities and positional pay (prize), 
respectively. Across the nine position levels, the university categorizes positions into 
six job types, namely responsible professor (position type-I), key teaching post 
(position type-II), key research post (position type-Ill), school or department key 
post (position type-IV), school or department common post (position type-V), and 
key administrative post (position type-VI), respectively. Position type-I, type-II, 
type-Ill and type VI are appointed and assessed by the university authority, whereas 
type-IV and type-V are appointed and assessed by the school or department 
administration. 
The reason why the university has categorized positions into six types comes 
from the fact that faculty production generally consists of a triad of teaching, 
research and service, but not every individual can accomplish such threesome 
production activities equally. This is due to the difference in preference, ability and 
time allocation. A more realistic approach is to allocate different faculty groups and 
11 
let them invest their time and effort relatively concentrating on one or two aspects of 
the triad. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 indicate that the responsible professors belong to a 
special and important faculty group. They are incumbents of the top positional levels 
receiving the highest positional pay. As their position title indicates, they take the 
most important responsibilities and accountabilities. They are required not only to 
perform well in both teaching and research, but also to play a leading role in the 
academic development and indulge in activities such as planning, organization and 
execution of curriculum, research and young faculty fostering. They are supposed to 
be the most versatile and productive members of the faculty. But, in reality, not every 
faculty member can play such an all-round and versatile role. That is the reason why 
the university sets specifically the key teaching post and the key research post both 
of which emphasize teaching-orientation or research-orientation, respectively. 
Actually, key posts at school or department level are also divided into such two 
oriented groups. However, such a categorization does not mean that faculty members 
in one category do not set foot in other academic production activities at all. 
The main force of the faculty comprises of the four types of jobs from position 
type-I through position type-IV, namely responsible professor post, key teaching post, 
key research post, and school/department key post. This study mainly covers position 
type-I to IV and investigate the impact of the incentive scheme on the faculty 
members who fall into such four groups. (Key administrative post relates to senior 
administrators and school/department common posts are mainly related to lower 
administrative and supporting staff or junior faculty. They are beyond the scope of 
interest to this study.) 
The case university's incentive scheme is based on a toumament-type 
compensation structure. The characteristics of the pay-by-position system are 
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consistent with the features prescribed by the tournament theory. According to 
Lazear (1996), the tournament theory has three essential features. First, prizes in the 
tournament are fixed in advance and are independent of absolute performance but 
depend on relative performance. This means that the pay slots are set ex ante and pay 
levels are determined by the relative position in the job hierarchy. Second, a person's 
promotion to a higher positional level is determined by the relative performance 
compared with other competitors or based on some standards for that position, and 
not by his or her absolute performance. Third, incentives come from the pay 
differential associated with the promotion, not from the increase of the pay level. If 
pay levels of all workers are raised whereas pay spread not changed, there will be no 
incentives for workers to make further endeavors. For the multi-level and 
multi-player tournament, the pay structure will be convex so as to maintain the 
incentives for competitors to inspire for higher positions. Convexity of the pay 
structure is considered to be the main characteristic of tournament theory (Eriksson 
1999)，which will lead to normative properties of performance incentives as the next 
chapter demonstrates. 
The pay-by-position system at the case university resembles a tournament in the 
following aspects. First, in the pay-by-position structure, positions and the associated 
payments are designed in advance by the policy makers. The number of positions for 
each level of position is limited. Especially, for higher level of positions, there is 
quota set ex ante by the university authority. For example, in 1999, 800 faculty 
members were appointed to key positions by the university authority and 1500 to key 
positions by school or department administration. Approximately one third of the 
total staff acquired these key positions. Their positional pay ranged from RMB 
8，000 Yuan to RMB 50, 000 Yuan, which was determined by their positional level. 
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Second, faculty members are promoted according to their relative performance 
based upon the standards set by the university. The university stipulates the criteria 
for its staff to compete for different levels and types of positions. The responsibilities 
corresponding to different positional types are listed in Table 2.2. Through a 
competitive selection process, staff members have to be assessed and ranked to a 
position along the positional ladder. After a contract term (1-3 academic years), all 
staff members will be re-assessed and their position level may be re-arranged 
according to the performance ranking results. This would result in promotion, 
demotion or staying with no change in positional level. 
The assessment standards set in the new pay-by-position system does not 
correspond to the old academic rank system which is still running parallel to the 
pay-by-position system; appointment to a new position is determined by the relative 
ability and past performance based upon the responsibility standards, not by seniority 
or the title of the old academic rank. For instance, a professor can be appointed as a 
responsible professor and thus receives a pay at the 8th or 9th level. But, if s/he does 
not meet the requirements for the responsible professor post, s/he may be granted 
only 6th, 5th, 4th or even lower level of positional pay. Meanwhile, one may not 
necessarily proceed upward step by step. An associate professor and even a lecturer 
could earn a positional pay of the 7th or 8th level which may be the same as a 
professor does. 
Third, the pay-by-position reform has changed the faculty pay structure greatly 
and has resulted in a convex relationship between pay and positional level. This is 
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because the design of pay-by-position is inherently a convex structure. Figure 2.2 
shows the structure of the positional pay. We can see that the positional pay rises at 
an increasing rate when one moves upward along the positional ladder. The marginal 
reward to the rise of positional level is increasing. Especially, at the top ranks for 
responsible professors, positional levels 8 and 9，the pay spread jumps obviously. 
The marginal increase in the spread of position pay between adjacent positional 
levels is RMB 1,000 Yuan for each position lower than level 8. More strikingly, at 
level 8 and beyond, the position pay becomes steeper and leaps with a jumping rate. 
When one ascends from level 7 to level 8，the marginal increase in the pay spread 
jumps from RMB 1,000 Yuan to 3,000 Yuan. Obviously, such an institutional 
characteristic provides pay-by-position system a clear convex incentive structure. 
The objectives of the university's policy makers in designing such a convex pay 
structure are to motivate faculty to improve their productivity in both research and 
teaching and at the same time to select talented faculty members to higher positions 
and more important jobs. 
Based on the above institutional characteristics, the pay-by-position system can 
be seen as a tournament with multiple prizes (payments for different positional levels) 
and a large number of contesting agents (faculty members). Due to the tournament 
features, the pay-by-position scheme is expected to resulted in the profound and 
far-flung influence on faculty in terms of its incentive effect on academic 
productivity as well as its selection or sorting function based upon faculty's ability 




In this chapter, we have described the background and development of the 
incentive reform at the case university and discussed the institutional characteristics 
of the pay-by-position system. In order to establish a compensation system that 
provides effective incentives and selects faculty on the basis of their ability and 
performance, the case university designed and implemented the pay-by-position 
scheme. It has three essential features: a) the pay slots along the positional ladder are 
fixed in advance; b) a faculty member's promotion is determined by his or her 
relative performance based upon the job standards set by the university; c) the 
structure of the positional pay is designed as convex. Such basic characteristics make 
the pay-by-position system resemble the scenario described by the theory of 
tournament which will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
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Table 2.1 Chronology of the Pay-by-position Scheme 
STAGE I 11 III 
PERIOD Sep 1997- Sep 1999- Mar Mar 2002- present Sep 2003 
Sep1999 2002 
As a pilot scheme, Pay-by-position Schools and A scenario on 
EVENT some teaching and system was set up departments were a new 
research key posts and implemented allowed by the academic 
were set up and university-wide, university authority rank system 
corresponding to issue extra pay, as was 
position pay was matching to the announced 
granted to professors positional pay, which but not 
and associate is also an important enacted, 
professors who took part of faculty s 
such pilot posts. income. 
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Table 2.2 Positional Types and Job Responsibilities 
Positional Appointment 
Name Main Responsibilities Appointed by 
Type Term/Years 
Play a leading role in planning, organization and 
execution of academic development including 
Responsible President of the 
I curriculum, research and young faculty fostering in 1-3 
Professor University 
addition to undertaking his/her own teaching and 
research tasks 
Teaching and curriculum development; research is 
II Key Teaching Post also required for those who graduated after 1982 University 1 
with a bachelor degree 
To conduct basic research; or 
Being head or deputy head of key research center 
or lab; or 
III Key Research Post Being principal investigator of key research University 1 
project; or 
Being head or deputy head of university academic 
supporting program or unit 
School/Dept. Key To undertake teaching or research tasks arranged School/ 
IV 1-3 
Post by the school or department department 
To undertake assistant teaching or research or 
School/Dept. School/ 
V provide common administrative or public services 1-3 
Common Post department 
arranged by the school or department 
As head or deputy head, to undertake leadership 
Key Administrative 
VI responsibilities at the university administrative University 1-3 
Post department or at schools/ departments 
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Responsible Key Teching Key Research School/Dept School/Dept Key Adminstrative 
Professor Post Post Key Post Common Post Post 
(Type-I) (Type-II) (Type-Ill) (Type-IV) (Type-V) (Type-VI) 
Note: The block corresponds to the scope of positional level for different positional types. 
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Figure 2.2 Structure of the Positional Pay 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 A Brief Introduction to the Theory of Tournament 
The theory of tournament has been studied considerably since Lazear and Rosen 
published their seminal article in 1981 (see Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1982, 
1986; Green and Stokey 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglits 1983; Ehrenberg and Bagnanno 
1988, 1990; Backer, Gibbs，Holmstrom 1994a, 1994b, and Lazear 1996 among 
others). This literature has a common theme that incentives are paid to competitors or 
agents according to their rank or relative performance. In contrast to the 
compensation scheme based upon individual output level such as the familiar 
practice under competitive conditions that workers are paid the value of their 
marginal products, compensating workers on the basis of their relative position in the 
firm will be an efficient provision of incentives and even sometimes superior to 
common compensation schemes such as piece rate. This makes paying salaries 
resemble prizes in sports tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
Though there are many ways to compensate workers according to their 
individual performance such as piece rate, options, discretionary bonuses, profit 
sharing, efficiency wage, deferred compensation, among others, promotion, or 
rewarding workers through their relative positions in job hierarchy is still the most 
common means of provision of incentives (Predergast 1999). A general observation 
on compensation in firms is that many organizations have a triangular structure and 
most top level managers come up through the ranks to attain higher ranking and 
more remunerative positions (Rosen 1986). To a large extent, firms primarily provide 
incentives through the prospect of promotion, which provides wage increase to 
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workers who earn higher ranking in the hierarchy (Predergast 1999). This is also the 
case in the compensation system for academics where they receive reward through 
ascending the academic ranks over their career cycle. College professors can be 
thought as competitors to get promoted and win tenure in the promotion rivalry 
(Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1988，1990). 
As Prendergast (1999) points out in his survey paper on incentives provision, 
tournament theory considers a group of agents competing for a fixed set of prizes 
that have been specified in advance and agents exert efforts to increase the likelihood 
to win a better prize. All that matters for winning is not the absolute level of 
performance, but how well one does relative to others. Also, extra weight on 
top-ranking prizes is required to induce competitors to aspire to higher goals 
independent of past achievements. At the same time, payments at the top have 
indirect effects of increasing productivity of competitors further down the 
hierarchical ladder (Rosen 1986). As individuals move up along the job ladders, the 
spread in payment increases along the position levels. This is because the value of 
winning not only is the winner's prize at that level but also includes the value of 
possibility to compete for larger prizes at higher levels (Eriksson 1999). For instance, 
the high salary for CEO may have incentives for all individuals in the firm. Also, 
toumament-type pay structure is viewed to be able to "kill two birds with one stone" 
(Prendergast 1999). It not only provides incentives but also sorts talented workers to 
higher ranks (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988). 
3.2 A Simple Model of Homogeneous Two-contestant Tournament 
Following Lazear and Rosen (1981)’s model, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1988), 
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Lazear (1996), Ericksson (1999) and Prendergast (1999) have simplified a 
tournament model with two players which captures the essence of the incentive 
problem in tournament and thus can serve as an analytical framework to examine the 
incentive effect of the toumament-type of compensation. Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
(1988) also extend the model to incorporate heterogeneous players with different 
abilities. Their models provide simple but insightful analytics that can derive 
meaningful implications by the theory of tournament. Though there is an extension to 
multi-competitors tournaments (see Green and Stokey 1983), the two-player model is 
still meaningful and effective as the basis for empirical work in this study. As 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1988，1999) put it, the two-player model could be seen as 
that one competes with the rest of the field and the implications will not be changed. 
In the models of Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1988), Lazear (1996)，Ericksson 
(1999) and Prendergast (1999, there are two identical agents, denoted j and k and two 
levels of ranks, winner and loser. The principal sets the rule of tournament: 
(i) a prize is given to the winner, W/； 
(ii) a prize is given to the loser, W2； 
(iii) the winner is the agent who produces larger output (or conducts better 
performance). 
Given a prize differential for winning, each agent is assumed to choose his 
effort level to maximize his probability to win. Given the assumption that agents are 
homogeneous, each agent assumes that his opponent is choosing his own optimal 
effort level. Finally, it is also assumed that the marginal cost of efforts is positive and 
increasing. Then the output of each agent can be represented by 
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Q/= U,- + 6+ e i,i=j,k (3.1) 
where Q, is agent /，s output or performance in a tournament, which depends on the 
agent /，s effort level U 5 reflects the specific factors in the tournament (e.g., at the 
case university, factors influenced by schools/ departments or academic years.) e 
is a random error such as luck. Given other factors constant, increase in agent's 
efforts will result in higher performance level in Q/. In the context of this study, it 
means higher level of performance in teaching and research. 
Under the above set of assumptions, the optimal strategy for agent /，s behavior 
is to maximize the following expected utility: 
p[W/ - c( U /)] + (1 - p)[W2- c ( U , ) ] = pW/ + ( l - p ) W 2 - c( y /) (3.2) 
where p is agent 厂s probability of wining, e.g., Q, > Qk, which depends on /，s effort 
level U c ( U /) is the cost function of effort U /. 
The first-order condition is 
(W 广 W2) (d p / a U / ) - c ' ( U /) = 0 (3.3) 
Note that the probability that agent j defeats k is given by 
p = Prob ( Uy + £ y> li " + £ = Prob(Uy 一U 々  > e k- ^ j) 
2 4 
where G is the normal cumulative distribution function on random variable £ a- - £ ；. 
If we assume a Nash-Cournot equilibrium that each agent conceives his 
opponent is choosing his/her own optimal effort level, we obtain 
a p / a u y = a G ( U y - u ^ ) / a U / = g(Uy -u^ t ) 
a p / a u k = aG(u a u = ^t-t^；) (3.4) 
Substituting (3.4) into the first-order condition (3.3) gives 
(W/ -W2) g ( U y - P ; t ) = c ' (Uy) 
(Wy-W2) g ( y = (a k) (3.5) 
Since g( U； - U = g( U t^ - ./)，c' (l^y) equals c ' ( U k), which implies that 
U y = U Therefore, the Nash-Cournut equilibrium effort for each agent will reach 
the point that each one exerts the same level of effort and perceives to be equally 
likely to win. So, (3.5) reduces to 
(W/ -W2) g(0) = c ' (U/ ) (3.6) 
Taking derivative gives 
a u / a ( W / - W 2 ) = g ( 0 ) / c " ( U / ) > o (3.7) 
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(see, Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1988，Lazear 1996，and Prendergast 1999.) 
Equation (3.7) implies that agent's effort is increasing in the size of the prize spread 
for winning if other things remain equal. 
Therefore, equation (3.1) can be rewritten as 
Q/= U , ( W / - W 2 ) + 6+ e iJ=j, k (3.8) 
This is the homogeneous two-contestant tournament model. It says that the agent's 
output depends on the prize spread and the specific factors in the tournament. If the 
two contestants are academics, their output in teaching and research will depend on 
the preset pay spread for winning a position they are competing for and the factors 
relating to their competition environment they work in. 
The basic implication from the model (3.8) is that greater prize differential leads 
to more efforts and thus higher productivity, holding other conditions constant; 
whereas increase in levels of the prizes do not affect effort levels if keeping the prize 
differential unchanged. 
3.3 Implications under Heterogeneous Contestants and Multi-position-level 
Situation 
When incorporating heterogeneity in the player's own ability and his/her 
opponent's ability into the above homogeneous-player model, the basic plot of the 
tournament story does not change. A greater purse spread for winning will result in 
more efforts and thus higher output level. The difference from the homogeneous 
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model is that a player's effort and output level will also depend on his/her own 
ability and his/her competitor's ability (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1988, 1999). Thus 
model (3.8) will be extended as 
Qi = ti i((W； - W2), A,o’ A,-e)+ S + e =j, k (3.9) 
where A/�and A,�denote individual /，s own ability and his/her competitors' or "the 
rest of the field's "ability, respectively. 
In the case where there are several positional levels within the firm, tournament 
theory predicts a similar implication that there will be an increasing pay structure in 
pay spread between positional levels as the individuals move up along the corporate 
ladders in order to maintain performance incentives. According to the tournament 
model, it is the pay structure that stimulates the incentives. It is the variance or 
dispersion in the pay structure or the convexity in the pay structure, and not the 
across-the-board wage raise that translates the incentives into efficiency in 
production. The equilibrium level of efforts made by competitors is increasing in the 
prize spread between winners and losers. Therefore, incentives come from the pay 
differentials when one endeavors to move up to the higher ranks. Increase in the pay 
level of each competitor will not affect efforts level, ceteris paribus, as long as prize 
differentials are kept unchanged (Eriksson 1999). 
It must be noted that, apart from the increasing pay in the pay structure, an extra 
weight on top-ranking prizes is required to induce competitors to aspire to higher 
goals independent of past performance (Rosen 1986). According to Rosen (1986), a 
typical incentive maintaining prize structure, depicted in solid line, is presented in 
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Figure 3.1. The prize rises proportionately with a constant inter-rank spread in lower 
ranks, but the prize at the top-rank jumps distinctly. In a corporate hierarchy the 
pass-through rate may fall at each successive rank in the promotion competition, 
higher ranking position are more demanding, and the option value of future's prize 
may discount, therefore the inter-rank spreads must be increasing, which increase the 
convexity of the rank/reward structure (Rosen 1986). A more attractive structure is of 
a curvature with an increasing slope in the entire positional hierarchy, especially with 
a jumping slope at the top position. The dashed line in Figure 3.1 indicates the more 
convex pay structure. In the corporate hierarchical environment, inter-rank spreads 
must be increasing to undo the incentive dilution effects，which increase the 
convexity of the reward structure (Rosen 1986). Consequently, there will be a convex 
relationship between pay and positional level and also a more dispersed pay structure 
across the whole positional hierarchy, which will have positive impact on efforts and 
hence productivity level according to the theory of tournament. More interestingly, 
the pay structure shown in Figure 3.1 well predicts the convex shape of the pay 
structure of the pay-by-position system, shown in Figure 2. 
3.4 Status Quo of Existing Research 
Though the tournament model is beyond academic interest and applicable not 
only to sports tournaments but also to many professional workers such as executives, 
managers, sales persons and college professors, empirical literature on tournament 
models is still not large. The insufficiency in the attempts to test the theory of 
tournament is mainly due to the difficulty in collecting data both on effort or output 
levels of agents who do complicated work and on the compensation structure they 
face. 
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Existing empirical studies on tournament models are, to a large extent, restricted 
to corporate executives or managers (see O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal 1988; Lenard 
1990; Main et al. 1993; Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt 1993; Lazear 1992; Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994a; Eriksson 1999，among others) or professional sports 
men (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1988，1990; Becker and Huselid 1992). If there are a 
few studies outside the above arena, an example is empirical research on the 
performance of broiler chicken producers (Knoeber 1989; Knoeber and Thurman 
1994). Such studies all find strong evidence supporting what tournament theory 
predicts on its incentive effect. Especially, studies on corporate executives have 
shown a convex relationship between pay and hierarchical positional levels. 
Literature on compensation for academics, if not restricted to studies on 
tournament theory, mainly focuses on faculty pay differential due to sex or race and 
wage determinants. Studies from the incentive aspect are still scarce. Some issues 
such as tenure (Carmichael 1988)，pay dispersion (Pfeffer and Langton 1993), and 
incentive change in a multitask environment (Brickley and Zimmerman 2001) have 
been addressed. None of studies on academics have been found concerning 
tournament-type incentive structure. Among studies on pay for academics, in contrast 
to prediction by tournament theory, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) find a negative 
relationship between pay dispersion and productivity and they asserts that 
organizational context may be important for understanding why organizations use 
more or less dispersed pay structure and when dispersion may be advantageous to 
them. Brickley and Zimmerman's (2001) study on the incentive change in a top-tier 
business school shows a strong substitution effect between teaching and research. 
Their study shows evidence that after the launch of an incentive scheme encouraging 
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teaching, faculty's performance in teaching rises but falls in research. Though such 
findings are not consistent with predictions by tournament theory, they can not serve 
as evidence that contradicts tournament theory because none of them provide test on 
the convexity in the pay structure in their studies. 
In addition to its incentive effect, tournament-type incentive structure also 
serves as a sorting device. Promotion in many firms takes the form of the job change, 
in the sense that responsibilities increase with ability (Prendergast 1999; also see 
Rosen 1982; Sattinger 1993). Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1988, 1990) presents 
evidence that more capable players are more likely to get higher positions in 
tournaments. Gibbs (1995), in his study on within-job and promotion-based incentive 
compensation in a corporate hierarchy, provides evidence that promotions serve as 
mechanism of sorting individuals by their ability. Though his study is not to test the 
theory of tournament, his findings are consistent with the inherent logic in 
tournament theory on sorting workers to jobs. 
Responding to the pleas for more empirical work to address the relevance of 
tournament theory (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990) and to distinguish between 
tournament theory and other alternative theories (Gibbons 1996 and Prendergast 
1999)，this study will contribute to the literature testing the theory of tournament and 
examining the incentives for academics with data of a top-tier university from China. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has briefly reviewed the literature of the tournament theory and 
given a simple model of homogeneous two-contestant tournament. This model offers 
the basic implication of the theory of tournament that greater prize differential leads 
30 
to more efforts and thus higher productivity, holding other conditions constant; 
whereas increase in levels of the prizes do not affect effort levels if keeping the prize 
differential unchanged. Under the setting of multi-position-level and 
multi-competitor, the tournament theory predicts a convex pay structure in order to 
maintain the incentives for competitors to aspire for higher positions. Apart from the 
incentive effect on output, the tournament theory also predicts that the 
toumament-type pay structure sorts talented workers to higher ranks on the basis of 
their ability and performance. Based upon the implication from the analytics of 
tournament theory and the institutional objectives of policy makers at the case 
university, empirical equations and hypotheses will be provided in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3.1 Incentive-maintaining Prize Structure 
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Chapter 4 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
The pay-by-position scheme in the case university has reshaped the structure of 
compensation for the faculty. The new incentive structure is self-evidently a convex 
curvature of pay to positional level relationship. By designing such a pay-by-position 
regime based upon relative performance, policy makers aim to enlarge the pay 
dispersion so as to change the pre-reform egalitarian pay pattern; and thus to deliver 
the incentives for faculty to improve the productivity in teaching and research. At the 
same time, policy makers also intend to provide additional incentives to those who 
are more capable, and thus to sort them to higher positional levels. Such policy 
objectives are consistent with the implications derived from the tournament theory 
that more dispersed structure or a convex pay-position shape leads to an increase in 
the effort and hence output level. Further more, promotion also functions as a 
mechanism to sort faculty on the basis of their ability. In order to assess the policy 
effect and to test the predictions of the theory, empirical models and hypotheses to be 
tested are discussed in the following sections. 
4.1 Measurement of Key Variables 
To construct the empirical models, the measurement issue has to be addressed 
first. Under the context of tournament as discussed in this study, three categories of 
variables are important. First, the dependent variables are taken to be faculty 
performance or productivity. Second, the key explanatory variable, pay dispersion or 
pay spread between positional levels, will have to be able to capture the convexity in 
the pay distribution along the job ladders. They should be exogenous because they 
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are set ex ante according to the tournament theory. Third, ability of individuals and 
ability of "the rest of the field" will also have to be measured. Other control variables 
that may be related to academic output will also be accounted for. This study uses 
data obtained from the field survey on personnel, compensation, and academic 
assessment at the case university. All data are collected from related administrative 
departments of the university. 
Performance 
Since 1990s, both teaching and research have been highly emphasized by the 
case university. One of the objectives of the pay-by-position reform is to improve 
teaching as well as research. Therefore, teaching and research are the two aspects of 
faculty output or performance to be explained in this study. Service, though 
important in a modem university, will not be addressed in this study. 
For teaching, mean of student rating scores on courses taught by instructors is 
employed as the measure of teaching performance. In fact, it is not a direct and 
comprehensive measure on teaching. It is the faculty teaching performance that is 
perceived by students. Nevertheless, it can still, to some extent, reflect the faculty's 
level of effort and output in teaching. The mean value of student rating scores on 
courses is calculated and reported by the concerning unit of the university on the 
basis of questionnaire evaluation answered by students who have taken the courses. 
In 1998, the university established the Center of Teaching Research and 
Training which functions as a unit to assess and improve teaching. Since then, 
teaching evaluation has been conducted each term as an important reference for 
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faculty assessment. This helps in acquiring observations for each academic year on 
student rating score on teaching in this study. 
For research, the number of articles published in scholarly journals is employed 
as a measure of the faculty's research performance. This serves practically as an 
important policy indicator for the university to maneuver to encourage and reward 
research and publication. Especially, since 1990s, the university has made efforts to 
encourage international publications. For instance, there was a special university 
fund to reward faculty who published articles in famous international journals such 
as Science, Nature, or other top journals indexed by Science Citation Index (SCI), 
Engineering Index (EI) and Index to Scientific & Technical Proceedings (ISTP). 
In this study, three variables are used to measure research. One variable is 
domestic publications, i.e., number of articles that are published in national core 
journals. Another variable is international publications, i.e., number of articles that 
are published in international journals. The third variable, a more comprehensive 
measure, i.e., total number of articles published in journals, domestic or international, 
which are indexed or cited by SCI, EI or ISTP. (We have observations on the third 
variable only for individuals in science, technology, engineering and some social 
sciences such as economics). 
In the survey, we only obtained research information for a selected sample of 
responsible professors. Such observations include cumulative three-year publications 
before and after the reform. Research information for other faculty cohorts, however, 
is unavailable in the survey. 
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Pay Dispersion 
In the tournament model, the key policy variable is the prize differential 
between positional levels. Under a multi-competitor and multi-position-level setting, 
the measure of pay dispersion or inequality among competitors could be an 
approximation of the pre-set prize differential in the tournament. In this study, three 
alternative measures of pay dispersion or inequality in terms of yearly total income 
are employed as explanatory variables to capture the incentives at the aggregate level. 
They are gini coefficient, coefficient of variation and relative mean deviation. 
Gini coefficient is a measure generally used in economic research of income 
inequality. It has graphic meaning in a Lorenz diagram in which it is measured by 
dividing the area between the 45 ° line (the perfect equality line) and Lorenz curve 
by the total area lying to the right of the of equality line (Todaro 2000). It ranges 
from 0, indicating the lowest degree of income dispersion (absolute equality), to 
100%, indicating the highest degree of income dispersion (absolute inequality). 
Organizations with higher gini coefficient have more hierarchical pay dispersion 
(Bloom 1999). For a group of people, their gini coefficient can also be expressed 
algebraically as 
Gini = 1 + 1/n + [ 2 / ( n ' f ) ] (Y, + 2Y2 + … + nYj , 
where Yj, i = 1 ... n, is individual /'s income on this group arranged in decreasing 
order of size, Y is mean income of the group, and n is the number of individuals in 
the group (Bloom 1999). It is usually expressed in percentage by multiplying 100. 
Coefficient of variation is also a measure of pay dispersion. It equals to the ratio 
of standard deviation to mean. The sample coefficient of variation (COV) of incomes 
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of a group of people is defined by 
COV = 1 0 0 ( S / f ) , 
where S is the sample standard deviation of incomes and Y is mean income of the 
group. 
Relative mean deviation (RMD) is defined as the absolute mean deviation 
divided by mean. 
RMD = 100(1/n) I Y, - 7 I ) / f , 1=1 
where Yi, i = 1 … n , is individual i's income on this group, Y is mean income of 
the group, and n is number of individuals on the group. 
Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean deviation are all 
relative measure of pay dispersion. They can capture the overall curvature of the pay 
structure on the positional ladder. We compute them for each reference group and 
each academic year. It is assumed that faculty members compete with their 
counterparts within the same academic rank in their academic unit (school or 
department); at the same time, they also face the competition from all the faculty 
members of the entire academic unit each year. Therefore, the reference group that is 
used for computation of the measure of pay dispersion is alternatively the academic 
rank that the individuals belong to in their school or department, or the whole 
academic unit (school or department) that the individuals work in. However, such 
pay dispersion variables are aggregate measures of the incentives; they cannot tell 
the pay spreads between individual positions. Hence, a measure of the incentives at 
the individual level is required. 
37 
Pay Spread 
Inter-position-level pay spread measures the prize spread described by the 
tournament model directly at the individual level. Incentives may drive from the 
increasing prize differential, which is set ex ante, between lower and higher positions 
in the hierarchical ranking. Here the average yearly total income at each positional 
level is used as the purse for that level, which can be viewed as exogenous, to some 
extent, for incumbents of each level. To capture the preset convex prize spread, two 
alternative measures are adopted: pay spread, i.e. the increase in the average yearly 
total income between adjacent positional levels if one moves up one position level, 
and average pay spread, i.e. the average of absolute value of pay differentials when 
one moves up or down to an adjacent level. 
The following formula defines the pay spread at positional level k by 
AUI = I,./ - I a， k = I, 2, . . . , 8 
where I* is the average yearly total income at positional level k within a school or 
department; is the average yearly total income at position level k + 1 within a 
school or department. A UI represents the marginal return at level k when one moves 
up one positional level, which can be seen as the incentives, i.e., the prize spread, for 
level k. We calculate A UI for each positional level for each academic unit (school or 
department) so that every individual in that school or department will face an 
expected marginal return if s/he can get promoted up one level in the job ladder. 
However, one may argue that A UI is not strictly exogenous because if individual 
f s income accounts for a large role in the calculation of I", for example, in the case 
that the school or department is quite small, A UI may be quite sensitive to 
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individual /'s income. Also, for the highest level, like positional level nine, it does 
not make sense because the agent has already been on the top and has no opportunity 
of raise ahead. To address this issue, an alternative measure is employed, of which 
individual /'s income will not enter the computation. Following Ehrenberg and 
Bagnanno (1990) in measuring the marginal return in the golf tournament ranking, 
we define an alternative measure, the average pay spread at positional level k, by 
A M I = [ ( I w - I,) + ( I, - L-；)] / 2 
= ( L . y — I A-/) / 2 ， J c = 2, 3’ . . . . 8 
where AMI assumes that the incumbent at level k considers the benefit from 
improving one positional level and the cost of being demoted one positional level. It 
represents the average absolute change in the average yearly total income when one 
ascends up or lowers down one level. When one is at the lowest level or highest level, 
AMI also makes sense, which means only the benefit from improving one level at 
the lowest level or the cost of being demoted one level from the highest level. 
A M I = I Ik.i — L. I, k = l o w e s t l e v e l , o r 
Ix- — I A--/ I, k = h i g h e s t l e v e l 
Proxy of Ability 
If players are heterogeneous in ability, tournament theory predicts that the 
efforts or output level will be influenced by the player's and his competitors' ability. 
To control for the individual heterogeneity in ability, we have to find proxy variables 
for the individual's own ability and his/her competitors' ability. Hence, a variable, i.e., 
number of years that the individual has spent to earn the current academic rank, or 
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years staying on previous academic ranks, proxies as individual's ability, when other 
variables such as academic rank and age are controlled for. Spending more years for 
a faculty member to earn current academic rank, other things equal, means lower 
ability because sticking down for more years at previous academic ranks means more 
times of pass-over in the assessment for promotion. Considering an example of 
faculty members who fall under the same age category and serve on the same 
academic rank, say two professors of the same age, the person who has spent less 
years serving on previous ranks was promoted to professorial rank earlier than the 
other who spent more years to attain the current rank. Therefore the former is 
considered to be more capable. Mean of the number of years that other colleagues at 
the same level of position have spent to earn their current academic ranks is defined 
as proxy of competitors' ability. 
Past performance also reflects ability. To measure past performance, the variable, 
whether or not being selected as incumbents in the pilot pay-by-position scheme in 
1997-1998 academic years, is used as a long-term indicator of past performance. 
Meanwhile, the variable, the change of positional levels in the position arrangement 
of last academic year is employed as a short-term past performance. 
Information on the above measures is available from the databases provided by 
the university during the survey. Observations on performance variable in teaching 
and research can be obtained directly from the database. Variables of pay dispersion, 
pay spread, and ability are calculated from raw data acquired from the survey. Other 
control variables that may also influence academic performance are available too, 
including education, experience, professional and personal characteristics. 
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4.2 Incentive Effect on Teaching 
In order to estimate the incentive effect on teaching, three kinds of equations are 
constructed. First, time trend effect of the implementation of the incentive scheme is 
examined using year dummies as the explanatory variables. Second, incentive effect 
is tested by employing pay dispersion variables such as gini coefficient, coefficient 
of variation, and relative mean deviation. Third, pay spread variable is also used as 
explanatory variables to capture the effect of incentives. For each kind of equation, 
homogeneity and heterogeneity in ability are dealt with separately. 
4.2.1 Time Trend Effect: An Overview of the Policy Effect 
Firstly, we use mean of teaching evaluation score of the students' ratings on 
courses as the dependent variable and year dummies as explanatory variables to 
indicate the time trend effect of the implementation of policy. Over the pooled 
cross-sectional sample of courses, the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
is to be estimated: 
TSCORE", : bo+ bi Year-dummies, + b i n + bs Y", + 5 � (， (4. 1) 
Equation (4.1) expresses the teaching performance of the instructor i in course j 
during the academic year t. TSCORE/力 is mean teaching evaluation score that 
instructor i acquires in teaching course j during the academic year t. Year-dummies, 
are dummy variables of academic years the sample covers, which are used as 
indicators of the time trend effect of the implementation of pay-by-position incentive 
scheme. The vector, X,,，represents the characteristics of instructor i during year t, 
through which personal and academic characteristics of instructors such as sex, 
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ethnicity, education, age, tenure at the university, academic rank and academic unit 
(school or department) affiliation among others are controlled. Y", denotes the course 
features of course j taught by instructor i during academic year t, through which 
features of courses such as number of students who evaluate the course (proxy for 
class size since direct data on class size is not available) and course type 
(undergraduate or graduate) are controlled. ^ ijt is an error term which captures all 
factors that can not be controlled. 
When individual heterogeneity is taken into consideration, two ability proxies, A/« 
and A"�enter the equation (4.1). Then we have 
TSCORE, .力=Z7yYear-dummies , + Z a " + k ^ ut + b山� + b山 c + ^ ut 
(4. 2) 
where A/„ is defined by the number of years that individual i has spent to earn current 
academic rank and ku indicates the number of mean years for other colleagues at the 
same level of position as individual i to earn their current academic ranks. Here, 
estimating equation (4.2) separately can suggest if the omitted variable bias arises in 
the homogeneous model in equation (4.1). 
Though instructor's characteristics and course features are controlled for，there 
are still unobservable factors of individual instructors that may inf luence the teaching 
evaluation score, such as the instructor's preference for teaching, relationship with 
students in classroom, etc.. Further more, quite a number of instructors taught more 
than one courses in a single academic year. Also, some taught in sequential years but 
some did not. Thus we observe course "clusters" over the sample period taught by 
the same individual instructors. An unobservable "cluster" effect might exist due to 
such factors. Such unobservable factors are unchanged with time and irrelevant to the 
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pay-by-position scheme. In order to control for such unobserved effect, a fixed effect 
model which is presented below needs also to be estimated. Note that individual i 
taught c o u r s e j = 1, 2, in academic year t. For all courses jt taught by 
individual i, a within-group transformation is conducted in fixed effect model to set 
off unobserved fixed effect. Then, a fixed effect model will be 
TSCORE", = bo + Z?yYear-dummies^ + + baXijt + a； + S � �， ( 4 . 3 ) 
In equation (4.3)，a,- denotes the fixed effect. Note that variables that do not 
change with time such as sex, ethnicity, education, school or department affiliation 
will not be entered into the fixed effect model. Neither do ability proxies and such 
variables as age and tenure because year dummies have accounted for all changes 
caused by time. 
In the equations (4.1)�(4.3)，the policy makers' expectation is that the faculty 
teaching performance increases with the progress of the incentive change over the 
sample period. Also, instructors with higher ability should perform better. Hence, we 
justify the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1.1: The implementation of the pay-by-position incentive 
scheme has a positive time trend effect on teaching performance 
measured by students'ratings (bi>0, and increasing in time). 
Hypothesis 1.2: The higher the ability of an instructor, the higher 
his/her rating score in teaching (bht <0); the lower the ability of the 
instructor's competitors, the higher his/her rating score in teaching 
(b5>0). 
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4.2.2 Incentive Effect on Teaching Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the 
Measure of Incentives 
The hypothesis on the time trend effect can not capture exactly the incentive 
effect of the pay-by-position structure although the year dummy indicators make 
somewhat sense. A close attention should focus on the incentive property that the 
toumament-type pay structure has. 
The main outcome of the pay-by-position incentive reform is that the pay 
structure becomes much more dispersed than the pre-reform era and the 
egalitarianism and compression in pay has been changed. The degree of pay 
dispersion varies across academic units (school or department), within academic 
ranks of the schools or departments, and across academic years. Such a variation in 
pay dispersion makes it meaningful to estimate the incentive effect of the pay 
structure on teaching performance to test what the theory of tournament predicts. 
According to the tournament theory, a more dispersed pay structure will lead to 
higher performance in teaching. Therefore, an estimation of the effect of pay 
dispersion on teaching evaluation score may approximately capture the basic 
property inherent in the tournament pay structure. After controlling for personal and 
course characteristics, the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) model is as follows. 
TSC0RE,7( = Co + C / P a y - d i s p e r s i o n " + c^X" + C3 Y.jt + 5,).,’ (4. 4) 
where Pay-dispersion,t is the measure of the degree of pay dispersion within an 
academic unit or within the academic rank in the unit that faculty member i faces 
during academic year t. In the estimation, the pay dispersion varialbe will be 
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represented alternatively by gini coefficient, coefficient of variation and relative 
mean deviation of yearly total income. Again, the vectors, X" and Y",，denotes the 
characteristics of instructor i, and the course features of course j taught by instructor i 
during academic year t’ respectively. S is the error term. 
Equation (4.4) tests no more than the homogeneous model in equation (3.8). 
After incorporating proxies of ability, it is rewritten by 
TSCORE/yt = Co + C / P a y - d i s p e r s i o n " + c’/ht �c ^ i j t + C4 A/„ + Cskic^ ^ijt 
(4. 5) 
where A/„ is again defined by the number of years that individual i has spent to earn 
current academic rank and kjc indicates the number of mean years for other 
colleagues at the same level of position as individual i to earn their current academic 
ranks. Equation (4.5) corresponds to the heterogeneous model in equation (3.9). 
Hence, estimating equation (4.5) can suggest if there is any difference in the 
estimates of homogeneous and heterogeneous models, or if the incentive effect is 
sensitive to omitting the variable of ability. 
Similar to the equation (4.3) in section 4.2.1, if the unobservable effect due to the 
course "cluster", course jt, taught by individual instructor i is accounted for, the fixed 
effect model will be 
TSCORE/yj = Co + C / P a y - d i s p e r s i o n " + c^X,c + CsY/jt + 3, + S .j^, (4. 6) 
where a,- denotes the fixed effect. 
According to the theory of tournament, more dispersed pay structure implies 
higher pay differential between the hierarchical positional ladder and hence is 
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associated with better performance in teaching. Also, more capable an instructor is, 
better s/he performs in teaching. These predictions are also consistent with what the 
policy makers anticipated when they designed the pay-by-position system. Therefore, 
when estimating equations (4.4)�（4.6), the following hypotheses are to be tested. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Higher degree of pay dispersion faced by the 
faculty leads them to make more efforts and hence get higher rating 
score in the teaching evaluation, (c-, > 0) 
Hypothesis 2.2: The higher the ability of an instructor, the higher 
his/her rating score in teaching (C4 <0); the lower the ability of 
competitors of an instructor, the higher his/her rating score in teaching 
(C5>0). 
4.2.3 Incentive Effect on Teaching Using Pay Spread Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives 
In this section, we go further by employing the inter-position-level pay spread in 
the positional ladder as regressor to estimate the incentive effect by the convexity in 
the pay structure. To do this, we substitute the "Pay-spread" measure for the policy 
variable, "Pay-dispersion", in equations (4 .4)�(4 .6) . Then the corresponding 
equations will be as follows. 
TSCORE", = do + d, P a y - s p r e a d " + d^lu + d,Xut + S , (4. 7) 
TSCOREo, = do + t/；Pay-spread/, + + d^lut^ 山、�+ 5 “ (4. 8) 
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TSCORE.v, = do ^ dj Pay - sp read" + d,ln + d.Xut + a. + S jj,， (4. 9) 
where Pay-spread/, is measured alternatively via the variables, pay spread ( A UI) 
or average pay spread (AMI). Pay spread (A UI) is the increase of the average 
yearly total income between adjacent positional levels when one moves up one 
positional level, which represents the marginal return when one moves up one step in 
the positional ladder. Average pay spread ( A MI) is the average absolute change in 
the average yearly total income when one ascends up or lowers down one level, 
which represents a balance between the benefit from improving one position level 
and the cost of being demoted one position level. In the above equations, coefficient 
d, reflect the monetary incentives on the teaching performance. 
Under the context of multi-contestant and multi-level hierarchy, the tournament 
theory predicts that higher inter-rank pay spread will induce individuals' higher 
inspiration to make more efforts at his/her position level and thus produce higher 
level of output. Ability also influences the output. More capable workers produce 
higher level of output, holding other factors constant. When we estimate equations 
(4.7)�（4.9), we have the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Higher pay spread between adjacent positional 
levels leads instructors at the positional level to make more efforts and 
hence reap higher rating score in the teaching evaluation (di>0). 
Hypothesis 3.2: The higher the ability of an instructor, the higher 
his/her rating score in teaching (cU <0); the lower the ability of 
competitors of an instructor, the higher his/her rating score in teaching 
(d5>0). 
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4.3 Incentive Effect on Research 
While addressing the incentive effect of the structure of the pay-by-position 
system on research output, we find that in the estimation we run into a special sample 
different from the one the teaching regression models are estimated upon. In the 
survey, research information was available merely for a selected sample, i.e., the 
responsible professors. Data on research for other faculty members was unavailable 
in the survey. Another limitation is that the sample of research information for 
responsible professors covers only two periods, i.e., before and after the 
implementation year of the pay-by-position system. The limitation of data on 
research will somehow restrict the construction of empirical models for the research. 
In this section, our empirical work focuses mainly on the potential problem of the 
sample selection. 
4.3.1 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives: the Ordinary Least Squares Model 
As section 4.1 describes, we have three kinds of measures on research 
performance, i.e., international publication of articles (RESIntl), domestic 
publication of articles (RESDom), and internationally indexed articles by SCI, EI and 
ISTP (RESIndex). Our empirical models regress these publication variables 
separately on pay dispersion measures and other control variables. 
Firstly, the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of domestic 
publication and international publication will be estimated over the full sample of 
responsible professors, which would indicate whether there is substitution between 
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domestic and international publication for the same sample. 
RESDom/t = Go Oi P a y - d i s p e r s i o r u + e^X" + 3 “ , (4. 11) 
R E S I n t l " = fo + f i P a y - d i s p e r s i o n " + f A n + ^ n , (4. 10) 
For the regression of the internationally indexed articles, only a smaller group of 
responsible professors belonging to the schools/departments of science, technology, 
engineering and some social sciences can be observed and thus tested over. The 
following OLS model will be estimated over this sub-sample. 
RESIndex/i : go — gi P a y - d i s p e r s i o n , , + gh + 5^ , (4. 12) 
In equations (4.11)�(4.12) , pay dispersion measures are alternatively gini 
coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean deviation. For the first 
observational period, responsible professors reported their three-year publications in 
academic year 1999, therefore we adopt yearly total income in academic year 1998 
to calculate the pay dispersion variables to represent the situation during the past 
three years (since the compensation information before the reform is only obtainable 
for the academic year 1998). For the second observational period, responsible 
professors reported their publication in academic year 2003. As their compensation 
information is available for 1999-2003, we calculate means of the pay dispersion 
variables for them. Such calculations are expected to be able to describe the situation 
of pay dispersion during their three-year of research period. 
In addition to the incentive effect on teaching performance, it is anticipated that 
the dispersed pay structure also have positive incentive effect on research. However, 
it is not necessarily both domestic and international publications increase at the same 
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time. Due to the constraints in time allocation between different research orientations, 
there may exist substitution between domestic (RESDom) and international 
publications (RESIntl). At the case university, international publication had been 
encouraged especially before the introduction of the pay-by-position scheme in order 
to increase the university's international competitiveness and reputation. We 
anticipate there is an obvious increase in the international publication, whereas the 
increase in domestic publication may be insignificant, or even subject to a fall. 
Number of indexed articles by SCI, EI and ISTP should increase due to the raise in 
the degree of pay dispersion because the university has made great efforts to 
encourage faculty to publish in journals indexed by SCI, EI and ISTP. We can also 
add ability proxies into equations (4.11)�（4.12) and expect that better faculty 
members produce more. 
Thus, we have the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4.1: Higher degree of pay dispersion leads to a rise in 
the number of publications in international journals. (fi > 0) 
Hypothesis 4.2: Higher degree of pay dispersion leads to no 
increase in domestic publications, (e-i > 0) 
Hypothesis 4.3: Higher degree of pay dispersion leads to more 
number of articles published in journals indexed by SCI, El and ISTP. 
(9i>0) 
Hypothesis 4.4: The higher the ability of a faculty member is, more articles 
si he publishes. 
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4.3.2 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives: the Heckman Two-stage Model 
The above exercises in section 4.3.1 ignore the fact that the sample of responsible 
professors is selected. In the above models, the objective is to estimate the incentive 
effect of pay dispersion on research productivity. However, we can only observe 
information on research for a special group of faculty, i.e., the responsible professors. 
As the responsible professors are selected from the faculty cohort who possesses 
highest academic rank(full professor or senior research fellow), the outcome of a 
latent variable, whether or not a faculty member is picked out from the group as 
responsible professor, will influence the estimation of the incentive effect. Due to the 
sample problem, selection bias may exist in the above OLS estimation. In order to 
examine the impact of pay dispersion on publication by controlling for selection bias, 
Heckman，s methodology (Heckit model) is adopted to estimate for responsible 
professor sample. 
In addition to the above OLS equations, a probit selection equation is added. So, 
for the Heckit model, we have: 
P( resp = I \ Z ) = 0{Zy) , (4. 13) 
where resp is a dummy variable indicating whether a professor/senior research 
fellow is selected as a responsible professor, Z is the vector of explanatory variables, 
and y is coefficients to be estimated in the selection equation ( 4 . 1 3 ) . � is the 
standard normal distribution function. As for Z,Xm equations (4.11)�（4.12) is its 
strict subset. Also, with current dataset obtained in the survey, we need to choose 
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instrumental variables for Z. So, in addition to X, two instrumental variables are 
added into Z, percentage of senior faculty who possess the highest academic rank in 
his/her school or department, and percentage of faculty who possess doctoral degree 
among senior faculty who possess the highest academic rank in his/her school or 
department, assuming that these two instrumental variables are correlated with resp, 
but have no impact on the individual's research productivity. Nevertheless, due to the 
limitation to data availability, the two variables here, of course, are not ideal 
instrumental variables. It is very difficult to find perfect instrumental variables in this 
study. 
Probit equation (4.13) is estimated at the first stage of the Heckman procedure 
over all full professors and senior research fellows for academic year 1999 and 2003. 
Then with inverse Mills term, second stage of the Heckman procedure is estimated 
over the selected sample of responsible professors. The hypotheses are consistent 
with those of the OLS equations in section 4.3.1. 
4.3.3 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Spread Variables as the Measure of Incentives 
Similar to the estimations of the incentive effect on teaching performance, after 
regressions on pay dispersion, the estimation on pay spread will reflect in a more 
direct way the incentive effect of the tournament structure of the pay-by-position 
system. Note that there is a jump in the pay spread at level 8 in the convex pay 
structure, which is the requirement of a typical incentive maintaining prize structure. 
According to the tournament theory, the incremental pay spread should deliver 
incentives to incumbents across the hierarchy including responsible professors at 
levels 8 and 9. Here, we have only responsible professor sample and we use average 
pay spread ( ^ MI) as variable of pay spread; however, the alternative variable, pay 
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spread (AJJI), will not be employed. This is because responsible professors are in 
position level 8 and 9 only; we can solely observe A UI for incumbents of position 
level 8, which will limit the variation in the variable A UI. However, ^ MI does not 
have such problem. For level 8，it means that the average of benefit of an increase by 
one level and cost of a decrease by one level. But for level 9, it means only the cost 
of decrease by one level. 
Under the context of multi-contestant and multi-level hierarchy, the tournament 
theory predicts that higher inter-rank pay spread will induce individuals' higher 
inspiration to make more efforts at his/her position level and thus produce higher 
level of output in research. Ability has also an influence on the output. More capable 
workers produce higher level of output in research, holding other factors constant. 
For OLS and Heckman two-stage estimations, we have the following hypotheses that 
Hypothesis 5 .1: Higher pay spread leads to a rise in the number of 
publications in international Journals. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Higher pay spread leads to no increase in domestic 
publications. 
Hypothesis 5.3: Higher pay spread leads to more number of articles 
published in journals indexed by SCI, El and ISTR 
Hypothesis 5.4: The higher the ability of an instructor, more articles si he 
publishes. 
53 
4.4 Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System: An Ordered Probit Model 
The above probit equation (4.13) has implied an inherent logic in tournament 
structure which is its sorting or selection mechanism for talented workers to take up 
higher positions. In order to test the hypothesis that the university sorts faculty 
members according to their ability and past performance, an ordered probit model of 
positional level on individuals' ability or past performance and other control 
variables is estimated. The equations to be estimated are as follows. 
OProbit (pos i t ion level/,) = f ( a a-； Proxy-of-abi l i ty/ , + a^Xy, + f " ) 
(4. 14) 
OProbit (pos i t ion level；,) =f ( + v /^ Past-performance/, + fish, + “,） 
(4. 15) 
In the models, the dependent variable is the individual's positional level which 
takes value 0 �9 . They incorporate the situation that individuals may not win over 
any niche in the positional ladder. For those who do not get any position, the value of 
their positional level takes 0. Key explanatory variables are the proxy-of-ability and 
past performance. The variable, years at previous academic ranks is again defined as 
proxy of ability. More years at previous academic rank means more times of 
pass-over in the assessment of academic rank promotion, therefore will decrease 
one's probability to be sorted to higher position. To measure past performance, the 
variable, whether or not being selected as incumbents in the pilot pay-by-position 
scheme in 1997-1998 academic years, is used as a long-term indicator of past 
performance. Meanwhile, the variable, the change of position levels in the position 
arrangement during last academic year is employed as a short-term past performance. 
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Other control variables include personal characteristics such as sex, ethnicity, 
whether or not being a communist party member, whether or not being a democratic 
party member, education background dummies like whether or not possessing a 
degree from the case university, whether or not possessing a doctoral degree, whether 
or not the doctoral degree is from overseas, experience variables including age, 
tenure at the case university and their quadratic terms, whether or not ever being 
employed by an oversea organization, whether or not ever being employed by a 
domestic institution other than the case university, and professional characteristics 
including dummy variables of academic ranks (highest rank is base group), whether 
or not belonging to professorial series (non-professorial series is base group), 
whether or not being doctoral advisor, and whether or not being administrative head 
of the university administration or school/department administration. Year dummies 
and dummy variables of schools or departments are also controlled. 
It also makes sense to put ability and past-performance together in the above 
models. Then we have 
OProb i t (pos i t ion level,-,) = f ( ^o + 没/Proxy-of-ability" + 
(9^  Past-performance “ + eh + 6 ) (4. 16) 
As the tournament theory predicts, which is also kept in mind by policy makers 
of the university, the pay-by-position system should play a role in selecting and 
sorting individual faculty members to the positional ladder on the basis of their 
ability and past performance. It is expected that if one has been passed over more 
times, it will be less likely for him or her to get a higher position. Similarly, if one 
was once selected as incumbent in the pilot pay-by-position scheme in 1997-1998，it 
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will be more likely for him/her to earn a higher position. Furthermore, in the short 
run, if one is ever promoted during last academic year to a higher position, it will be 
more likely for him/her to win a higher position in present academic year. Therefore, 
we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: The pay-by-position system sorts faculty who are 
more capable to higher positional levels. (a 01,<O, fi^ 2 > O j 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter provides empirical models and states hypotheses to be estimated. 
Using both aggregate and individual measures of incentives, i.e. the pay dispersion 
variables and pay spread variables, we have constructed equations to test the 
incentive effect for both teaching and research performance. Especially, since the 
information of research performance is restricted to a selected sample, Heckman 
two-stage model is adopted to address the sample selection problem. We hypothesize 
that the increase of pay dispersion improves the faculty's efforts and thus boosts the 
output in teaching and research; also, the higher the pay spread of a positional level 
in the positional hierarchy, the more productive is the faculty at the positional level. 
Moreover, we have also established ordered probit models to test the hypothesis that 
the university sorting competitors according to their ability and past performance. 
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Chapter 5 
DATA PRESENTATION AND A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Empirical data as well as institutional documents on the pay-by-position 
incentive reform were collected through the field survey at the case university. The 
personnel databases and performance records at the university serve as the sources of 
information on personnel, compensation, and performance in teaching and research. 
The full sample, personnel and compensation information covers the population 
ranging from academic year 1998 through 2003. (In this study, information of 
workers in non-academic units, administrative and supporting staff in academic units, 
staff in university-owned enterprises, and part-time workers is not included.) 
Pay-by-position data spanning from academic year 1999 through 2003 is combined 
with the full sample. Data of the pilot scheme of pay-by-position in academic years 
1997-1998 is also added to the full sample. Teaching performance data records the 
mean of student ratings on courses between academic year 1999 and 2003. Research 
output data covers only a special group of faculty, i.e. the responsible professors, 
who reported their three-year publications in academic years 1999 and 2003. 
Therefore, we have the full sample of personnel and compensation data spanning 
from academic year 1998 through 2003, a sample of teaching performance for all 
evaluated instructors (including responsible professors) ranging between academic 
year 1999 and 2003, and a sample of research performance for the responsible 
professors in academic years 1999 and 2003. 
5.1 Survey and Data Processing 
Data collection and processing has been a labor intensive and time consuming 
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process in this study. The survey went through two stages: interview and documents 
collection, and data collection. Data processing includes data input, coding, error 
checking, merging, and computing for derived variables. 
The survey began in the early spring of 2003. To understand in depth and obtain 
the knowledge of the pay-by-position reform, at the initial stage of the survey, 
concerned parties from the Department of Personnel Affairs (DPA) and the Task 
Force of the Pay-by-position system (TFP) were interviewed and guiding documents 
regarding the pay-by-position scheme were collected. Sources for data collection 
were also clarified and targeted at this stage. Unfortunately, the outbreak of SARS in 
the mainland China and Hong Kong SAR suspended the survey for months. In fact, 
the survey re-started and the data collection process commenced after October 2003. 
DPA and TFP and their officers facilitated the data collection greatly during the 
survey. Of course, the rule of confidentiality has been strictly obeyed in the survey 
and study. Information on individuals' position, positional pay, and other 
compensation, and data on the personal, academic and professional characteristics 
were obtained from the personnel records of DPA. The full sample covers the staff 
population and spans between academic years 1998-2003. Data of pay-by-position 
ranging from academic year 1999 to 2003 was combined with the full sample. 
Furthermore, data of the pilot scheme of pay-by-position in academic years 
1997-1998 was also provided. By adding to the full sample, whether being selected 
onto a position in the pilot scheme of pay-by-position or not is indicated in the full 
sample. 
With the support and coordination from DPA and TFP, the Center of Teaching 
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Research and Training (CTRT) provided the information of teaching evaluation. 
CTRT was established in 1998 and has since then functioned as an intermediate unit 
to evaluate courses every academic term. The evaluation results have been an 
important reference for administrators to conduct assessment in the pay-by-position 
framework. The mean of student ratings on courses, features of the courses, and 
identification information for instructors of the courses were acquired. Such data 
covers all instructors who were evaluated by the CTRT and ranges from the 
academic year 1999 through 2003. Note that the sample size of each academic year 
varies because the number of schools or departments that participated in the 
evaluation increased gradually. Since the academic year 2001, all courses provided 
by all schools and departments have accepted the evaluation each term. Observations 
of individual instructors also varied each academic year due to courses arrangement. 
Many instructors do not teach in regular sequential terms. Quite a number of 
instructors teach more than one courses during a single academic year. 
Data on the research performance was acquired from DPA; however, the 
information is not the across-the-board data but rather limited to a special group of 
faculty, i.e. responsible professors. Research performance information for other 
groups of individuals was unavailable in the survey. In the pay-by-position system, 
responsible professors are regarded as the most important group in the faculty by the 
university and occupy the highest level of positions. To assess the incentive results 
for them, DPA required the responsible professor to fill in a form reporting their 
academic results of the previous three years in the fall of academic year 1999, prior 
to their taking up the positions. Further, they had to re-supply the similar information 
in the academic year 2003, i.e. three years after they had undertaken the 
responsibilities. Note that some responsible professors were missed because they 
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were either on a business trip or on leave and therefore were unable to return the 
forms. Nevertheless the response rate is still higher than 70%, Finally, information 
regarding the three-year publication including the number of articles in national core 
journals, in international journals, and articles indexed by SCI, EI and ISTP was 
obtained. Information concerning other academic results such as research grants and 
number of students supervised is not used in this study. 
If we treat individuals as elements of the data set, Figure 5.1 shows the 
relationship between different data sets obtained from DPA and CTRT, from which 
samples to be estimated are constructed. Set A is the personnel data of the staff 
population spanning academic years between 1998 to 2003, including personal, 
educational, experience and professional characteristics, and compensation; Set B is 
pay-by-position data during academic years 1999-2003 for all staff who have been 
appointed a position in the new hierarchy, including positional level, positional type, 
positional pay and extra pay; Set C is teaching evaluation information for courses 
taught by instructors who were evaluated by CTRT during academic years 
1999-2003, including the mean of student ratings on the course, features of the 
course, identification information on the instructor of the courses; and Set D is the 
research productivity information for responsible professors in 1999 and 2003， 
respectively, including publications in national core journals, publications in 
international journals, and publications in journals indexed by SCI, EI and ISTP. Sets 
B, C, and D are subsets of Set A which is the population set. Set D, which covers 
responsible professor data, is the subset of Set B, which covers all appointees 
belonging to the pay-by-position system. Figure 5.1 suggest that we have 
i) the sample for estimation on teaching performance of all evaluated instructors 
by merging Sets A，B and C (A 门 B 门 C); 
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ii) the sample for estimation on research performance o f responsible professors 
by merging Sets A , B and D (A 门 B 门 D); 
in) the sample for estimation on sorting function o f the pay-by-posi t ion sys tem 
upon the full sample o f faculty in Set A or B (A U B). 
Data processing includes data input, coding, error checking, merging and 
computing. Personnel data from Set A and teaching evaluation information for recent 
academic years from Set C are in the electronic form. But the raw data is mainly in 
Chinese character, which is encoded as numeric when processing the data. 
Information for early academic years from Set C comprises of printed forms, which 
are scanned into electronic code. Data of research output for responsible professors 
are inputted by hand from reporting forms. After the process of data input and 
encoding, error checking was carried out very carefully. Checking and correcting the 
errors in sorting index and identification variable for individuals in different data sets 
were especially put with more prudence so that different data sets could be merged 
together properly. Using the encoded raw data, derived variables such as age, tenure 
at the university, and proxy of ability were generated. Key explanatory variables such 
as the gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, relative mean deviation for total 
yearly income and pay spread between adjacent positional levels were computed by 
programming. Finally, samples for estimation of the empirical models were 
constructed. The description of the data is reported in the following section. 
5.2 Description of Data 
Variables in this study are classified into the following categories: 
- p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : sex , age, ethnicity, nationality, political aff i l iat ion 
( communis t party member, democratic party member); 
- e d u c a t i o n a l b a c k g r o u n d : degree (whether doctoral), institutions granting the 
degree (overseas university, the case university or any other domest ic 
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institution); 
- w o r k e x p e r i e n c e : tenure at the case university, tenure at current academic rank, 
years s ince attaining the highest degree, years at previous academic rank 
(proxy o f ability), last employer (overseas, domestic); 
- p r o f e s s i o n a l charac ter i s t i c s : academic rank series (whether professorial) , 
academic rank, whether doctoral supervisor, whether administrative head, 
academic unit affi l iated to (school/department dummies) ; 
- c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d p a y - b y - p o s i t i o n ; positional level , compensat ion (salary, 
posit ional pay, extra pay, yearly total income, and pilot pay), gini 
coef f ic ient , coef f ic ient o f variation, relative mean deviation, pay spread, 
average pay spread; 
- p e r f o r m a n c e o f t e a c h i n g a n d research: mean o f the student ratings o f courses , 
features o f course (number o f students o f evaluation, course type -
undergraduate or graduate), publications (number o f domest ic articles, 
number o f international articles, number o f indexed articles by SCI, EI 
and ISTP). 
- d a t a i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d sor t ing: dummies for academic year, identif ication for 
individuals, code for units. 
The definition of the above variables is presented in Table 5.1. Tables 5.2.1 ~ 
5.2.7 report the summary statistics of data from which we can see the change of 
faculty characteristics and its composition, the distribution of positional levels, 
faculty compensation and its structure, and the trend in academic performance of 
faculty. 
Table 5.2.1 shows the personal characteristics and educational background of 
faculty each academic year across 1998-2003. We can see that males dominate the 
faculty with an increasing proportion that rose from 71% in 1998 to 75% in 2003. 
Mean of the faculty age decreased slowly from 43 in 1998 to 42 in 2003. Percentage 
of minorities or foreigners has been maintained being lower than 4% and 1%, 
respectively, during the reform period. Faculty also shows an obvious feature of 
political affiliation, a large proportion of communist party members, which rose from 
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56% in 1998 to 60% in 2003, and a moderate percentage of members belonging to 
the eight democratic parties, which remains at 4- 5%. We can also find that the 
change in educational background of the faculty is quite remarkable. The proportion 
of faculty possessing doctoral degrees rose from 28% in 1998 to 51% in 2003. 
Further, the percentage of faculty with overseas degrees also moved up from 6% in 
1998 to 9% in 2003. However, the number of faculty members who graduated from 
the case university has decreased by 12% till 2003 from 56% in 1998. The trend in 
the educational background suggests that the level of education increased but the 
degree of academic inbreeding reduced. 
Table 5.2.2 presents the faculty's work experience background for each 
academic year during 1998-2003. Consistent with the mean of age being early 40s, 
variables of experience show a trend of a youthful and energetic profile. The number 
of years since the highest degree was acquired was 15 years on average in 1998 
whereas it decreased to 12 years on average in 2003. Tenure at the case university 
lowered down too from 15 years on average to 11 years in 2003. During the period, 
the mean tenure at the current academic rank was maintained to be around 5 years. In 
terms of employment background, more faculty members have employment 
experience in overseas organizations or other domestic organizations. The proportion 
of faculty who were ever been employed by an oversea organization rose by 3 
percentage points from 3% in 1998. The percentage of faculty who were ever hired 
by a domestic organization is 28% in 2003; whereas it was 17% in 1998. This 
indicates that the university has made efforts to attract in more faculty from outside, 
especially the domestic labor market. Finally, a considerable attribute of faculty 
experience is that the number of years at the previous academic ranks was shortened 
by 4 years from more than 10 years in 1998. As for a faculty with average age of 42, 
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spending around 6 years to earn the current academic rank (more than half of faculty 
possesses associate or higher ranks, see Table 5.2.3) means relatively higher ability. 
The reduction in years at previous academic rank indicates that the university has 
endeavored to attract more capable faculty if we assume that the criteria for academic 
promotion is kept constant. 
Table 5.2.3 reports the summary statistics for faculty professional characteristics 
during the period 1998-2003. The proportion of faculty in professorial rank series 
decreased from 60% in 1998 to 50% in 2003. Other faculty falls under the research 
series (such as senior research fellow, associate research fellow, assistant research 
fellow and so on) or professional series (such as senior engineer, engineer, assistant 
engineer and so on). The reduced percentage in professorial series suggests that the 
university uses its human resources by classifying them into different functional 
series. The professorial series emphasizes both teaching and research; whereas the 
research series concentrate on research. In terms of the structure of academic rank, 
the proportion of faculty with highest academic rank (professor or senior research 
fellow) remains constant at around 27% and the proportion of associate decreased 
from 30% in 1998 to 27% in 2003. However, the percentage of faculty with medium 
academic rank rose from 33% in 1998 to 42% in 2003. Junior academic rank faculty 
accounts for the smallest part and fell from 10% in 1998 to 4% in 2003. After five 
years, the academic rank of faculty, in general, shows a reverse pyramid structure 
with more than 50% faculty having the associate and highest ranks, 40% possessing 
medium rank and a very small part belonging to the junior rank. Such a structure 
may be resulted by the increase of the proportion of faculty possessing doctoral 
degree. Note that during the period of 1998-2003, percentage of doctoral supervisor 
increased too. In 2003, more than 10% of faculty members were eligible to supervise 
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doctoral students. In addition to teaching and research, faculty who provides public 
services to the university by assuming administrative tasks for the university or 
school/department remains a constant percentage at around 6%. 
The distribution of individuals among schools, departments and other academic 
units as seen in Table 5.2.4 reflects the change in the disciplinary structure of the 
university across the reform period. In five years, the university built up the 
disciplinary framework for changing from a university dominated by engineering, 
technology and science into a comprehensive one. Since 1999，schools of law, fine 
arts, medicine, and journalism have been established or reestablished, respectively; 
meanwhile, schools of humanities and social sciences, economics and management, 
public policy and management have been consolidated. Since 2003, the university 
has become a comprehensive university covering disciplines of science, technology 
and engineering, architecture, humanities and social sciences, law, economics and 
management, public management, fine arts, medicine among others. Among the 
schools and departments, schools of mechanical engineering and information science 
& technology are the two largest units possessing around 16% of the faculty, 
respectively. Together with other units of engineering and technology, they 
accommodate around 60% of faculty. Eleven percent of faculty members are in the 
school of science. The rest 29% are in the schools of architecture, humanities and 
social sciences, economics and management, public policy and management, law, 
fine arts, medicine and journalism. Schools of medicine and journalism are the two 
smallest units with only 10 to 20 faculty members. It is worth noticing that, with the 
diversification of disciplinary structure, the scale of faculty population has been held 
on a moderate level of around 4,000 faculty members in 2003. 
65 
Table 5.2.5 reports the distribution of faculty individuals among positional 
levels in the pay-by-position system during academic years 1999-2003. The majority 
of faculty is appointed at the middle positional levels. Only a small part of the faculty 
is assigned the lowest two positional levels. The proportion of faculty holding the 
position of responsible professors and falling under the highest two positional levels, 
i.e. level eight and level nine remained relatively constant, at approximately 17% 
during the period. The proportion of faculty who belonged to the middle levels, i.e. 
level four to seven, rose from 56% in 1998 up to 66% in 2003; the percentage of 
lowest two levels, level one and two, however, fell from 15% in 1998 to 6% in 2003. 
Among the faculty members who attained a position during 1999-2003, around 10% 
were selected to take a position in the pilot scheme of pay-by-position in academic 
years 1997-1998. Comparing the number of observations in Table 5.2.5 with that in 
Table 5.2.4 suggests that more than 20% of faculty can not get any position in the 
pay-by-position system each academic year, which implies that they will neither 
receive the positional pay nor would they obtain the contract renewal in the 
subsequent year and hence they have to leave the university or get transferred to the 
inner labor market to find a new job. Through the positional ladder system, the 
university curtailed the size and structure of its staff. 
Table 5.2.6 reports the compensation statistics for each academic year during 
1998-2003. Faculty income has been mainly consisting of the salary and positional 
pay ever since the academic year 1999. State wage and miscellaneous allowances, 
according to one's rank, title and seniority are accounted into the salary in this study 
in order to make it distinct from the positional pay. After the spring of 2002, the 
university authorized the schools or departments to offer the extra pay as the 
matching payment to the positional pay. Salary and extra pay are provided each 
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month through out the year but positional pay is offered monthly only for 10 months. 
In the pilot scheme of pay-by-position in academic years 1997-1998, the pilot 
payment was offered to a selected group of faculty but its amount was not a very 
huge figure. Around 10% of faculty received the payment in the pilot scheme. 
Components of income are summed into the variable, yearly total income. From the 
table, we can see that during the reform period faculty income has been increasing 
significantly. By 2003, the mean total income had risen by 2.8 times more than that 
in 1998. Positional pay and extra pay are the major contributors to the income 
increase. They account for about 60% of the total income. However, the raise of 
income is not equally across-the-board. By comparing the standard deviation in 
salary, positional pay and extra pay, we find that the variation in salary is small 
(standard deviation is around RMB 4 0 0 �7 0 0 Yuan and the mean is around RMB 
1 0 0 0 �2 0 0 0 Yuan) and it is relatively very large in positional pay (standard deviation 
is around RMB 1400 Yuan and the mean is around RMB 1700 Yuan) and extra pay 
(standard deviation is around RMB 1200 Yuan and the mean is around RMB 750 
Yuan). It is the variation in the positional pay and the extra pay that has determined 
the dispersed distribution in the yearly total income. In 2003, the mean of the yearly 
total income was approximately RMB 50,000 Yuan whereas its corresponding 
standard deviation was 30,000 Yuan. Therefore, positional pay as well as extra pay 
has played a substantial role in not only the level of total income but also the income 
distribution. The pay-by-position system has significantly changed the situation of 
faculty income and its distribution. 
Table 5.2.7 reports the summary statistics for performance across academic 
years 1999-2003. The mean of the student ratings on courses for instructors in the 
sample as well as features of courses are presented. At the same time, number of 
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articles in national core journals, international journals and journals indexed by SCI, 
EI and ISTP for responsible professors are reported, respectively. The table suggests 
that the mean student rating score increasingly rose during the period. It ranges from 
below 60 to above 90 but concentrates on average toward the highest value, i.e. 100. 
Mean student rating score increased by around 3 points from 1999 to 2003 and the 
average mean student rating scores were all above 80. This suggests that students are 
inclined to rating their teachers with high scores. Around 70-80% courses are for 
undergraduates and the average number of students who evaluate the course is 
approximately 60, which indicates the class size is generally large. The increasing 
trend in output is also the same for research performance of responsible professor 
sample. Compared with the research output before the pay-by-position reform, the 
three-year publications in domestic, international and indexed journals reported in 
2003 increased considerably. The mean of the number of articles within three years 
on national core journals increased from 10 in 1999 to 14 in 2003; whereas the mean 
number of articles on international journals grew from 3 in 1998 up to 6 in 2003. The 
mean number of articles indexed by SCI, EI and ISTP went up too, which rose from 
2 to 7, 4 to 8，and 1 to 2 for SCI, EI, and ISTP, respectively. We can see that the 
international and indexed publications increased much more significantly than 
domestic publications. The increasing trend of performance in teaching and research 
is also shown in Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
5.3 A Preliminary Probe into Data 
After the preview of data summary statistics, a further probe into the data is 
made in this section. Pay structure, dispersion, and pay spread between positional 
levels, promotion/demotion of positional levels and the distribution of academic 
output by positional level are reported. 
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With the introduction of positional pay, the distribution of income among 
faculty has been reshaped and become more convex and dispersed. Before the reform 
in 1999’ salary was the main institutional income for faculty and its low level and 
compressed structure prevailed for decades. After the pay-by-position system was 
established in 1999，the hierarchical positional pay has accounted for a large part in 
faculty compensation and made the total income distribution more convex and 
dispersed. Such a pay structure is expected to result in corresponding impact on 
academic output. 
Convexity in the Pay Structure 
Figures 5.3.1 � 5 . 3 . 3 present the curvature of the structure of the base salary and 
the total income by box-plot graph. It is depicted by academic rank for academic year 
1998 and by positional level after 1999. By the contrast between before and after the 
introduction of pay-by-position system in 1999, we can see the change in the pay 
structure from a compressed picture into a convex curvature. 
Figure 5.3.1 shows that the curvature of the structure of the base salary, i.e. the 
left panel, and of the total income, i.e. the right panel, in 1998. The two panels give 
very similar pictures, which reflect the pay compression and egalitarianism before 
the reform. The median value for different academic ranks are very close, especially 
for ranks lower than the highest rank. The lower quartile and upper quartile values 
are very close too for lower ranks, concentrating on the median. Further, ranges of 
base salary or total income for junior and medium ranks almost totally fall into the 
range of the higher rank. Such situation has been changed greatly since the new 
positional hierarchy was established in 1999. 
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Figures 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 present the box-plot of distribution of base salary and 
total income for academic years subsequent to 1999. As Figure 5.3.2 suggests, the 
positional hierarchy reshapes the distribution of base salary and enlarges its 
dispersion to some degree. The range and the upper and lower quartiles become 
distinct for each positional level. However, the difference in median value is still 
pretty small and some ranges overlap each other, especially for positions lower than 
level four. After accounting for the positional pay, the main contributor for the 
income distribution reshaping, as Figure 5.3.3 suggests, the distribution of total 
income become immediately more convex and more dispersed. Especially in 
academic years 1999 and 2001，ranges of total income for positional levels did not 
lap over each other except at positions lower than level 3. Although ranges of total 
income in the following years overlap to some degree, the median value and the box 
of lower and upper quartile remained the convexity along the positional ladder. 
Pay Dispersion 
Pay-by-position scheme has broken through the situation of egalitarianism 
before 1999 and established the new pay structure featured with obvious convexity. 
To measure the pay dispersion more accurately, three relative measures are employed 
alternatively: gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean deviation. 
Table 5.3.1 reports the gini coefficient, coefficient of variation and relative 
mean deviation of base salary, positional pay and total income for academic years 
1998 to 2003. The upper panel is the statistics with academic unit, school or 
department, as reference group; the lower panel, with academic rank within a unit as 
reference group. Table 5.3.1 suggests that the compression and equalitarianism in 
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base salary prevailed through the period of 1998- 2003. Gini coefficient of base 
salary is no more than 9% within academic rank in a unit and only around 17% 
within a unit. The standard deviation is also very small (e.g., around 4 �S � / � f o r gini 
coefficient), which indicates that it was the similar case for different academic units 
or ranks. However, since the introduction of positional pay, such situation has been 
broken through. For instance, the gini coefficient of positional pay is above 45% 
within a unit and higher than 30% within academic rank in a unit. Also, the degree of 
dispersion of positional pay varies largely across units or academic ranks in a unit. 
For example, the standard deviation for gini coefficient is around 10% within 
academic unit and 20% within academic rank. Because positional pay accounts for a 
large part in the total income, since it was introduced in faculty compensation in 
1999, the dispersion in total income has consequently been enlarged. For instance, 
gini coefficient has been around 28% for academic unit and 15% for academic rank 
since 1999. As a contrast, it was 22% for academic unit and 11% for academic rank 
in 1998. 
Pay Spread 
The pay spread between adjacent positional levels also reflects the convexity of 
the pay structure in the pay-by-position system. Table 5.3.2 summarizes the 
positional pay, base salary and total income for different positional levels and the 
spread between adjacent levels. The positional pay and base salary are rising and 
hence the total income is also increasing along with the positional level. The 
difference in base salary between adjacent levels is much smaller than the 
inter-position-level spread in position pay, which suggests again that it is the 
positional pay that plays a major role in the reshaping of the income distribution. 
From column (4) of Table 5.3.2 we can see that the marginal increment in the 
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positional pay spread is RMB 1,000 Yuan from level 2 to level 7; whereas at level 8, 
it jumps to RMB 3,000 Yuan. Consequently, the mean total income goes up with an 
increasing slope from RMB 16,925 Yuan at level one to RMB 95,379 Yuan at level 
nine. The average percentage increase in the mean of total income between adjacent 
levels is around 20%; while from level 8 to level 9，the mean total income jumps by 
31%. 
Table 5.3.3 reports the summary statistics for the pay spread (increase of the 
average yearly total income between adjacent positional levels when one moves up 
one positional level) and average pay spread (the average absolute change in the 
average yearly total income when one ascends up or lowers down one level) of the 
overall positional hierarchy for each academic year. Both pay spread and average pay 
spread increase with academic year, which may provide on average continuous 
incentives for faculty members to make efforts increasingly along the years 
subsequent to 1999. The mean of the pay spread rose from RMB 9,000 Yuan in 1999 
to RMB 14,000 Yuan in 2003, which delivered quite a large marginal return if when 
one moved upward one positional level on average. The large standard deviation 
indicates that there exists considerable variation in the pay spread or average spread 
along the positional ladder or among the schools or departments across the years. 
Promotion and Demotion 
Table 5.3.4 reports the frequency of promotion and demotion within one and 
two academic years. To record the occurrence of the change of positional levels, 
variables deltalevel and deltalevel ‘ are employed to indicate the change of 
positional level after one academic year and after two academic years, respectively. 
They take values at positive integers, i.e. number of promoted levels, or negative 
72 
integers, i.e. number of demoted levels, or zero, i.e. positional level unchanged. In 
the tournament incentive system, promotion is the main motivation and demotion 
provides negative incentives. Consistent with a general observation that promotion 
occurs much more frequently than demotions in organizations, the proportion of 
those who get promoted is higher than those demoted. For instance, in the academic 
year 2003, 17% of incumbents acquired a promotion of one level higher than their 
year 2002's position, and only 2% got a promotion of two levels higher than their last 
year's position. However, no more than 3% were demoted to levels lower than their 
last year's position. Compared with academic year 2001, 25% were promoted by one 
level and approximately 5% were promoted by more than two levels in the academic 
year 2003; whereas only around 3% were demoted. During the period of 2000-2003, 
both the proportion of faculty who were promoted and demoted increased and the 
percentage of faculty who remained on unchanged positional levels decreased. 
Distribution of Academic Output by Positional Level 
Since faculty are sorted onto the positional levels according to their ability and 
performance in the pay-by-position system, it is natural to expect that faculty 
academic output is also consistent with the convex pay structure, i.e. the output 
increasingly rises with the positional level. Due to the data restriction, we give only 
the teaching performance distribution in the positional level and do not report the 
research output distribution. 
Figure 5.3.4 shows that the performance in teaching is basically increasing with 
the rise of positional level, which is consistent with the convexity of the pay structure. 
Starting from the level 4’ the mean of student rating score increases with the 
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positional level. (Because very few instructors fall under positional level 3，the part 
under level 3 can be ignored.) Figure 5.3.5 presents the box-plot graphs of the 
distribution of teaching output in the positional level for each academic year. Again, 
we see that the distribution of teaching output display a consistent picture with the 
convex pay structure. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter presents the data and gives a statistical analysis on it. Coming from 
the personnel databases and faculty performance records, data in this study covers a 
wide range of variables including personal characteristics, educational background, 
work experience, professional characteristics, compensation and pay-by-position, 
and performance of teaching and research. Statistics show that the performance of 
both teaching and research has been improved after the incentive reform. Moreover, 
the pay-by-position scheme has also changed the pay structure from the egalitarian 
and compressed picture into a dispersed and convex curvature. For example, as the 
box-plot figures show, the total income has displayed a clear convex structure since 
1999. The positional pay rises with an increasing slope along the positional ladder; 
the marginal increment in the pay spread at the top level is as large as three times of 
that at lower levels. As for the measure of pay dispersion, after the introduction of the 
pay-by-position system, the gini coefficient of total income has been around 28% 
within an academic unit and 15% within academic rank in a unit since 1999. 
Particularly, the distribution of teaching output in the positional level is consistent 
with the convex pay structure. The relationship between the improvement in 
academic productivity and the change of pay structure will be examined and reported 
in the next chapter. 
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Table 5.1 Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Personal Characteristics 
S e x 1 for male; 0 for female 
A g e years s ince birth, derived from raw date of birth, rounded to 0.1 
Ethnicity 1 if minority; 0 otherwise 
Nat ional i ty 1 if foreigner; 0 otherwise 
C o m m u n i s t Party M e m b e r 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
D e m o c r a t i c Party M e m b e r 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Educational Backeround 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from the j possess ing a degree from the case university; 0 otherwise 
case university 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g an oversea degree 1 possess ing a degree from an oversea university; 0 otherwise 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g doctoral degree 1 possess ing a doctoral degree; 0 otherwise 
Work Experience 
years s ince acquired the highest degree, derived from raw date 
Years s ince acquiring highest degree …， , , , 
of highest degree, rounded to 0.1 
years s ince getting employed by the case university, derived 
Tenure at the university from raw date ofbeing employed, rounded to 0.1 
years s ince promoted to the current rank, derived from raw date 
Tenure at current academic rank 
of promotion, rounded to 0.1 
years at previous academic ranks before getting promoted to the 
Years at prev ious ranks: proxy o f ability current rank, derived from raw date of promotion and date of 
being employed, rounded to 0.1 
Ever e m p l o y e d by an oversea 1 i f had been employed overseas before jo in ing the case 
organizat ion university; 0 otherwise 
Ever e m p l o y e d by a domes t i c 1 if had an non-case-university domest ic employment 
organizat ion experience before jo in ing the case university; 0 otherwise 
75 
(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
Profession al Ch aracteristics 
W h e t h e r b e l o n g i n g to professorial 1 i f ranking in professorial academic rank series; 0 otherwise 
a c a d e m i c rank ser ies 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g h ighes t academic j jf p o s s e s s i n g highest academic rank; 0 otherwise 
rank 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g assoc iate academic 1 i f p o s s e s s i n g associate academic rank; 0 otherwise 
rank 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g m e d i u m academic 1 i f p o s s e s s i n g m e d i u m academic rank; 0 o therwise 
rank 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g jun ior academic rank 1 i f pos se s s ing a junior academic rank; 0 otherwise 
W h e t h e r b e i n g doctoral supervisor 1 for doctoral supervisor; 0 otherwise 
W h e t h e r b e i n g administrat ive head 1 i f be ing school /dept . head or above; 0 otherwise 
D u m m y variables for academic unit 1 i f working in that school or department or independent 
a f f i l ia t ion ( s c h o o l or department) academic unit; 0 otherwise 
Compensation and Pay-by-position 
Pos i t iona l l eve l posit ional level that one takes in the pay-by-pos i t ion sy s t em 
W h e t h e r b e i n g se l ec ted in the pi lot 1 for gett ing a posi t ion in the pilot s c h e m e o f the 
s c h e m e o f pay -by -pos i t i on in pay-by-pos i t ion in academic years 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 ; 0 otherwise 
a c a d e m i c years 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 
Salary B a s e salary monthly, in R M B Yuan 
Pi lot p a y Month ly payment for the pos i t ion in the pilot s c h e m e o f 
pay-by-pos i t ion in academic years 1997-1998，in R M B Yuan 
Pos i t ional pay Month ly payment for the pos i t ion in the pay-by-pos i t ion sy s t em 
o f academic years 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 3 , in R M B Yuan 
Extra pay extra payment monthly provided by the academic unit ( school 
or department) s ince Mar 2 0 0 2 , in R M B Yuan 
Year ly total i n c o m e yearly s u m o f salary, posit ional pay (pilot pay if in 1998) and 
extra pay, in R M B Yuan 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
a measure o f income dispersion/inequality, ranging from 0， 
Gini coe f f i c i en t indicating the lowest degree o f income dispersion (absolute 
equality), to 100%, indicating the highest degree o f income 
dispersion (absolute inequality). The reference group for 
computation is alternatively the academic rank within the 
academic unit or the entire unit for each academic year. 
an alternative measure o f pay dispersion equaling to the ratio o f 
standard deviation to mean. The reference group for 
C o e f f i c i e n t o f variation ( C O V ) computation is alternatively the academic rank within the 
academic unit or the entire unit for each academic year. 
an alternative measure o f pay dispersion equaling the absolute 
mean deviation divided by mean. The reference group for 
Relat ive mean deviat ion ( R M D ) . , , , , .丄•丄 computation is alternatively the academic rank within the 
academic unit or the entire unit for each academic year. 
the increase o f the average yearly total income between adjacent 
posit ional levels when one m o v e s up one positional level , which 
Pay spread ( ^ U I ) represents the marginal return when one m o v e s up one posit ion 
level . 
the average absolute change in the average yearly total income 
w h e n one ascends up or lowers down one level with the 
A v e r a g e pay spread ( A M I ) assumption that the incumbent at a positional level considers the 
benefi t from improving one posit ion level and the cost o f being 
demoted one positional level . 
Performance 
-teaching 
T S C O R E mean student rating score on the course taught by instructor i 
N u m b e r o f students w h o evaluate the number o f students w h o evaluated the course taught by 
course instructor i 
Whether the course is o f undergraduate 1 if the course is o f undergraduate level; 0 otherwise 
Whether the course is o f graduate 1 if the course is o f graduate level; 0 otherwise 
-research 
Number o f articles published in national core journals within D o m e s t i c articles ( R E S D o m ) 
recent three years 
International articles (RESInt l ) N u m b e r o f articles published in international journals within 
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(Table 5.1 continued) recent three years 
SCI articles Number o f articles indexed by Sc ience Citation Index (SCI) 
within recent three years 
EI articles Number o f articles indexed by Engineering Index (EI) within 
recent three years 
Number o f articles indexed by Index to Scientif ic & Technical 
ISTP articles 
Proceedings (ISTP) within recent three years 
Indexed articles by SCI, EI and ISTP 
Sum o f SCI, EI and ISTP 
( R E S I n d e x ) 
Data identification and sortine 
A c a d e m i c year d u m m i e s D u m m y variables for academic years 
Individual identif icat ion Code for identifying individuals 
Uni t c o d e Code for identifying unit to which the individual is affil iated 
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Table 5.2.1 Summary Statistics for Personal and 
Educational Characteristics Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Variable Statistics 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Personal Characteristics 
S e x Mean 0 .7121 0 . 7 1 9 4 0 .7266 0 .7276 0 .7318 0 .7497 
(S .D . ) ( 0 .4529 ) (0 .4494) (0 .4458) (0 .4452) (0 .4431) (0 .4332) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
A g e Mean 4 2 . 7 2 4 2 . 4 7 42 .43 42 .23 4 2 . 0 6 4 1 . 6 0 
( S . D . ) (12 .12 ) (11 .87) (11 .49) (11 .18) (10 .87 ) (10 .73) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Ethnicity Mean 0 . 0 2 7 9 0 .0275 0 .0317 0 .0323 0 . 0 3 4 9 0 .0327 
( S . D . ) ( 0 .1648 ) (0 .1635 ) (0 .1751) (0 .1769) (0 .1837) (0 .1778) 
N 3 5 4 4 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 8 4 1 0 2 
Nat ional i ty M e a n 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 1 4 0 .0018 0 .0025 0 .0025 0 .0039 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 0 2 3 7 ) (0 .0374 ) (0 .0422) (0 .0502) (0 .0501) (0 .0623) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
C o m m u n i s t Party M e a n 0 . 5 6 3 3 0 .5861 0 . 6 2 1 9 0 . 6 3 5 0 0 .6547 0 .5928 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 4 9 6 0 ) (0 .4926 ) (0 .4850) (0 .4815) (0 .4756) (0 .4914) 
N 3 4 3 5 3 3 0 0 3 3 9 9 3 3 4 8 3275 3 8 9 0 
Democrat i c Party M e a n 0 .0431 0 . 0 4 5 8 0 .0465 0 . 0 4 6 9 0 . 0 4 5 2 0 .0403 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 2 0 3 1 ) (0 .2090 ) (0 .2106) (0 .2114) (0 .2078) (0 .1968) 
N 3 4 3 5 3 3 0 0 3 3 9 9 3 3 4 8 3275 3 8 9 0 
Educational Backsround 
P o s s e s s i n g doctoral M e a n 0 . 2 7 6 6 0 . 3 2 5 8 0 . 3 5 6 7 0 . 4 0 1 2 0 . 4 4 9 6 0 . 5 1 0 4 
degree ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 4 4 7 4 ) (0 .4687 ) (0 .4791) (0 .4902) (0 .4975 ) (0 .5000) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
P o s s e s s i n g an Mean 0 .0601 0 . 0 6 3 6 0 . 0 6 7 7 0 .0705 0 . 0 7 8 4 0 .0873 
o v e r s e a degree ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 2 3 7 6 ) (0 .2441 ) (0 .2512 ) (0 .2560 ) (0 .2689) (0 .2822) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
P o s s e s s i n g a M e a n 0 . 5 6 0 9 0 . 5 3 7 7 0 . 4 7 8 2 0 . 4 5 5 8 0 . 4 3 9 8 0 . 4 4 0 2 
degree from the ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 4 9 6 3 ) (0 .4986 ) (0 .4996) (0 .4981 ) ( 0 . 4 9 6 4 ) (0 .4965) 
case universi ty N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
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Table 5.2.2 Summary Statistics for Work Experience 
Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Variable Statistics 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Years s ince M e a n 15.18 14.54 14.04 13.50 12.94 12.28 
acquiring highest (S .D . ) (13 .05 ) (12 .82 ) (12 .389) (12 .04) (11 .60) (11 .37) 
degree N 3 4 8 2 3 5 1 2 3 8 6 7 3913 3 9 3 9 4 0 6 7 
Tenure at the case M e a n 14.84 14.07 12.50 12.03 11.50 10.87 
univers i ty ( S . D . ) ( 13 .23 ) (13 .09 ) (12 .89) (12 .55) (12 .16) (11 .86) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Tenure at current Mean 4 . 6 4 4 . 7 3 4 . 9 2 5 .49 5 .29 4 .90 
a c a d e m i c rank (S .D . ) (3 .96) (4 .12) (4 .254) (4 .20) (4 .31) (4 .46) 
N 3 5 2 6 3 5 6 2 3673 3715 3775 3 9 6 2 
Ever e m p l o y e d by M e a n 0 . 0 3 1 8 0 . 0 4 0 0 0 . 0 4 9 9 0 . 0 5 0 0 0 .0541 0 . 0 5 9 2 
an oversea (S .D . ) ( 0 . 1 7 5 4 ) (0 .1959) (0 .2178) (0 .2178) (0 .2262) (0 .2360) 
organizat ion N 2771 2 9 0 2 3 0 4 6 3165 3 2 7 4 3 5 1 3 
Ever e m p l o y e d by M e a n 0 . 1 6 8 2 0 .1985 0 . 2 2 6 2 0 . 2 4 9 6 0 .3363 0 .2807 
a d o m e s t i c ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 3 7 4 1 ) (0 .3989 ) (0 .4184) (0 .4329) (0 .4725) (0 .4494) 
organizat ion N 2771 2 9 0 2 3 0 4 6 3165 3 2 7 4 3513 
Years at prev ious M e a n 10.25 9 .32 8.31 7 .18 6 .64 6 .19 
a c a d e m i c ranks ( S . D . ) (11 .87) (11 .57) (11 .36) (10 .96) (10 .36) (9 .66) 
N 3 5 2 6 3 5 6 2 3 6 7 3 3715 3775 3 9 6 2 
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Table 5.2.3 Summary Statistics for Professional 
Characteristics Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Variable Statistics 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Professorial Mean 0 . 5 9 3 9 0 . 5 9 3 2 0 . 6 0 9 4 0 .5829 0 .5403 0 .4957 
a c a d e m i c rank (S .D . ) ( 0 .4912 ) ( 0 . 4 9 1 3 ) (0 .4879) (0 .4931) (0 .4984) (0 .5000) 
series N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Highes t a c a d e m i c M e a n 0 . 2 6 4 2 0 . 2 7 8 4 0.2811 0 . 2 6 0 0 0 . 2 6 4 9 0 . 2 6 6 4 
rank (S .D . ) ( 0 . 4 4 1 0 ) (0 .4483 ) (0 .4496) (0 .4387) (0 .4413) (0 .4421) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
A s s o c i a t e M e a n 0 . 3 0 3 4 0 . 2 9 8 3 0 .3018 0 . 3 0 0 4 0 . 2 8 5 2 0 . 2 7 4 4 
a c a d e m i c rank (S .D . ) ( 0 . 4 5 9 8 ) (0 .4576 ) (0 .4591) (0 .4585) (0 .4516) (0 .4463) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
M e d i u m academic Mean 0 . 3 3 3 3 0 . 3 3 8 7 0 . 3 4 9 0 0 . 3 6 5 6 0 . 3 9 1 3 0 .4185 
rank ( S . D . ) ( 0 .4715 ) (0 .4733 ) (0 .4767) (0 .4817) (0 .4881) (0 .4934) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3917 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Junior a c a d e m i c Mean 0 . 0 9 9 0 0 . 0 8 4 7 0 .0682 0 . 0 7 4 0 0 . 0 5 8 6 0 .0407 
rank ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 2 9 8 7 ) (0 .2784 ) (0 .2521) (0 .2618) (0 .2348) (0 .1976) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Doctoral M e a n 0 . 0 7 5 6 0 .1001 0 . 1 3 5 3 0 .1251 0 .1161 0 .1038 
supervisor ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 2 6 4 4 ) (0 .3002 ) (0 .3421) (0 .3308) (0 .3204) (0 .3051) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Adminis trat ive M e a n 0 . 0 6 3 5 0 .0611 0 . 0 5 8 7 0 .0568 0 . 0 5 5 0 0 . 0 5 9 0 
head ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 2 4 3 8 ) (0 .2396 ) (0 .2351) (0 .2316 ) (0 .2281) (0 .2356) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
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Table 5.2.4 Summary Statistics for the Distribution of  
Staff among Academic Units Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Variable Statistics 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Architecture Sch. Mean 0 . 0 4 4 6 0 . 0 4 3 7 0 . 0 4 2 9 0 .0430 0 .0405 0 .0397 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 2 0 6 4 ) (0 .2045 ) (0 .2026) (0 .2028) (0 .1971) (0 .1953) 
Civi l & Hydraulic M e a n 0 .0601 0 .0561 0 . 0 5 1 6 0 .0518 0 .0515 0 .0505 
Sch. (S .D . ) ( 0 . 2 3 7 6 ) (0 .2301 ) (0 .2212) (0 .2216) (0 .2211) (0 .2189) 
Mechanica l Mean 0 . 1 7 7 9 0 . 1 7 8 6 0 .1631 0 .1581 0 . 1 5 9 8 0 .1582 
Engineer ing Sch. (S .D . ) ( 0 .3825 ) (0 .3831 ) (0 .3695) (0 .3649) (0 .3665) (0 .3650) 
Information Sch. Mean 0 . 1 7 7 4 0 . 1 6 4 8 0 .1532 0 .1556 0 .1553 0 .1545 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 3 8 2 0 ) (0 .3711) (0 .3602) (0 .3626) (0 .3623) (0 .3615) 
S c i e n c e Sch. Mean 0 . 1 0 7 7 0 .1107 0 .1057 0 .1114 0 .1131 0.1121 
( S . D . ) ( 0 . 3 1 0 1 ) (0 .3139 ) (0 .3075) (0 .3147) (0 .3167) (0 .3155) 
E c o n & M a n a g . M e a n 0 . 0 3 3 6 0 . 0 4 4 0 0 .0357 0 .0343 0 . 0 3 7 4 0 .0421 
Sch. (S .D . ) ( 0 . 1 8 0 1 ) (0 .2052 ) (0 .1857) (0 .1822) (0 .1899) (0 .2010) 
Publ ic Manag. Mean 0 . 0 0 2 8 0 . 0 0 5 3 0 .0107 0 . 0 1 2 6 0 . 0 1 3 6 0 .0161 
Sch. (S .D . ) ( 0 . 0 5 3 0 ) (0 .0728) (0 .1030) (0 .1117) (0 .1157) (0 .1258) 
Humanis t ic & M e a n 0 . 0 7 3 0 0 . 0 7 0 4 0 . 0 7 4 0 0 . 0 7 5 0 0 .0681 0 .0631 
Soc ia l Sci . Sch. (S .D . ) ( 0 . 2 6 0 2 ) (0 .2558 ) (0 .2619) (0 .2635) (0 .2520) (0 .2432) 
N u c l e a r Mean 0 . 0 8 8 6 0 .0855 0 .0735 0 . 0 6 7 0 0 . 0 6 3 6 0 . 0 6 8 2 
T e c h n o l o g y Inst. (S .D . ) ( 0 . 2 8 4 1 ) (0 .2797 ) (0 .2610) (0 .2500) (0 .2440) (0 .2522) 
Other Engineer ing M e a n 0 . 1 4 6 4 0 .1455 0 .1322 0 . 1 3 4 2 0 .1345 0 .1358 
Departments ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 3 5 3 5 ) (0 .3527 ) (0 .3388) (0 .3409) (0 .3412) (0 .3426) 
Other teaching M e a n 0 . 0 8 8 0 0 . 0 8 6 6 0 . 0 7 8 9 0 .0788 0 . 0 7 3 4 0 .0738 
units ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 2 8 3 3 ) (0 .2813 ) (0 .2696) (0 .2695) (0 .2608) (0 .2616) 
S h e n z h e n C a m p u s M e a n 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 .0005 0 .0008 0 .0045 0 . 0 0 9 0 
( S . D . ) - ( 0 .0167 ) (0 .0226 ) (0 .0275) (0 .0671) (0 .0945) 
L a w Sch. M e a n 0 . 0 0 8 4 0 . 0 1 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 9 0 . 0 1 0 8 0 .0115 
( S . D . ) 一 ( 0 . 0913 ) (0 .1005) (0 .1037) (0 .1034) (0 .1064) 
Fine Arts Sch. M e a n 0 .0677 0 . 0 6 5 9 0 .0641 0 .0551 
( S . D . ) - — (0 .2512) (0 .2482) (0 .2449 ) ( .2282) 
M e d i c i n e Sch. M e a n 0 .0005 0 . 0 0 5 0 0 .0058 
( S . D . ) - _ _ (0 .0225) (0 .0707 ) (0 .0763) 
Journal ism Sch. M e a n 0 . 0 0 4 8 0 . 0 0 4 4 
( S . D . ) - - 一 _ ( 0 .0689 ) (0 .0661) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
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Table 5.2.5 Distribution of Positional Levels during Academic Years 1999-2003 
Posit ional Frequency 
Level 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 9 9 52 4 7 3 9 18 
( 3 . 5 6 ) (1 .68) (1 .48) (1 .23) (0 .57) 
2 2 9 4 241 255 2 0 6 156 
( 1 0 . 5 8 ) (7 .79) (8 .04) (6 .50) (4 .94) 
3 3 3 3 4 2 9 4 5 4 4 0 2 3 6 4 
(11 .99 ) (13 .87 ) (14 .32) (12 .68) (11 .53) 
4 3 3 4 3 9 6 4 5 3 536 517 
( 1 2 . 0 2 ) (12 .80 ) (14 .29) (16 .91) (16 .38) 
5 3 5 6 4 3 7 4 4 8 4 6 9 518 
( 1 2 . 8 1 ) (14 .12 ) (14 .13) (14 .79) (16 .41) 
6 4 5 8 5 0 4 512 5 2 4 553 
( 1 6 . 4 9 ) (16 .29 ) (16 .15) (16 .53) (17 .52) 
7 4 1 6 4 8 3 4 7 2 4 5 9 501 
( 1 4 . 9 7 ) ( 15 .61 ) (14 .89) (14 .48) (15 .87) 
8 3 4 2 4 0 8 3 8 7 393 3 9 0 
( 1 2 . 3 1 ) ( 13 .19 ) (12 .21) (12 .40) (12 .35) 
9 146 144 142 142 140 
( 5 . 2 6 ) (4 .65) (4 .48) (4 .48) (4 .43) 
N 2 7 7 8 3 0 9 4 3 1 7 0 3 1 7 0 3 1 5 7 
( 1 ^ 
Note : percentage is in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.2.6 Summary Statistics for Compensation Each Academic Year, 1998-2003 
Variable Statistics 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Compensation and 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Pav-hv-position 
Monthly salary Mean 1032.3 1201.7 1371.2 1742.6 1771.2 2076 .1 
( R M B , Yuan) (S .D . ) (410 .7 ) (400 .3 ) (436 .5) (592 .7) (621 .6 ) (717 .1) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Month ly pilot pay Mean 79 .7 
( R M B , Yuan) (S .D . ) (229 .3 ) 
N 3 5 4 6 - - - - -
M o n t h l y posi t ional Mean 1639.6 1699.7 1683.1 1694.1 1684.3 
pay ( R M B , Yuan) (S .D . ) ( 1450 .7 ) (1429 .1 ) (1403 .3 ) (1396 .7 ) (1400 .9 ) 
N - 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
M o n t h l y extra pay Mean 769.1 751 .9 
(S .D . ) (1087 .6 ) (1162 .4) 
N - - - - 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Yearly total i n c o m e M e a n 13343 .68 3 0 8 1 6 . 9 8 3 3 4 5 0 . 5 6 3 7 7 4 2 . 2 9 4 7 4 2 5 . 0 8 5 0 7 7 7 . 7 4 
( R M B , Yuan) (S .D . ) ( 6 3 0 1 . 3 2 ) ( 1 7 8 6 4 . 6 5 ) ( 1 8 0 4 4 . 8 9 ) ( 1 9 5 8 4 . 3 9 ) ( 2 7 7 5 6 . 3 8 ) ( 2 9 3 8 5 . 2 8 ) 
N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3958 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
Whether be ing M e a n 0 . 1 3 2 0 0 . 1 2 3 6 0 . 1 0 7 2 0 .1001 0 . 0 9 1 0 0 . 0 8 1 4 
se l ec ted in the pilot ( S . D . ) ( 0 . 3 3 8 5 ) (0 .3292 ) (0 .3094 ) (0 .3001) (0 .2876) (0 .2735) 
pay-by-pos i t ion N 3 5 4 6 3 5 6 7 3 9 1 7 3 9 5 8 3 9 7 9 4 1 0 3 
s c h e m c in 
1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 
(1 = yes ; 0 = no) 
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Table 5.2.7 Summary Statistics for Performance Each Academic Year, 1999-2003 
Variable Statistics 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-teaching 
M e a n o f the Mean 82 .62 82 .67 83 .68 85 .38 85 .65 
student rating (S .D . ) (5 .68) (5 .52) (5 .66) (5 .36) (5 .29) 
score (Tscore) Min . /Max 4 9 . 8 / 9 5 . 9 49 /94 .65 53 .9 /97 .4 49 .3 /97 .7 55 .2 /97 .8 
S i z e o f evaluat ion Mean 6 6 . 8 6 6 0 . 3 6 59 .79 50 .93 55 .65 
(S .D . ) ( 47 .58 ) (41 .63) (44 .81) (40 .25) (61 .43) 
Min . /Max 7 /355 7 / 4 0 9 11/373 10/444 10/745 
Undergraduate Mean 0 . 8 0 9 3 0 . 7 3 6 2 0 .7508 0 .6868 0 . 6 5 4 0 
course (S .D . ) ( 0 . 3 9 3 1 ) (0 .4409 ) (0 .4327) (0 .4640) (0 .4759) 
Min . /Max 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
Graduate course M e a n 0 . 1 9 0 7 0 . 2 6 3 8 0 .2492 0 .3132 0 . 3 4 6 0 
(S .D . ) ( 0 . 3 9 3 1 ) (0 .4409 ) (0 .4327) (0 .4640) (0 .4759) 
Min . /Max 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
N 821 1198 1589 1226 1390 
-research 
D o m e s t i c articles M e a n 9 . 9 2 13.94 
( R E S D o m ) (S .D . ) ( 10 .36 ) - - - (12 .66) 
International M e a n 2 .57 5 .67 
art ic les(RESIntl ) ( S . D . ) (4 .93) - - - (9 .75) 
SCI articles M e a n 2 .08 7 .23 
(S .D . ) (5 .14 ) - 一 - (11 .20) 
EI articles M e a n 3 .73 8 .26 
(S .D . ) (5 .97) _ (11 .17) 
ISTP articles M e a n .78 2 .08 
(S .D . ) (2 .51 ) - - - ( 6 2 7 ) 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3.2 Base Salary, Positional Pay and Total Income of Different Position 
Levels and the Pay Spread between Adjacent Levels 
pooled across 1999-2003, Yuan/year 
Base Salary Positional Pay Total Income 
Positional  
, • (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level 
Mean Spread Payment Spread Mean Spread 
1 13337 - 3000 - 16925 -
887 2000 3212 
2 14224 5000 20137 (6.7) (66.7) (19.0) 
1285 3000 5167 3 15509 8000 25304 (9.0) (60) (25.7) 
1689 4000 7243 4 17198 12000 32547 (10.9) (50) (28.6) 
1703 5000 8034 5 18901 17000 40581 (9.9) (41.7) (24.7) 
1636 6000 8357 6 20537 23000 48938 (8.7) (35.3) (20.6) 
2619 7000 10981 7 23156 30000 59925 (12.8) (30.4) (22.4) 
3662 10000 12862 8 26818 40000 72787 (15.8) (33.3) (21.4) 
8291 10000 22592 9 35109 50000 95379 (30.9) (25) (31.0) 
Note : the percentage o f the increase in pay is in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.3.3 Summary Statistics for the Pay Spread and Average Pay Spread Each 
Academic Year, 1999-2003 
Variable Statistics 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Pay spread M e a n 8988 .57 9 7 3 4 . 8 4 10777 .30 13131 .94 13678 .92 
(S .D . ) ( 5 7 6 8 . 3 6 ) ( 6 5 0 9 . 4 4 ) (7941 .95 ) (9154 .25 ) ( 1 0 2 5 4 . 5 0 ) 
Average pay spread M e a n 8 1 9 2 . 1 6 8826 .05 9882 .58 11990.61 12641.56 
( S . D . ) ( 5 1 7 0 . 5 0 ) ( 5 8 1 3 . 8 2 ) (7122 .65 ) (7999 .68 ) (8358 .93 ) 
Note : 
Pay spread: the increase in the average yearly total income between 
adjacent positional levels when one m o v e s up one positional 
level , which represents the marginal return when one m o v e s 
up one posit ion level. 
Average pay spread: the average absolute change in the average yearly total 
income w h e n one ascends up or lowers down one level with 
the assumption that the incumbent at a positional level 
considers the benefit from improving one posit ion level and 
the cost o f being demoted one posit ion level. 
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Table 5.3.4 Frequency of Promotion and Demotion in the Positional Hierarchy, 
2000-2003 
Indicator of posit ion 
value 2000 2001 2002 2003 
level change 
-3 5 (0.21) 2 (0.07) 5 (0.17) 3 (0.10) 
-2 6 (0.25) 7 (0.24) 5 (0.17) 18 (0.63) 
-1 63 (2.58) 19 (0.66) 29 (0.99) 55 (1.92) 
0 1638 (67.19) 2734 (94.70) 2451 (83.88) 2239 (78.04) 
deltalevel 1 663 (27.19) 111 (3.84) 407 (13.93) 491 (17.11) 
2 52 (2.13) 14 (0.48) 17 (0.58) 51 (1.78) 
3 5 (0.21) _ 5 (0.17) 9 (0.31) 
4 3 (0.12) _ 3 (0.10) 3 (0.10) 
5 3 (0.12) 一 
-4 _ 1 (0.04) 1 (0.04) 一 
-3 _ 3 (0.13) 5 (0.19) 2 (0.07) 
-2 9 (0.39) 8 (0.30) 15 (0.56) 
del ta level ' -1 55 (2.38) 33 (1.24) 67 (2.51) 
0 _ 1508 (65.14) 2166 (81.21) 1791 (67.08) 
1 _ 667 (28.81) 413 (15.49) 668 (25.02) 
2 59 (2.55) 31 (1.16) 100 (3.75) 
3 7 (0.30) 8 (0.30) 23 (0.86) 
4 _ 3 (0.13) 2 (0.07) 4 (0.15) 
5 3 (0.13) — 
N o t e : 1. percentage is in parenthesis; “-，’ means no observation; 
2. deltalevel: change o f posit ional level after one academic year; 
3. deltalevelchange o f posit ional level after two academic years. 
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Set A: general personnel and compensation database 
for staff population, academic years 1998-2003, 
including information of pilot scheme in 
1997-1998; 
Set B: pay-by-position data, academic years 
1999-2003; 
Set C: mean of the student ratings on courses 
evaluated during academic years 1999-2003; 
Set D: research output data for responsible 
professors in academic year 1999 and 2003, 
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Figure 5.2.1 Trend of the Mean of Student Rating Score of Courses 
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Figure 5.2.2 Number of Articles by Responsible Professors 
reported in academic years 1999 and 2003, respectively 
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Note : D o m e s t i c : number o f articles published in national core journals within recent three years; 
International: number o f articles published in international journals within recent three years; 
SCI: number o f articles published in journals cited by Sc ience Citation Index (SCI) within 
recent three years; 
EI: number o f articles published in journals cited by Engineering Index (EI); 
ISTP: number o f articles publ ished in journals cited by Index to Scientif ic & Technical 
Proceed ings ( ISTP) journals within recent three years. 
93 
Figure 5.3.1 Distribution of Total Income in Academic Year 1998 (Box-plot) 
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Figure 5.3.2 Distribution of Base Salary in Academic Years 1999- 2003 (Box-plot) 
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Figure 5.3.3 Distribution of Total Income in Academic Years 1999-2003 (Box-plot) 
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Figure 5.3.4 Distribution of Teaching Output in Positional Level across 1999-2003 
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Figure 5.3.5 Distribution of Teaching Output in Positional Level 1999-2003(Box-plot) 
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Chapter 6 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Tests of incentive effect on teaching and research by the pay-by-position 
compensation scheme are carried out over two different samples with data on 
teaching and research performance, respectively. One sample is the data set with 
mean of the student ratings on courses as teaching performance measure for all 
instructors whose courses were evaluated by the Center of Teaching Research and 
Training (CTRT) from academic year 1999 through 2003, Another sample is data set 
with cumulative three-year publication as research performance measure for 
responsible professors, reported in academic year 1999 and 2003. Section 6.1 reports 
the estimation results for the incentive effect on teaching over the instructor sample. 
Results for the estimation of incentive effect on research for the responsible professor 
sample are reported in section 6.2. Since the responsible professor sample is selected, 
Heckman，s two-stage methodology is adopted to control for sample selection. Finally, 
in order to examine the sorting role of tournament, in section 6.4，an ordered probit 
model of position levels over the entire sample of staff is estimated and reported. 
6.1 Incentive Effect on Teaching - Evidence from the Full Instructor Sample 
In this section, the estimation results of the incentive effect on teaching are 
reported. First, time trend effect of the implementation of the incentive scheme is 
examined. Second, incentive effect is discussed by employing pay dispersion 
variables such as gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean 
deviation. Third, pay spread variable is used as explanatory variables to capture the 
effect of incentives. 
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6.1.1 Estimation of the Time Trend Effect on Teaching after the Implementation of the 
Pay-by-position Scheme: An Overview of the Policy Effect 
The full sample of instructors is pooled cross-sectional data ranging from 
academic year 1999 through 2003. All courses that were evaluated by CTRT as well 
as information on instructors are included. However, not every instructor in the 
sample appears in a sequential way from 1999 through 2003. Some instructors whose 
courses got evaluation in 1999 taught and were rated at each academic year 
afterwards; whereas some of them taught and were evaluated only in some single 
years. Some instructors began teaching and were evaluated after academic year 1999. 
Some instructors even taught just once. In order to observe the incentive effect on 
those who taught sequentially after 1999 so as to exclude the turnover effect due to 
new instructors' entering the sample in the middle of the period 1999-2003，a 
sub-sample of instructors who taught both in 1999 and beyond needs to be examined 
specifically. The ordinary least squares (OLS) model and fixed effect model are 
estimated for both samples. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6.1.1a reports the results of 
the estimation over the full sample of instructors; columns (3) and (4) presents the 
results of estimation over the sub-sample of instructors whose courses were 
evaluated in both academic year 1999 and beyond. Columns (1) and (3) are OLS 
results; columns (2) and (4) are fixed effect results. 
Generally, as Table 6.1.1a suggests, all the estimation results of OLS and fixed 
effect models imply that teaching evaluation score has increasingly risen after the 
implementation of pay-by-position reform, controlling for other factors that may 
influence student ratings on courses, which is consistent with the general hypothesis 
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that the incentive reform improves teaching performance. Coefficients of year 
dummies are of interest in the estimation results. They represent the average time 
trend effect, ceteris paribus, of the implementation of incentive compensation 
scheme. With academic year 1999，launching year of the incentive scheme, as base 
year, coefficients of academic year 2001, 2002 and 2003 are all positive and 
significant at 1% level. Also, they are basically increasing except that the coefficient 
of year 2003 is a little smaller than that of year 2002 in OLS estimation for the data 
set in column 3. Coefficient of year 2000 is not significantly different from zero, 
which implies that the average increase in teaching evaluation is not immediate. For 
the estimation over pooled cross section data as column (1) indicates, in comparison 
with academic year 1999，the rating score of courses rises on average 1.11 in 
academic year 2001，2.68 in 2002，and 2.97 in 2003. After controlling for fixed effect 
as column (2) shows, the corresponding average increase becomes 1.47，3.17 and 
3.65, respectively. For the estimation over the sequential data set of 1999 and beyond, 
the rating score increases on average 1.87 in 2001, 3.60 in 2002, and 3.29 in 2003, as 
seen in column (3). After controlling for fixed effect, the average increase becomes 
1.70 in 2001, 3.42 in 2002, and 3.55 in 2003. These results show that, controlling for 
individual and course factors or individual fixed effect, teaching evaluation has 
increasingly risen with considerable magnitude and statistical significance after the 
introduction of the incentive compensation reform in 1999. Moreover, average 
increase in student rating score is higher for the sub-sample who taught during the 
period of 1999 and beyond. This implies that the average incentive effect in teaching 
is higher for those who teach sequentially during the period after the implementation 
of the pay-by-position reform in 1999. 
From Table 6AAa, we can also see the impact by control variables, some 
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academic characteristics, i.e., whether belonging to professorial series and academic 
rank, and course features, i.e., number of students who evaluated the course and 
course type, have significant impact on student teaching evaluation. In the OLS 
estimation, courses by instructors who belong to professorial series is on average 1- 2 
points higher in the mean rating score, holding other things equal, than those who are 
categorized into non-professorial track, say, research or professional staff series. 
Instructors possessing highest academic rank (say, full professor or research fellow 
title), with medium academic rank as base group, earn on average one to two points 
more in the mean student rating, if other things remain equal. Rating score of the 
undergraduate courses is lower more than one point than the graduate course. The 
significantly negative coefficient of number of evaluating students implies that larger 
size of class will decrease rating score, holding other factors equal. 
When taking into account the heterogeneity in ability, proxy of player's ability 
and his/her competitors' ability are inserted as regressors and the estimation results 
are reported in Table 6.LIZ?. Coefficients of year dummies are consistent with those 
of Table 6.1.1(3. Coefficients of other control variables are also consistent with those 
of Table 6.1.1a. Furthermore, coefficients of proxy variables for ability accord with 
the hypotheses that if one has more years at previous academic rank, other things 
equal, his/her rating score will be lowered and if competitors have more years at 
previous rank, his/her rating score will be higher. 
The general increasing improvement of teaching performance measured by 
student evaluation score may be attributed to the sustaining rounds of 
toumament-type pay-by-position contract arrangement in each academic year. In last 
chapter, we find that the mean of the pay spread is increasing in academic year, 
102 
which delivers continuous incentives for instructors to endeavor. Another explanation 
for the increase of teaching evaluation score may be related to the extra-pay scheme 
which was matched into the pay-by-position scheme in academic year 2002. 
Extra-pay scheme enlarges the pay spread and dispersion further and the incentive 
effect on teaching is therefore enhanced again. However, one may argue that the 
significant increase in teaching performance reflected in the coefficients of year 
dummies may not be accredited solely to the implementation of pay-by-position 
scheme. Coefficients of year dummies may also incorporate the general time trend in 
teaching productivity such as the advancement in teaching technology, improvement 
of academic environment and so on. Hence, a further in depth examination on the 
incentive structure in the pay-by-position system and their effect on teaching is 
required. 
6.1.2 Estimation of the Incentive Effect on Teaching Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the 
Measure of Incentives 
Similar to the above exercises, after inserting variable of pay dispersion, OLS 
and fixed effect models are estimated over the full sample of instructors pooled 
across academic years and the sub-sample of instructors who taught in both academic 
year 1999 and beyond. Table 6.1.2a presents the results. Only coefficients of 
variables of pay dispersion are reported. In panel A, the academic rank within the 
school or department to which the instructor belongs to is used as the reference group 
to measure pay dispersion the instructor faces across years; specifications 1, 2 and 3 
correspond to the equation using the measure of gini coefficient, coefficient of 
variation, or relative mean deviation, respectively. In panel B, the entire school or 
department is used as reference group to measure the pay dispersion the instructor 
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faces across years; specifications 4，5, and 6 correspond to the three alternative pay 
dispersion measures, respectively. All specifications 1-6 include year dummies, 
academic unit (school/department) dummies, and other control variables in Table 
6.1.1a. 
Results in Table 6.1.2a show that coefficients of pay dispersion variables are 
consistently positive and significant in all estimations. Most of them are significant at 
1% level. The three alternative measures of pay dispersion give similar results. 
Comparatively, rating score responds most sensitively to the measure of relative 
mean deviation. The results support the hypothesis that enlarging the pay dispersion 
lead to the improvement of student rating score of teaching and therefore imply the 
increase of instructors' effort and performance in teaching. The results are similar for 
the alternative reference groups to measure the pay dispersion- within the academic 
rank of the school/department or among the entire academic unit. The magnitude of 
the pay dispersion effect on the improvement of teaching evaluation is not trivial. In 
the OLS estimation, as column (1) indicates, if the gini coefficient increases by 5%, 
the mean rating score may be improved by 0.5 point. For instructors in the 
sub-sample who taught continuously in the academic years 1999-2003，an increase of 
gini coefficient by 5% will lead the mean rating score to rise by 0 .6�0.8 points, as 
column (3) suggests. Fixed effect estimation does not change the basic story, as seen 
in columns (2) and (4), except that the magnitude of the pay dispersion effect is a bit 
smaller. 
When taking into account the heterogeneity in ability, proxy of player's ability 
and his/her competitors' ability are inserted as regressors and the estimation results 
are reported in Table 6.1.2.^?. Coefficients of pay dispersion variables are consistent 
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with that of Table 6.1.2a. Also, coefficients of proxy variables for ability accord with 
the hypotheses that if one has more years at previous academic rank, other things 
equal, his/her rating score will be lowered and if competitors have more years at 
previous rank, his/her rating score will be higher. 
6.1.3 Estimation of the Incentive Effect on Teaching Using Pay Spread Variables as the 
Measure of Incentives 
Estimation of the pay spread's impact on teaching is a more direct measure of the 
incentives at the individual level. Estimation results are reported in Table 6.1.3a, 
OLS and fixed effect models are estimated over the full sample and sub-sample, 
respectively. Columns (1)，（2)，(5) and (6) are OLS estimations; columns (3), (4)，(7) 
and (8) present fixed effect estimations. The positive and significant coefficients of 
both pay spread and average pay spread support the prediction by the tournament 
theory that the teaching performance as seen in the student rating score rises with the 
increase of pay spread between positional levels in the hierarchy. As columns (1) and 
(2) of the OLS estimation indicates, in the convex pay structure, an increase of RMB 
10 thousand Yuan in the spread of the average yearly total income between positional 
levels will result in a rise in the student rating score by around 1 point. For those who 
taught continuously during academic years 1999-2003，as columns (5) and (6) 
indicate, the incentive effect was more than 1 point or even as close to 2 points. 
Consistent with the above estimation on pay dispersion specifications, such groups of 
instructors are more sensitive to incentives by the pay-by-position structure. 
The fixed effect estimation gives consistent evidence to support the tournament 
hypothesis. Coefficients of other control variables are consistent with the results in 
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Table 6.\.\a. 
When incorporating heterogeneity in ability, proxy of player's ability and his/her 
competitors' ability are inserted in the estimation and the results are reported in Table 
6.1 Jb. Coefficients of pay spread variables are consistent with those of Table 6.1.3a. 
Also, coefficients of proxy variables for ability are consistent with the hypotheses 
that if one has more years at previous academic rank, other things equal, his/her 
rating score will be lowered and if competitors have more years at previous rank, 
his/her rating score will be higher. 
6.2 Incentive Effect on Research - Evidence from the Selected Sample of 
Responsible Professors 
Data on research output is available only for responsible professors, which is 
relatively a small sample for two observational periods. Responsible professors 
reported their three-year academic output in academic year 1999，just before they 
were appointed as responsible professor. In academic year 2003，they reported their 
three-year academic output again. Similar to the teaching sample of instructors, this 
sample is pooled cross-sectional data. In order to get the panel data, a sub-sample by 
those who reported their outputs both in 1999 and 2003 is also used for estimation. 
However, its size is further reduced. 
6.2.1 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives: the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation 
Firstly, the OLS estimation of domestic and international publication is applied to 
the pooled cross-sectional data of 1999 and 2003 for responsible professors. 
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Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6.2.1 reports the results which imply that the pay 
dispersion effect on international publication is positive and significant but the effect 
on domestic publication is insignificant. Three alternative measure of pay dispersion 
give basically the consistent estimation, which provides strong evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that pay dispersion increases the international publication; however, 
the impact on domestic publication is positive but not different from zero, which 
indicates that there might exist a substitution between domestic and international 
publication. For international publications, increasing one standard deviation (5.72%) 
of Gini coefficient will result in a rise in the number of international articles by 1.5 
with a t statistic value (2.96) higher than 1% significance level. 
The same OLS estimation is also carried out over the sub-sample with 
internationally indexed publication of SCI, EI and ISTP. Coefficients of the three 
alternative measures of pay dispersion are unanimously positive and significant at 
1% level. Also, the magnitude is larger than their international publication 
counterparts. As column (3) in Table 6.2.1 indicates, increasing one standard 
deviation in Gini coefficient is associated with an increase in the indexed publication 
by 4.2，which is quite a remarkable effect. It satisfies the expectation of policy 
makers of the case university in positively encouraging the publication indexed by 
SCI, EI and ISTP. 
Note that, among the three measure of pay dispersion, presented in Table 6.2.1, 
coefficient of variation is less sensitive, but still supportive to the conclusion; relative 
mean deviation is the most sensitive measure. One standard deviation (4.27%) 
increase in the relative mean deviation will incur a rise in the international 
publication by 1.5 with a t statistic at 3.06，and in indexed publication of SCI, EI and 
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ISTP by 4.4 with a t statistic at 3.76. Also, in these specifications, coefficients of year 
dummy variable are very statistically significant and economically large, which 
reflects aggregate time effect on the research publication. There exists a significant 
rising trend in the publications during academic year 1999 to 2003. Nevertheless, 
after controlling for such time trend effect and other factors, strong evidence that 
tournament structure results in the increase in research productivity is present. 
Furthermore, the same OLS models are also estimated over the sub-sample of 
responsible professors who reported their publications in both 1999 and 2003. This 
restricts the sample size by a decrease of around 50%. Columns (4), (5) and (6) in 
Table 6.2.1 presents the estimates, which support the above conclusion. However, the 
magnitude and significance level decrease. Especially, estimates of coefficient of 
variation become insignificant though positive. Nevertheless, coefficients of both 
gini index and relative mean deviation give positive estimates at 10% significance 
level. 
6 . 2 . 2 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Dispersion Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives: the Heckman Two-stage Estimation 
In order to control for sample selection, Heckman two-stage method is adopted. 
Table6.2.26t reports the Heckman two-stage regression results. Columns (1)，(2) and 
(3) in Table 6.2.2a are the results of the regressions over the pooled cross-sectional 
sample. Columns (4), (5) and (6) are estimates of the regressions over the sub-sample 
of responsible professors who reported their publication in both 1999 and 2003. It is 
noticed that the coefficient of Lamda, inverse Mills ratio term, in all specifications is 
insignificant, which indicate that we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is no 
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selection problem. Also, coefficients of all variables of pay dispersion measures are 
similar to their OLS counterparts with respect to both statistical and economic 
meaning. Again, we find strong evidence that the pay dispersion by the 
pay-by-position system is positively and significantly associated with both 
international and internationally indexed publication, but has insignificant and 
relatively small impact with regard to the domestic publication. 
Table 6.2.2b contains the estimated results in the first stage of Heckman 
procedure. Column (1) shows the results of estimation of the selection equation over 
the pooled cross section of all full professors. We can see that the sign of the 
instrumental variable, i.e. percentage of senior faculty who possess the highest 
academic rank in his/her school or department, is consistent with intuition. If there 
are more senior faculty members with highest academic rank in the school or 
department, it means that there are more competitors thus deceases the likelihood for 
one professor to win a position of responsible professor, if holding other factors 
equal. However, only coefficient of such variable in column (1) is significant at 5% 
level. Coefficients of such variable in other estimations over sub-sample are 
insignificant and much smaller in practical sense. Impact of another instrumental 
variable, i.e. percentage of faculty who possess doctoral degree among the highest 
ranks in his/her school or department, is insignificant. 
Coefficients of some other control variables in Table 6.22b are not trivial. If one 
individual with highest academic rank belongs to professorial series, it will be more 
likely for her or him, ceteris paribus’ to be selected as responsible professor. Also, if 
one possesses a degree from the case university, it will increase the probability for 
her or him to be selected as responsible professor, keeping other things equal. 
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Especially, ability does matter in the selection process. The variable, tenure at highest 
academic rank, can be treated as the proxy of ability which is equivalent to years at 
previous ranks for responsible professors with the inverse sign. More years at the 
highest academic rank, controlling for age and other factors, means that the 
individual was promoted to highest academic rank earlier thus indicates higher ability. 
The practically large positive and statistically significant coefficient of tenure at 
highest academic rank indicates that the case university does select responsible 
professors on the basis of the professors' ability. 
Column (2) in Table 6.2.2b presents the results of the estimation of selection 
equation over the pooled cross section of the full professors in departments of 
science, technology, engineering and some social sciences, for whom we have 
observations on the number of articles published in journals indexed by SCI, EI and 
ISTP. Estimates in column (2) are consistent with those in column (1). Columns (3) 
and (4) are the estimation results of the first stage of the Heckman procedure for the 
sub-sample of responsible professors who report their publication in both 1999 and 
2003. The results are highly consistent with those in columns (1) and (2). 
The estimation results of Heckman two-stage regression indicate that pay 
dispersion has significant and positive impact on international publications but has 
no significant impact on the domestic publication. Also, there is no evidence that 
there is any selection problem. Results for Heckman two-stage and OLS models are 
basically consistent; only the magnitude of incentive effect in Heckman two-stage is 
higher than that of the OLS estimation. 
Heckman two-stage estimation is also carried out over the sub-sample of those 
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responsible professors who reported their publication both before and after the 
incentive reform. Basically, Heckman two-stage results are consistent with OLS 
results except that the impact on internationally indexed articles is insignificant in 
Heckman two-stage estimation. Again, pay dispersion has no significant impact on 
the domestic publication but plays a significant role in improving the international 
publication. 
6.2.3 Incentive Effect on Research Using Pay Spread Variables as the Measure of 
Incentives: OLS and Heckman two-stage estimation 
Similar to the estimations of the incentive effect on teaching performance, after 
regressions on pay dispersion, pay spread variables are used as measures of the 
incentives at the individual level in the estimation of incentive effect on research. 
However, because we have only a sample of responsible professors, we use only the 
average pay spread�AMI), i.e. the average absolute change in pay if one would 
consider either a promotion or a demotion of one level, as measure of incentives; the 
alternative variable, pay spread{ A UI), i.e. the pay increase if one would move up 
one positional level, will not be employed. The reason is that the responsible 
professors occupy the eighth and ninth positional levels and we can solely observe 
A UI for those on position level 8, which will limit the sample size and the variation 
in the variable A UI. (Actually, coefficients of A UI are all insignificant in the 
estimations. We do not report the results here.) However, A MI does not have such 
problem. For level 8, it means the average of the benefit of increasing one level and 
the cost of decreasing one level; for level 9，it means only the cost of decreasing one 
level. For proxy of ability, the variable, tenure at highest academic rank, which is 
equivalent with the inverse sign to years at previous ranks for responsible professors, 
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is used. More years at the highest academic rank, controlling for age and other 
factors, means that the individual was promoted to highest academic rank earlier thus 
indicates higher ability. 
Tables 6.2.3a and 6.23b report the results of the OLS and Heckman two-stage 
estimations, respectively. Because we have no pay spread observations for the 
pre-reform years, the estimations are carried out over only the 2003 sample of 
responsible professors. A sub-sample of responsible professors who reported their 
publications in both 2003 and 1999 is also estimated so that we can exclude the 
turnover effect by those who entered the sample after 1999 when the incentive 
reform was launched. For OLS regressions, as Table 6.2.3a suggests, coefficients of 
pay spread in the regressions of domestic publication, international publication and 
indexed publication are all insignificant for both fiill sample and sub-sample of 
responsible professors. Although the coefficient of pay spread for international 
publication is positive, it is insignificant. Coefficients of pay spread for domestic and 
indexed publication regressions are negative and insignificant. 
After controlling for sample selection, as Table 6.2.3/? suggests, coefficients of 
pay spread in the regressions of the international and indexed publications are 
positive, especially, significant at 5% level for the international publication, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that a raise in pay spread leads to the increase in the 
number of international publication. The impact on domestic publication is negative 
and insignificant. Estimation of the sub-sample gives consistent results. An increase 
of RMB 10 thousand Yuan in the average pay spread in the yearly total income for 
responsible professors will result in an increase of 4.26 international articles. For 
those who reported their publications in both 1999 and 2003, this coefficient 
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becomes 5.67. 
Noticeably, in Table 6.2.36, coefficient of Lamda, inverse Mills ratio term, 
becomes significant for most of the Heckman regressions, which suggests that there 
exists selection problem in the estimation of publication for responsible professors. 
For the international publication regressions, coefficients of Lamda are positive and 
significant at 5% or 10% significance level; for the domestic publication regressions, 
negative and the significance level is 1%. This means that professors who are 
selected as responsible professors tend to publish less domestic articles but more 
international articles. After controlling for the sample selection, effect of pay spread 
on the international publication remains positive and becomes significant. For the 
indexed publication, the effect becomes positive but insignificant; and for the 
domestic publication, it remains negative and insignificant. 
The above estimations of the pay spread effect on research for responsible 
professors show that the convex pay structure provides incentives for research too. A 
raise in the pay spread will lead to more efforts in research and the increase of 
publication. Of course, the limitation of the above estimation on research is obvious 
due to the sample selection problem. A more ideal approach is to obtain a sample of 
research data covering all positional levels and different positional type of faculty 
members. 
The results of the estimation on the incentive effect suggest that both teaching 
and research efforts and outputs increased after the introduction of the 
pay-by-position system, which gives a different picture from previous research by 
Brickley and Zimmerman (2001) where substitution between teaching and research 
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is detected. In our study, teaching effort/output, as seen from the instructor's sample 
and research effort/output, as evident from the responsible professor's sample, both 
increased after the introduction of the incentive change. Especially, the incentives 
come from the convex pay structure, not simply the raise of salary. Substitution 
effect may exist between domestic and international publications. An increase in the 
international publication may be at the cost of no change in the domestic publication. 
6.3 Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System - Ordered Probit Estimation 
From the results of the first stage in the Heckman two-stage regressions (say, 
Table 6.2.2.b), we have seen that the case university does select responsible 
professors on the basis of the professors' ability. It is true again for the ordered probit 
estimation over the full sample including not only responsible professors but also 
other groups of faculty. 
Ordered probit model is estimated over the entire staff sample including both 
positional pay receivers who have won a position and those losers who have no 
positional pay across academic years 1999-2003. Estimation results in Table 6.3 
suggest that the case university does sort staff to positions in the pay-by-position 
system according to their ability and past performance. Sign of coefficients of the 
key explanatory variables are consistent with what the tournament theory predicts 
and the significance level is above 1%. More years at previous academic rank will 
lower the probability for the individual to be selected into the pay-by-position system 
and less likely to attain the top level. Being selected as a pilot-pay receiver or being 
promoted to higher positional level during previous academic year will increase the 
probability to win a higher position. 
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In column (1) of Table 6.3，coefficient of the proxy ability variable is negative 
and significant at 1 % level though the magnitude is relatively small when compared 
with other significant coefficients. Columns (2) and (3) present the results when 
using the two alternative measures of past performance, i.e. whether or not being 
selected in the pilot pay-by-position scheme in 1997-1998 and the change of 
positional level in last academic year. Coefficients of both variables are positive and 
significant at 1% level. Their magnitude is large. In contrast to the proxy of ability, 
variables of both long-term and short-term past performance are stronger predictors 
for positional level. When incorporating together the above three key explanatory 
variables, as column (4) suggests, the sign and significance level are still consistent 
with the former estimations. Magnitude of the coefficients for ability and short-term 
past performance is similar to their separate specification results in columns (1) and 
(3). But the coefficient of long-term past performance, whether or not being selected 
as pilot pay-by-position receiver, becomes more than two times larger than that seen 
in column (3). 
Some control variables whose coefficients are statistically significant are worth 
noticing too. First, political affiliation contributes to getting a higher position. If 
other factors are equal, being a member of the communist party or a democratic party 
will increase one's probability to be promoted to higher position levels. Second, 
education background also matters. Possessing a degree from the case university will 
make one more likely to get a higher position, holding other factors equal. 
Meanwhile, ceteris paribus, if possessing a doctoral degree will also increase the 
probability of moving to higher positions. It is worth noticing that the effect of 
possessing an oversea doctoral degree is ambiguous. Third, professional 
characteristics make big difference. Keeping other things equal, if one belongs to the 
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professorial rank series, it will be more likely to get higher positions. In comparison 
to highest academic rank, lower academic rank will decrease the likelihood to earn 
higher position. If one is a doctoral advisor or assumes administrative head, it will be 
more likely, ceteris paribus, to get higher positions. 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the empirical equations constructed in the chapter four are 
estimated and the results are reported. Our findings strongly support the theory of 
tournament. First, we find that the pay-by-position reform has a huge impact on 
improving teaching performance. The mean of student rating score has increasingly 
risen after the implementation of pay-by-position reform. In comparison to the 
implementation year, after controlling for fixed effect and other factors that may 
influence teaching performance, the mean of student rating score rose on average two 
points in 2001，three points in 2002, and four points in 2003. Second, we find that the 
incentive effect on faculty productivity in both teaching and research is significantly 
positive. More dispersed pay structure leads to higher academic productivity in both 
teaching and research. This conclusion is robust for alternative measures of pay 
dispersion such as gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, and relative mean 
deviation. We also find that the raise in the pay spread between adjacent positional 
levels results in higher output in both teaching and research, which indicates that the 
toumament-type pay structure does provide effective incentives. Specifically, for the 
incentive effect on research, we find that the positive effect is significant for the 
international publication, but insignificant for domestic publication, which imply that 
there may exist substitution between international and domestic publication. Finally, 
we also find strong evidence of the sorting function in the pay-by-position system. 
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The ordered probit estimation results suggest that being stuck on previous academic 
ranks for more years, which implies lower ability, will lower the probability for the 
individual to win a position in the pay-by-position system and less likely to get the 
top level. Being selected as a pilot-pay receiver before the incentive reform or being 
promoted to higher positional level during the previous academic year, which 
indicates better past performance, will increase the probability to win higher 
positions. 
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Table 6.1.l^z Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Time Trend Effect 
on Teaching Performance (without Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of teaching 
All courses pooled cross Only courses evaluated in both 
Independent variables 
academic years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond 
(1)0LS (2) Fixed effect (3) OLS (4) Fixed effect 
Intercept 86 .74*"(43 .66) 84 .14…(82 .84 ) 8 2 . 4 5 … ( 2 8 . 3 1 ) 85.41 … ( 6 4 . 6 1 ) 
Year Dummies 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 0 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0 .09 (0 .37) 0.15 (0 .72) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 7 1 ) -0 .04 ( -0 .17) 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 1 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 1.11 … ( 4 . 7 4 ) 1 .47…(7.14) 1 .87…(6 .96) 1 .70…(7 .74) 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 2 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 2 . 6 8 … ( 1 0 . 8 4 ) 3 . 1 7 … ( 1 3 . 9 5 ) 3 . 6 0 … ( 1 1 . 3 4 ) 3 . 4 2 … ( 1 2 . 8 9 ) 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 3 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 2 . 9 7 … ( 1 2 . 1 8 ) 3 . 6 5 … ( 1 5 . 4 7 ) 3 . 2 9 … ( 1 0 . 1 4 ) 3 . 5 5 … ( 1 2 . 6 6 ) 
Characteristics of instructor 
S e x (1 = male; 0 = f emale ) - 0 . 3 9 " ( - 2 . 2 8 ) - 0 .19(0 .87) -
Ethnicity (1 = minority; 0 otherwise) -0 .08( -0 .22) - 0 .92 ' (1 .69 ) -
Nat ional i ty (1 if foreigner; 0 otherwise) 2 .6!*( 1.74) - 2 .22(1 .05) -
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from case -0 .06 ( -0 .32 ) - 0 .001 (0 .01 ) -
universi ty (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g an oversea degree -0.31 ( -1 .43) - 0 .24(0 .68) -
(1 = yes ; 0 = no) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral degree 0 .11(0 .55) - 0 .02(0 .08) -
(1 = yes ; 0 = no ) 
A g e o f instructor -0 .16*(-1 .78) - -0_03(-0.25) -
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
A g e squared 0 .001(1 .51) - 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 ( 0 . 0 1 ) -
Tenure at the case university -0 .001 ( -0 .04) - -0 .03 ( -0 .68 ) -
Tenure squared 0 .001(0 .88 ) - 0 .002*(1.65) -
Whether be long ing to professorial rank 1 .33…(5 .29) 0 .02(0 .02) 2 . 0 3 … ( 4 . 4 5 ) -0.31(-0_25) 
series (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Highest academic rank (1 = yes; 0 = no) 2 . 0 2 … ( 6 . 7 6 ) .31(0 .45) 1.21 … ( 2 . 6 2 ) -0 .58( -0 .60) 
A s s o c i a t e academic rank (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0 .38(1 .52) 0 .11(0 .21) -0 .15( -0 .39) -0 ,93 ( -1 .16 ) 
Junior a c a d e m i c rank (1 = yes; 0 = no) 1.81 … ( 2 . 7 4 ) 0 .06(0 .05) -0 .58( -0 .42) -2.17(-1_05) 
Characteristics o f the course 
N u m b e r o f students w h o evaluated the -0.01 … ( - 3 . 8 3 ) -0.01 … ( - 8 . 2 6 ) -0 .003( -1 .52 ) -0.01 … ( - 5 . 2 9 ) 
course 
-1 .67 … ( - 9 . 8 4 ) - 1 . 8 0 … ( - 9 . 2 9 ) - 1 . 2 8 … ( - 5 . 1 7 ) -1.11 … ( - 4 . 1 4 ) 
Undergraduate course (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
School or department dummies y e s - y e s -
A d j - R ^ 0 .1105 - 0 . 1 3 0 9 
R ' ( w i t h i n ) - 0 . 1 3 4 8 - 0 . 1 4 2 9 
F 23 .00*" 7 0 . 8 3 … 15.03 … 41.85*** 
c o r r ( u J , X b ) - -0 .1055 - - 0 . 1 0 6 4 
N 6195 6 1 9 5 2 9 8 0 2 9 8 0 
N o o f g r o u p s - 1639 - 4 6 0 
Note : t-statistics in parenthesis; S igni f icance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *，** and ***， 
respectively. 
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Table 6AAb Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Time Trend Effect 
on Teaching Performance (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of teaching 
All courses pooled cross Only courses evaluated in both 
Independent variables 
academic years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond 
(1 )0LS (2) Fixed effect (2) OLS (4) Fixed effect 
Intercept 8 6 . 7 4 … ( 4 3 . 7 6 ) 8 4 . 1 4 … ( 8 2 . 8 4 ) 82 .04"*(28 .28) 85 .4 广 *(64.61) 
Year Dummies 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 0 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0 .24 (0 .99) 0 .15 (0 .72) 0 . 3 2 ( 1 . 1 9 ) -0 .04 ( -0 .17) 
A c a d e m i c year 2001 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 1 .28…(5 .40) 1 .47…(7 .14) 1 .96…(7 .15) 1 .70…(7 .74) 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 2 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 2 . 9 7 … ( 1 1 . 6 4 ) 3 . 1 7 … ( 1 3 . 9 5 ) 3 . 7 9 … ( 1 1 . 5 2 ) 3 . 4 2 … ( 1 2 . 8 9 ) 
A c a d e m i c year 2 0 0 3 (1 = yes; 0 = no) 3 . 2 9 … ( 1 2 . 9 9 ) 3 . 6 5 … ( 1 5 . 4 7 ) 3 . 4 8 … ( 1 0 . 2 0 ) 3 . 5 5 … ( 1 2 . 6 6 ) 
Proxy of ability 
Years at prev ious ranks - 0 . 1 0 … ( - 4 . 1 2 ) - - 0 . 1 4 … ( - 3 . 7 7 ) -
M e a n years at prev ious ranks 0.12***(7.04) - 0 .13 (5 .19) -
Characteristics of instructor 
S e x ( l = male; 0 = f emale ) -0 .50"*( -2 .95) - -0 .02( -0 .11) -
Ethnicity (1 = minority; 0 otherwise) - 0 . 0 6 ( -0 .15) - 0 .95*(1.76) -
Nat ional i ty (1 i f foreigner; 0 otherwise) 2 .65*(1.78) - 2 . 7 6 ( 1 . 3 2 ) -
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from case -0 .06 ( -0 .31) - -0 .04 ( -0 .16) -
university (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g an oversea degree -0 .31 ( -1 .40) - 0 .09 (0 .26) -
(1 = yes ; 0 = no) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral degree -0 .01 ( -0 .04) - -0 .09 ( -0 .35) -
(1 = yes ; 0 = no) 
A g e o f instructor -0 .17*(-1 .88) - - 0 .02 ( -0 .19) -
A g e squared 0 .001 (1 .37) - - 0 . 0005 ( -0 .35) -
Tenure at the case university 0.07* (1 .85) - 0 . 0 9 ( 1 . 6 2 ) -
Tenure squared 0 .001 (1 .02) - 0 . 002 (1 .53) -
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
W h e t h e r b e l o n g i n g to professorial rank 1 . 2 2 … ( 4 . 8 7 ) 0 . 0 2 ( 0 . 0 2 ) 1.93*** ( 4 . 2 1 ) -0 .31 ( - 0 . 2 5 ) 
ser ies (1 = ye s ; 0 = no) 
H i g h e s t a c a d e m i c rank (1 = ye s ; 0 = no) 1 . 6 3 … ( 4 . 8 2 ) 0 .31 (0 .45) 1 . 0 9 " ( 2 . 0 6 ) - 0 . 5 8 ( - 0 . 6 0 ) 
A s s o c i a t e a c a d e m i c rank (1 = yes ; 0 = no) 0 .18 (0 .68 ) 0.11 (0 .21) - 0 . 3 7 ( - 0 . 9 0 ) - 0 . 9 3 ( - 1 . 1 6 ) 
Junior a c a d c m i c rank (1 = yes ; 0 = no) 1.81 … ( 2 . 7 4 ) 0 . 0 6 ( 0 . 0 5 ) - 0 . 3 8 ( - 0 . 2 8 ) - 2 . 1 7 ( - 1 . 0 5 ) 
Characteristics of the course 
N u m b e r o f s tudents w h o evaluated the -0 .01 … ( - 3 . 7 7 ) -0 .01 … ( - 8 . 2 6 ) -0 .003* ( - 1 . 7 0 ) -0 .01 … ( - 5 . 2 9 ) 
c o u r s e 
, , . . , , , n � -1 .61 … ( - 9 . 4 9 ) - 1 . 8 0 … ( - 9 . 2 9 ) -1.17…（-4.72) -1 .11 … ( - 4 . 1 4 ) Undergraduate c o u r s e (I = yes ; 0 = no) ‘‘ ^ ^ ‘ � ‘ 、乂 
School or department dummies y e s - y e s -
A d j - R 2 0 . 1 2 4 3 - 0 . 1 5 2 4 
R ' ( w i t h i n ) - 0 . 1 3 4 8 - 0 . 1 4 2 9 
F 2 4 . 1 9 … 7 0 . 8 3 * " 15 .57"* 4 1 . 8 5 … 
corr (uJ，Xb) - - 0 . 1 0 5 5 - - 0 . 1 0 6 4 
N 6 1 7 4 6 1 9 5 2 9 8 0 2 9 8 0 
N o o f g r o u p s - 1639 - 4 6 0 
N o t e : t -stat ist ics in parenthesis; S ign i f i cance level o f 10%, 5 % and 1% are marked as *，** and ***， 
respect ive ly . 
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Table 6.1.2a Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Teaching Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or RMD, as 
measure of Incentives (without Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of teaching Dispersion measures in  
AH courses pooled cross Only courses evaluated in both Specifications 
(1 的 academic years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond 
( l )OLS (2) Fixed effect (3) OLS (4) Fixed effect 
fK 
The reference group to measure 
income dispersion is the 
academic rank in the same school 
or department 
1. Gini c o e f f i c e n t (in %) 0 . 0 9 " * ( 5 . 4 7 ) 0.07…（3.71) 0 . 1 2 … ( 4 . 8 3 ) 0 . 0 5 " (1 .96 ) 
2. C o e f f i c i e n t o f variation (in %) 0.05…（5.66) 0.04…（3.66) 0.07…（5.21) 0 . 0 3 " (2 .27 ) 
3. Re la t ive mean deviat ion (in %) 0 . 1 1 " * ( 5 . 3 0 ) 0.09…（3.53) 0 . 1 4 … ( 4 . 5 7 ) 0 . 0 5 * ( 1 . 7 1 ) 
B 
The reference group to measure 
income dispersion is the entire 
school or department 
4 . Gini c o e f f i c e n t (in %) 0 . 1 0 * " (4 .88 ) 0.08…（3.24) 0 . 1 6 … ( 5 . 2 3 ) 0 . 0 8 " (2 .55 ) 
5. C o e f f i c i e n t o f variation (in %) 0.05…（4.74) 0.04…（3.37) 0.08…（5.31) 0 . 0 4 " (2 .50 ) 
6. Re la t ive m e a n dev iat ion (in %) 0 . 1 3 * " (4 .64 ) 0.10…（2.95) 0.20…（5.21) 0 . 1 0 " (2 .30) 
N o t e l : all s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 1-6 include year d u m m i e s and control variables in Table 6 .1 .1a. Coef f ic ients 
o f year d u m m i e s and control variables are basical ly consis tent with those o f Table 6 .1 .1a . 
N o t c 2 ; t-statist ics in parenthesis; S ign i f i cance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *，** and ***， 
respect ive ly . 
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Table 6.12b Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Teaching Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, GOV, or RMD，as 
measure of Incentives (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of teaching 
Dispersion measures in — 
All courses pooled cross Only courses evaluated in both Specifications academic years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond (1-6) 
(1) OLS (2) Fixed effect (3) OLS (4) Fixed effect 
fK 
The reference group to measure 
income dispersion is the 
academic rank in the same school 
or department 
1. Gini c o e f f i c e n t ( in %) 0.08…（5.15) 0 . 0 7 * " (3 .71 ) 0 . 1 0 … ( 4 . 1 9 ) 0 . 0 5 " (1 .96 ) 
Years at p r e v i o u s ranks - 0 . 1 0 * " ( - 4 . 1 9 ) - -0.14…（-3.70) -
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0.12…（6.69) - 0 . 1 2 … ( 4 . 6 7 ) -
2. C o e f f i c i e n t o f variation ( in %) 0 . 0 4 * " ( 5 . 3 0 ) 0 . 0 4 * " ( 3 . 6 6 ) 0 . 0 6 … ( 4 . 5 9 ) 0.03** ( 2 . 2 7 ) 
Years at p r e v i o u s ranks - 0 . 1 0 … ( - 4 . 1 6 ) - -0.14*** ( - 3 . 6 5 ) -
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0 . 1 ( 6 . 6 8 ) - 0.12…（4.69) -
3. R e l a t i v e m e a n dev ia t ion ( in %) 0.10…（5.07) 0 . 0 9 " * ( 3 . 5 3 ) 0. 12…（3.97) 0 . 0 5 . ( 1 . 7 1 ) 
Years at p r e v i o u s ranks -0.10…（-4.18) - -0.14…（-3.65) -
M e a n Years at p r e v i o u s ranks 0 . 1 2 * " ( 6 . 7 7 ) - 0.12…（4.78) -
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(Table 6.1.2b continued) 
B 
The reference group to measure 
income dispersion is the entire 
school or department 
4. Gini c o e f f i c e n t (in %) 0 . 1 0 … ( 4 . 5 2 ) 0.08…（3.24) 0 . 1 4 … ( 4 . 5 7 ) 0 . 0 8 " (2 .55 ) 
Years at prev ious ranks -0.10…（-3.97) - -0.14…（-3.69) -
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0.12…（6.81) - 0.12…（4.61) -
5. C o e f f i c i e n t o f variation (in %) 0 . 0 5 … ( 4 . 3 9 ) 0 .04"* (3 .37) 0 . 0 7 … ( 4 . 6 3 ) 0 . 0 4 " (2 .50 ) 
Years at prev ious ranks -0.10…（-3.98) - -0.13…（-3.63) -
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0 .12"* (6 .82 ) - 0.12…（4.62) -
6. Re la t ive m e a n deviat ion (in %) 0 . 1 2 * " (4 .26 ) 0.10…（2.95) 0 . 1 7 … ( 4 . 5 3 ) 0 . 1 0 " (2 .30 ) 
Years at prev ious ranks -0.10…（-3.99) - -0.14…（-3.70) -
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0.12…（6.81) - 0.12…（4.59) -
N o t e l : all s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 1-6 include year dummies , school /department dummies , and other control 
var iables in Table 6 . 1 . 1 6 . C o e f f i c i e n t s o f year d u m m i e s and control variables are basical ly consistent 
w i t h Table 6 .1 . lb. 
N o t e 2 : t-statist ics in parenthesis; S ign i f i cance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *，** and ***， 
respect ive ly . 
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Table 6.13a Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Teaching Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional Levels as 
measure of Incentives (without Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of courses 
All courses pooled cross academic Only courses evaluated in both 
Independent variables years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond 
OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
8 7 . 1 6 … I 87 .45 … 8 1 . 5 3 … | 8 1 . 5 4 … 8 3 . 6 0 … | 83 .96…83_15…丨83.18… 
Intercept 
( 4 3 . 4 0 ) (43 .44 ) (79 .96 ) (79 .92 ) (28 .65 ) ( 2 8 . 7 2 ) ( 6 2 . 4 4 ) ( 6 2 . 4 2 ) 
Marginal return between 
adjacent positional levels 
Pay spread : increase o f mean yearly … … ** ” 0.78 0.32 1.24 0.35 
i n c o m e w h e n promoted up one -
(7 .08) (2 .41) (7 .73 ) (2 .15) 
l eve l ( in 10 thousand Yuan) 
A v e r a g e pay spread: average of 
abso lu te c h a n g e in mean yearly 1 .33"* 0.46*** 1.74 0 . 5 3 
• • - -
i n c o m e w h e n up-or -down one (9 .08 ) (2 .79) (8 .36) (2 .63) 
l eve l ( in 10 thousand Yuan) 
Characteristics of instructor 
Year d u m m i e s y e s y e s y e s ye s ye s y e s ye s ye s 
S e x ( l = male; 0 = f e m a l e ) - 0 , 4 7 … - 0 . 4 2 " 0 .03 0 .07 
( - 2 . 8 0 ) ( - 2 . 4 9 ) (0 .13) (0 .32 ) 
Ethnic i ty - 0 . 2 7 - 0 . 2 6 0 .78 0 .83 
(1 = minori ty; 0 o therwise ) ( - 0 . 6 7 ) ( -0 .65 ) (1 .41) (1 .49) 
Nat iona l i ty 2 . 0 8 2 . 0 2 2 . 7 4 2 .85 
(1 i f fore igner; 0 o therwise ) ( 1 . 3 5 ) (1 .31 ) (1 .32) (1 .37) 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g a degree f rom - 0 . 1 2 - 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 0 8 -0 .07 
c a s e univers i ty (1 = yes ; 0 = no) ( - 0 . 6 4 ) ( - 0 . 5 5 ) ( -0 .31 ) ( -0 .27 ) 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g an oversea -0.39* -0.37* 0 .01 0 .003 
d e g r e e (1 = y e s ; 0 = no ) ( - 1 . 7 5 ) ( - 1 . 6 7 ) (0 .02 ) (0 .01) 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral 0 . 03 0 .03 - 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 1 3 
d e g r e e (1 = y e s ; 0 = n o ) ( 0 . 1 3 ) ( 0 . 1 7 ) ( - 0 . 5 2 ) ( - 0 . 4 9 ) 
A g e o f instructor -0 .18* - 0 . 1 9 " - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 1 0 
( - 1 . 9 1 ) ( - 2 . 0 2 ) ( - 0 . 6 3 ) ( - 0 . 7 4 ) 
A g e squared 0 .001 0 .002* 0 . 0 0 0 4 0 .001 
( 1 . 5 2 ) ( 1 . 6 7 ) ( 0 . 3 1 ) ( 0 . 4 5 ) 
Tenure at the c a s e univers i ty - 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 2 
( - 0 . 1 5 ) ( - 0 . 1 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 1 ) 
Tenure squared 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 0 .001 
( 0 . 8 7 ) ( 0 . 9 0 ) (1 .24 ) ( 1 . 1 8 ) 
W h e t h e r b e l o n g i n g to professorial 1 . 1 2 … 1 . 1 8 " * - 0 . 0 5 -0 .05 1 . 7 0 … 1 . 7 9 … - 0 . 4 4 - 0 . 4 0 
rank ser ies (1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( 4 . 3 6 ) ( 4 . 5 8 ) ( - 0 . 0 5 ) ( - 0 . 0 5 ) (3 .71 ) ( 3 . 9 0 ) ( - 0 . 3 5 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 ) 
H i g h e s t a c a d e m i c rank 1 .03*" 1 . 3 8 … 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 7 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 0 - 0 . 6 8 -0 .69 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( 3 . 2 0 ) ( 4 . 3 9 ) ( 0 . 3 6 ) ( 0 . 3 9 ) (0 .09 ) ( 0 . 6 3 ) ( - 0 . 6 9 ) ( -0 .71 ) 
A s s o c i a t e a c a d e m i c rank - 0 . 0 2 0.11 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 5 -0.70* - 0 . 6 4 -1 .07 -1 .09 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( - 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 4 2 ) (0 .11) (0 .10 ) ( - 1 . 7 1 ) ( - 1 . 5 6 ) ( - 1 . 3 1 ) ( - 1 . 3 3 ) 
Junior a c a d e m i c rank 2 . 0 2 … 1 . 9 1 … 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 5 5 - 2 . 2 4 -2 .27 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( 2 . 9 8 ) ( 2 . 8 0 ) (0 .08 ) (0 .08 ) ( - 0 . 3 3 ) ( - 0 . 3 8 ) ( - 1 . 0 6 ) ( -1 .08 ) 
School or department dummies y e s y e s - - y e s y e s - -
Characteristics of the course 
N u m b e r o f s tudents w h o eva luated -0 .01 … - 0 . 0 1 • “ - 0 . 0 1 * " -0 .01 … - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 2 -0 .01 … - 0 . 0 1 … 
the c o u r s e ( - 3 . 8 2 ) ( - 3 . 7 1 ) ( - 8 . 0 1 ) ( - 8 . 0 1 ) ( - 1 . 3 4 ) ( - 1 . 2 7 ) ( - 5 . 0 8 ) ( -5 .09 ) 
Undergraduate c o u r s e - 1 . 6 0 … - 1 . 6 2 … - 1 . 7 7 … - 1 . 7 7 … - 1 . 2 0 … - 1 . 2 7 … - 1 . 1 2 * " - 1 . 1 3 … 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( - 9 . 3 4 ) ( - 9 . 4 7 ) ( - 9 . 0 3 ) ( - 9 . 0 2 ) ( - 4 . 8 5 ) ( - 5 . 1 4 ) ( - 4 . 1 6 ) ( -4 .19 ) 
A d j - R 2 0 . 1 1 9 3 0 . 1 1 4 7 - - 0 . 1 4 8 0 0 . 1 4 5 3 - -
R ' ( w i t h i n ) - - 0 . 1 3 4 8 0 . 1 3 4 6 - - 0 . 1 4 2 6 0 . 1 4 2 2 
F 2 3 . 6 3 … 2 2 . 6 4 … 6 2 . 5 8 … 6 2 . 4 7 " * 16.40 … 1 6 . 07 3 7 . 1 3 ' " 3 7 . 0 0 _ 
c o r r ( u J , X b ) - - - 0 . 0 9 8 3 - 0 . 1 0 0 4 - - - 0 . 0 8 8 3 - 0 . 0 9 0 5 
N 6 0 1 3 6 0 1 4 6 0 1 3 6 0 1 4 2 9 2 6 2 9 2 7 2 9 2 6 2 9 2 7 
N o o f g r o u p s - - 1583 1583 - - 4 6 0 4 6 0 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% arc indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table 6.13b Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Teaching Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional Levels as 
measure of Incentives (Controlling for the Ability Variables) 
Dependent variable: rating score of courses 
All courses pooled cross academic Only courses evaluated in both 
Independent variables years 1999-2003 academic year 1999 and beyond 
OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
⑴ （2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
‘ 8 7 . 1 4 … I 8 7 . 3 6 … 8 1 . 5 3 叫 8 1 . 5 4 … 8 3 . 1 7 … | 83 .37 … 8 3 . 1 5叫 8 3 . 1 8 … 
Intercept 
( 4 3 . 3 8 ) ( 43 .43 ) (79 .96) (79 .92) (28 .50) (28 .55) (62 .44) (62 .42) 
Marginal return between 
adjacent positional levels 
Pay spread : increase o f mean yearly 
y P 0.58*** 0.32" 1.06"* 0.35** 
i n c o m e w h e n promoted up o n e -
(5.07) (2.41) (6.49) (2.15) 
l eve l (in 10 thousand Yuan) 
A v e r a g e pay spread: average o f 
abso lute change in mean yearly 1 .05"* 0.46*** 1.47*** 0.53*** 
i n c o m e w h e n up-or-down one (6 .81) (2 .79) (6 .84) (2 .63) 
leve l ( in 10 thousand Yuan) 
Years at prev ious ranks -0.05** -0.07*** - - -0 .11*" -0.13*** - -
(-1.99) (-2.67) (-2.84) (-3.37) 
M e a n Years at prev ious ranks 0 . 1 0 … 0 . 1 1 * * * - - 0.09*** 0.10*** - -
(5.39) (6.06) (3.44) (3.65) 
Characteristics of instructor 
Year d u m m i e s y e s yes yes y e s yes yes yes yes 
S e x ( l = male; 0 = f emale ) - 0 . 5 4 … - 0 . 5 1 * " - - -0 .12 -0 .10 - -
( - 3 . 1 6 ) ( -3 .00 ) ( -0 .53) ( -0 .45) 
Ethnic i ty -0 .25 -0 .25 - - 0 .81 0 .85 - -
(1 = minority; 0 o therwise) ( - 0 . 6 3 ) ( -0 .62 ) (1 .47) (1 .54) 
Nat iona l i ty 2 .03 1.99 - - 3 .06 3 .20 - -
(1 i f foreigner; 0 o therwise ) ( 1 . 3 2 ) (1 .29 ) (1 .48) (1 .54) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from -0.11 - 0 . 0 9 - - -0 .09 -0 .08 - -
c a s e univers i ty (1 = yes ; 0 = no) ( - 0 . 6 1 ) ( -0 .51 ) ( -0 .34) ( -0 .32) 
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(Table 6.1.3b continued) 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g an o v e r s e a -0.42* -0.41* - - -0 .05 - 0 . 0 6 - -
d e g r e e (1 = y e s ; 0 = n o ) ( - 1 . 9 1 ) ( - 1 . 8 2 ) ( - 0 . 1 4 ) ( - 0 . 1 6 ) 
W h e t h e r p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral -0 .05 - 0 . 0 6 - - -0 ,21 -0 .21 - -
d e g r e e (1 = ye s ; 0 = n o ) ( - 0 . 2 7 ) ( - 0 . 2 9 ) ( - 0 . 7 8 ) ( - 0 . 7 9 ) 
A g e o f instructor -0.18* - 0 . 1 9 " - - - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 8 - -
( - 1 . 9 8 ) ( - 2 . 0 8 ) ( - 0 . 5 4 ) ( - 0 . 6 1 ) 
A g e squared 0 . 0 0 2 0 .002* - - 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 - -
( 1 . 5 2 ) ( 1 . 6 1 ) (0 .00 ) ( 0 . 0 6 ) 
Tenure at the c a s e univers i ty 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 - - 0 .08 0 . 1 0 - -
( 0 . 5 4 ) ( 0 . 9 2 ) (1 .28) (1 .62 ) 
Tenure squared 0 .001 0 .001 - - 0 .001 0 .001 - -
( 1 . 0 1 ) ( 1 . 0 5 ) (1 .22 ) ( 1 . 1 5 ) 
W h e t h e r b e l o n g i n g to professor ia l 1 . 0 7 … 1 . 1 2 * " - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 5 1.71 … 1 . 7 9 … - 0 . 4 4 - 0 . 4 0 
rank ser ies (1 = ye s ; 0 = no) ( 4 . 1 5 ) (4 .33 ) ( - 0 . 0 5 ) ( - 0 . 0 5 ) (3 .69) (3 .87 ) ( - 0 . 3 5 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 ) 
H i g h e s t a c a d c m i c rank 0 . 7 2 " 1 . 0 3 … 0 .25 0 . 2 7 0 . 2 0 0 . 4 8 - 0 . 6 8 - 0 . 6 9 
(1 = y c s ; 0 = n o ) ( 1 . 9 6 ) ( 2 . 8 5 ) ( 0 . 3 6 ) ( 0 . 3 9 ) (0 .35 ) ( 0 . 8 7 ) ( - 0 . 6 9 ) ( - 0 . 7 1 ) 
A s s o c i a t e a c a d e m i c rank - 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 .05 -0.75* -0.70* -1 .07 - 1 . 0 9 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( - 0 . 5 9 ) ( - 0 . 1 9 ) (0 .11) ( 0 . 1 0 ) ( - 1 . 8 0 ) ( - 1 . 6 6 ) ( - 1 . 3 1 ) ( - 1 . 3 3 ) 
Junior a c a d e m i c rank 1 . 9 6 … 1 . 8 7 … 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 3 0 - 0 . 3 2 - 2 . 2 4 - 2 . 2 7 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( 2 . 8 9 ) ( 2 . 7 6 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( - 0 . 2 1 ) ( - 0 . 2 3 ) ( - 1 . 0 6 ) ( - 1 . 0 8 ) 
School or department dummies y e s y e s - - y e s y e s - -
Characteristics of the course 
N u m b e r o f s tudents w h o eva luated -0 .01 … - 0 . 0 1 … - 0 . 0 1 … - 0 , 0 1 … - 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 3 -0 .01 … - 0 . 0 1 … 
the c o u r s e ( - 3 . 6 9 ) ( - 3 . 6 1 ) ( - 8 . 0 1 ) ( - 8 . 0 1 ) ( - 1 . 4 7 ) ( - 1 . 4 4 ) ( -5 .08 ) ( - 5 . 0 9 ) 
Undergraduate c o u r s e - 1 . 5 6 … - 1 . 5 7 … - 1 . 7 7 … - 1 . 7 7 … - 1 . 1 2 … - 1 . 1 7 * " - 1 . 1 2 " * - 1 . 1 3 " * 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( - 9 . 1 3 ) ( - 9 . 1 8 ) ( - 9 . 0 3 ) ( - 9 . 0 2 ) ( - 4 . 5 4 ) ( - 4 . 7 3 ) ( - 4 . 1 6 ) ( - 4 . 1 9 ) 
A d j - R ^ 0 . 1 2 3 3 0 . 1 2 0 3 - - 0 . 1 6 3 4 0 . 1 6 2 2 - -
R V i t h i n ) - - 0 . 1 3 4 8 0 . 1 3 4 6 - - 0 . 1 4 2 6 0 . 1 4 2 2 
F 2 3 . 7 6 … 2 3 . 1 4 … 6 2 . 5 8 … 6 2 . 4 7 … 1 6 . 1 3 … 1 6 . 0 0 * " 3 7 . 1 3 * " 3 7 . 0 0 * " 
c o r r ( u J , X b ) - - - 0 . 0 9 8 3 - 0 . 1 0 0 4 - - - 0 . 0 8 8 3 - 0 . 0 9 0 5 
N 5 9 9 2 5 9 9 3 6 0 1 3 6 0 1 4 2 9 2 6 2 9 2 7 2 9 2 6 2 9 2 7 
N o o f g r o u p s - - 1583 1583 - - 4 6 0 4 6 0 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis; Significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% arc indicated by ** and ***, respectively. 
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Table 6.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Research Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or RMD, as 
measure of incentives 
Dependent variable: publication 
All responsible prof/s pooled Only those reported their Dispersion measures in 
together those who report publications both before and Specifications (1-3) 
their publication before or after reform 
after reform 
(The reference group to measure income � （2) � � � （6) 
,. . . , Domestic Interna- Indexed Domestic Interna- Indexed 
dispersion is the academic rank in the 
� articles tional articles articles tional articles 
same school or department) 
articles by SCI, articles by SCI, 
EI&ISTP EI&ISTP 
1. Gini coefficient (in %) 0.11 0.26… 0.73… 0.04 0.29* 0.63* 
(0.85) (2.96) (3.54) (0.17) (1.91) (1.81) 
Year d u m m y 2 . 5 6 … 2 . 8 4 … 8 . 2 1 … 2 . 0 3 2 . 0 4 " 7 . 8 3 … 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) ( 2 . 7 0 ) (4 .47 ) (5 .93 ) (1 .36 ) ( 1 , 9 7 ) (3 .42 ) 
A d j r2 0 . 2 0 3 8 0 . 1 4 7 3 0 . 2 1 3 2 0 . 2 5 2 4 0 . 1 0 9 6 0 . 1 8 1 6 
F 7 . 6 0 " * 5 . 4 6 • “ 8.21 … 5 . 7 0 * " 2 .71 … 4 . 2 7 " * 
N 6 2 0 6 2 0 533 321 321 281 
2. Coefficient of variation ( in %) 0.08 0.10** 0.27… 0.05 0.08 0.17 
(1.19) (2.30) (2.60) (0.45) (1.02) (0.98) 
Year d u m m y 2 . 8 0 … 3 . 0 3 * " 9 . 1 1 * " 2 . 2 2 2.13* 8 . 2 0 … 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) ( 2 . 8 4 ) (4 .58 ) ( 6 . 0 9 ) ( 1 . 4 2 ) (1 .96 ) (3 .37 ) 
A d j r2 0 . 2 0 4 7 0 . 1 4 2 4 0 . 2 0 4 5 0 . 2 5 2 9 0 . 1 0 1 8 0 . 1 7 4 4 
F 7 . 6 4 … 5 . 2 8 " - 7 . 8 4 … 5 . 7 广 2 . 5 8 … 4 . 1 1 … 
N 6 2 0 6 2 0 533 321 321 281 
3. Relative mean deviation (in %) 0.18 0.35… 1.02… 0.05 0.37* 0.87* 
(1.05) (3.06) (3.76) (0.21) (1.92) (1.94) 
Year d u m m y 3 . 5 8 … 2.81 … 8 . 4 6 … 2 . 0 2 1.99* 7 . 8 2 … 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) ( 3 . 9 9 ) ( 4 . 4 4 ) ( 5 . 9 8 ) ( 1 . 3 7 ) (1 .93 ) (3 .43 ) 
A d j R^ 0 . 1 7 8 6 0 . 1 4 8 2 0 . 2 1 5 7 0 . 2 5 2 5 0 . 1 0 9 7 0 .1831 
F 6 . 8 9 … 5 . 4 9 … 8 . 3 1 … 5 . 7 0 " * 2 .71 … 4 . 3 0 * " 
N 6 2 4 6 2 0 5 3 3 321 321 281 
Note 1 ： t-statistic is in parenthesis; Significance level of 10%，5% and 1% are marked as *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
Note 2: regressions of indexed articles do not cover schools or departments of humanities, fine arts, journalism, 
and other teaching units because these schools or departments do not require SCI, EI and ISTP articles. 
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Table 62.2a Heckman Two-stage Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 
Research Performance Using Pay Dispersion Variable, Gini, COV, or RMD, as 
measure of incentives 
Dependent variable: publication 
All responsible professors Only those reported their 
r,. . pooled together those who publications both before and Dispersion measures in ‘‘ ^ 
Specifications (1 3) report their publication before after reform 
or after reform 
(The reference group to measure income ⑴ ⑶ ⑶ ⑷ ⑶ （6) 
dispersion is the academic rank in the Domestic Interna- Indexed Domestic Interna- Indexed 
same school or department) articles tional articles articles tional articles 
articles by SCI, articles by SCI, 
EI&ISTP EI&ISTP 
1. Gini coefficient (in %) 0.16 0.37"* 0.86*** 0.22 0.31* 0.64 
(1.12) (3.52) (3.87) (0.97) (1.78) (1.24) 
Year d u m m y 5 . 1 2 " ' 1.01 7 . 0 3 " 2.45 3 .14 13 .27" 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) (2 .63) (0 .73) (2 .37) (0 .93) (1 .56) (2 .26) 
Lamda -8 .54 5.85 3 .90 0.97 -5 .67 -30.31 
( -1 .56) (1 .50) (0 .39) (0 .10) ( -0 .74) ( -1 .20) 
Wald chi2 5 6 1 . 2 2 … 4 9 3 . 2 0 " * 489 .52*" 4 1 0 . 8 9 … 3 2 1 . 5 8 … 1 9 3 . 9 1 … 
N 1583 1583 1361 1288 1288 1111 
Unccnsored observations 562 562 485 302 302 265 
2. Coefficient of variation ( in %) 0.09 0.15… 0.31 … 0.11 0.08 0.17 
(1.17) (2.95) (2.78) (0.98) (0.89) (0.59) 
Year d u m m y 5.23"* 1.34 7 . 8 0 ' " 2.95 3.94* 14.5广 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) (2 73) (0 .97) (2 .59) (1 .15) (1 .92) (2.16) 
Lamda -8 .15 5 .89 4 .26 0.03 -8 .82 -35.09 
( -1 .48) (1 .49) (0 .42) (0 .00) ( -1.15) (-1.22) 
Wald chi2 5 5 9 . 9 4 … 4 8 4 . 6 7 … 4 7 9 . 0 6 … 4 1 0 . 5 0 … 3 1 1 . 4 6 … 2 5 7 . 8 2 … 
N 1583 1583 1361 1288 1288 1112 
Uncensored observations 562 562 485 302 302 265 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
3. Relative mean deviation (in。/。） 0.19 0.51*** 1.20*** 0.27 0.40* 0.88 
(1.00) (3.67) (4.12) (0.95) (1.83) (1.40) 
Year d u m m y 5 .15*" 0 .96 7 . 1 6 " 2 .43 3 .08 1 3 . 0 2 " 
(1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) (2 .64) (0 .70) (2 .42) (0 .92) (1 .52) (2 .31) 
Lamda -8 .73 5 .90 3 .64 0 .87 -5 .60 -29.11 , 
( -1 .59) (1 .52) (0 .36) (0 .09) ( -0 .73) ( -1 .20) 
Wald chi2 5 5 5 . 8 2 … 4 9 0 . 4 2 * " 4 9 1 . 6 7 4 1 0 . 1 7 * " 317 .12"* 2 7 1 . 4 4 
N 1583 1583 1361 1288 1288 1112 
U n c e n s o r e d observat ions 5 6 2 562 485 3 0 2 3 0 2 265 
N o t e 1: t-statistic is in parenthesis; S igni f icance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *, ** and 
*** , respectively. 
N o t e 2: regress ions o f indexed articles do not cover schools o f humanities, f ine arts, journalism, and 
other teaching units. 
N o t e 3: the number o f total observations is restricted to faculty with highest academic rank because 
responsible professors are selected from only such group. 
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Table 6.2.2b First Stage Results of the Heckman Two-stage Regression of 
Specification 1 in Table 6.2.2a 
Dependent variable of selection equation: 
whether or not responsible professor (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
All responsible professors Only those reported their 
pooled together those w h o publications both before and 
E x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s report their publication before after reform 
in selection equation or after reform 
^ ^ W 
Reporting Reporting Reporting Reporting 
domest ic or SCI, EI and domestic or SCI, EI and 
international ISTP articles international ISTP articles 
articles articles 
Intercept -1 .40 -1 .76 - 4 . 8 6 … -5 .21*" 
( -0 .96) ( -1 .12) ( -2 .75) ( -2 .74) 
Variables in Xb 
Gini coe f f i c i ent 0.01 0 .001 0.01 0 .003 
(1 .12) (0 .04) (0 .83) (0 .25) 
Year d u m m y - 0 . 6 3 … - 0 . 4 8 … -0 .41*" - 0 . 2 7 " 
( 1 = after reform; 0 = before reform) ( -6 .12) ( -4 .27) ( -3 .22) ( -2 .01) 
S e x (1 = male; 0 = f emale ) 0.23* 0 .35*" 0 .60*" 0 .73"* 
(1 .94) (2 .63) (3 .27) (3 .50) 
Ethnicity (1 = minority; 0 otherwise) -0 .03 -0 .55 -0 .77 
( -0 .10) ( -1 .33) ( -1 .52) 
Whether be long ing to professorial 0 . 8 6 … 0 . 8 4 … 1.01 … 0.91** 
rank series (1 = yes ; 0 = no) (7 .80) (7 .07) (7 .08) (6 .02) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g doctoral degree 0 . 2 3 " 0.32** 0 .10 0 .25 
(1 = y c s ; 0 = no ) (2 .00) (2 .40) (0 .70) (1 .58) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g oversea degree -0.01 -0 .07 0 .12 -0 .12 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( -0 .10) ( -0 .51 ) (0 .70) ( -0 .67) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.82*** 0 .79 
case university (1 = yes; 0 = no) (5 .84) (5 .10) (6 .03) (5 .46) 
A g e o f respons ible professor 0.01 -0 .01 0 .08 0 .08 
(0 .15) ( -0 .21 ) (1 .18) (1.11) 
A g e squared - 0 . 0 0 0 4 -0 .0001 -0.001* -0 .001 
( -0 .66) ( -0 .20 ) ( -1 .77) ( -1 .58) 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
Tenure at highest academic rank • 0 . 2 4 … 0 . 2 4 … 0 . 2 4 … 0 . 2 3 … 
(13 .90) (12 .77) (11 .57) (10 .42) 
Tenure squared - 0 . 0 0 4 … - 0 . 0 0 4 … - 0 . 0 0 3 … - 0 . 0 0 3 … 
( -7 .75) ( -7 .66) ( -5 .90 ) ( -5 .44) 
School/dept dummies y e s y e s y e s y e s 
Instrumental variables 
% o f faculty with highest rank - 1 . 8 7 " -0 .69 -0 .30 0 .46 
( -2 .41) ( -0 .77) ( -0 .32 ) (0 .41) 
% o f those with doctoral degree 0 .50 0 .15 0.51 0 .02 
a m o n g faculty with highest rank (1 .16) (0 .32) (0 .96) (0 .03) 
N u m b e r o f observat ions 1583 1361 1288 1112 
N u m b e r o f uncensorcd observat ions 5 6 2 4 8 5 3 0 2 265 
N o t e 1: t-statistic is in parenthesis; S igni f icance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *，** and 
***，respectively. 
N o t e 2: regress ions o f indexed articles do not cover schools or departments o f humanities, f ine arts, 
journal i sm, and other teaching units. Variable o f ethnicity in indexed article regression is 
dropped due to collinearity. 
N o t e 3: the number o f the total observations is restricted to faculty with highest academic rank 
because responsible professors are se lected from only such group. 
133 
Table 6.2.3^? Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect 
on Research Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional Levels as 
Measure of Incentives 
Dependent variable: publication 
Responsible professors in 2003 All responsible professors in 2003 sample who reported in both 2003 sample and 1999 
Independent variables � （2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic Interna- Indexed Domestic Interna- Indexed 
articles tional articles by articles tional articles by 
articles SCI, articles SCI, 
EI&ISTP EI&ISTP 
- 7 5 . 9 8 … 0 .64 -29 .30 - 8 7 . 8 2 " 15.70 -49 .87 
Intercept 
( -2 .51) (0 .02) ( -0 .49) ( -2 .12) (0 .42) ( -0 .58) 
Maryinal return for responsible 
professors 
Average pay spread for responsible -0 .35 1.17 -1 .96 0 .46 2.31 -1 .53 
profcssors ( in 10 thousand Yuan) ( -0 .20) (0 .76) ( -0 .59) (0 .20) (1 .10) ( -0 .34) 
Characteristics of instructor 
S e x ( l = male; 0 = f e m a l e ) 4 .01 1.46 6 .10 8 .34 4 .58 9 .00 
(1 .47) (0 .62) (1 .08) (1 .64) (1 .00) (0 .80) 
Ethnici ty -6.31 -3 .02 -14 .32 -6.51 0 .48 
(1 = minority; 0 o therwise) (.0.77) (-0.43) (-0.68) (-0.52) (0.04) “ 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from .0.45 0 .78 1.04 -0 .78 -0.51 -1 .10 
case univers i ty (1 = yes ; 0 = no) ( . 0 . 20 ) (0 ,41) (0 .24) ( -0 .25) ( -0 .18) ( -0 .17) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g an oversea -1 .28 1.34 3 .56 -4 .56 -1 .93 1.07 
degree (1 = yes ; 0 = no) ( -0 .56 ) (0 .68) (0 .74) (1 .34) (0 .63) (0 .15) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral 3.57* -0 .42 -0 .47 4 .37 -3 .89 -3 .35 
degree (1 = yes ; 0 = no) (1 .70 ) ( -0 .23 ) ( -0 .10 ) (1 .45) ( -1 .44) ( -0 .54) 
A g e o f instructor 3 .22"* -0 .08 1.75 3 . 6 5 " -0 .80 2 .50 
(2 .86) ( -0 .08 ) (0 .79) (2 .42) ( -0 .59) (0 .81) 
A g e squared - 0 . 0 3 ' " 0 .06 -0 .02 -0.04** 0.01 -0 .02 
( -2 .99 ) (0 .00) ( -0 .93 ) ( -2 .52 ) (0 .54) ( -0 .85) 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
Tenure at highest rank 0 . 9 3 " 0 .9 广 1 . 9 6 " 0 .96 1 . 1 8 " 1.84 
(2 .05) (2 .32) (2 .17) (1 .57) (2 .17) (1 .50) 
Tenure squared - 0 . 0 2 -0.02* - 0 . 0 4 -0 .02 -0.04* -0 .04 
( -1 .08 ) ( -1 .92 ) ( -1 .46) ( -0 .85) ( -2 .28) ( -1 .18) 
Whether b e l o n g i n g to professorial . 3 . 7 2 -2 .65 - 2 . 6 4 - 7 . 4 8 " -3 .45 -3 .09 
rank series (1 = yes; 0 = no) ( -1 .58) ( -1 .30 ) ( -0 .59) ( -2 .04 ) ( -1 .05) ( -0 .42) 
School or department dummies y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s 
Adj -R^ 0 .2561 0 . 0 8 0 6 0 .1154 0 . 3 0 2 4 0 . 0 5 8 4 0 .1033 
F 4.11 … 1.96 … 2 .45"* 4 .13 … 1.45* 1.9 广 
N 2 4 2 2 4 2 201 160 160 135 
Note : t-statistics in parenthesis; S igni f icance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *，** and ***， 
respect ively . 
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Table 6.2.36 Heckman Two-stage Regressions Examining the Incentive Effect on 
Research Performance Using Pay Spread between Adjacent Positional Levels as 
Measure of Incentives 
Dependent variable: publication 
Responsible professors in 2003 All responsible professors in 2003 sample who reported in both 2003 sample 
and 1999 
Independent variables � （2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic Interna- Indexed Domestic Interna- Indexed 
articles tional articles by articles tional articles by 
articles SCI, articles SCI, 
EI&ISTP EI&ISTP 
-35 .05 -5.75* -3 .14 -6 .27 -18 .57 -70 .68 
Intercept ( 1 00) ( . 1 .67 ) ( -0 .78) ( -1 .50 ) ( -0 .46 ) ( -0 .84 ) 
Marginal return for responsible 
professors 
Average pay spread for responsible ] 別 4 . 2 6 " 4 .35 -1 .12 5.67** 1.77 
professors( in 10 thousand Yuan) (.Q go) (2 .09) (0 .99) ( -0 .35) (2 .06) (0 .30) 
Characteristics of instructor 
S e x ( l = male; 0 = f emale ) 5.49* 2 .07 8.71 7 .36 5 .77 10.29 
(1 .89) (0 .81) (1 .48) (1 .47) (1 .25) (0 .97) 
Ethnici ty -2 .05 -5 .54 -20 .62 -0 .55 -4 .34 0 .15 
(1 = minority; 0 otherwise) ( -0 .25 ) ( -0 .79) ( -1 .01) ( -0 .05) ( -0 .40) (0 .02) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a degree from -0 .46 1.09 3.41 -2 .47 0 .27 0 .15 
case universi ty (1 = yes; 0 = no) ( -0 .21 ) (0 .56) (0 .77) ( -0 .79 ) (0 .10) (0 .02) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g an oversea -0 .78 0 .59 0 .90 -3 .70 1.08 -0 .95 
degree (1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( -0 .33 ) (0 .28) (0 .18) ( -1 .10) (0 .36) ( -0 .13) 
Whether p o s s e s s i n g a doctoral 3.91* 0 .45 2 .52 5.86* -2 .73 -1 .00 
degree (1 = yes; 0 = no) (1 .76) (0 .23) (0 .54) (1 .89) ( -1 .00) ( -0 .16) 
A g e o f instructor 2 . 7 7 " 0 .23 1.58 2.87* -0 .49 2.45 
(2 .31 ) (0 .22) (0 .71) (1 .87) ( -0 .37) (0 .84) 
A g e squared - 0 . 0 3 " -0 .003 -0 .02 -0.03* 0 .004 -0 .02 
( -2 .38 ) ( -0 .28 ) ( -0 .78 ) ( -1 .88 ) (0 .35) ( -0 .84) 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
Tenure at the highest rank -0 .58 1 . 6 9 … 3 .12*" -1 .19 2 . 1 2 … 2.41 
( -0 .90) (3 .04) (2 .59) ( -1 .40 ) (2 .84) (1 .53) 
Tenure squared 0.01 - 0 . 0 4 … - 0 . 0 7 " 0 .02 - 0 . 0 6 … -0 .06 
(0 .72) ( -2 .67) ( -2 .09) (0 .92) ( -2 .94 ) ( -1 .41) 
Whether b e l o n g i n g to professorial -8 .78"* -0 .04 -0 .39 - 1 2 . 3 8 … -0 .15 -1 .45 
rank series (1 = yes ; 0 = no) ( -3 .25) ( -0 .02) ( -0 .08) ( -3 .11) ( -0 .04) ( -0 .20) 
School or department dummies y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s 
-9.44… 7.21" 14.3 广 - 1 1 . 1 5 … 6.91* 5.24 
Lamda 
( -2 .81) (2 .44) (2 .02) ( -2 .69 ) (1 .84) (0 .61) 
Wald chi2 2 9 0 . 9 0 … 2 3 9 . 1 4 … 2 0 7 . 2 4 " * 2 3 9 . 0 7 * " 1 8 9 . 3 8 … 1 6 5 . 2 9 * " 
N 773 773 6 3 4 691 691 568 
U n c e n s o r e d observat ions 228 228 193 153 153 131 
Note : t-statistics in parenthesis; S igni f icance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are indicated by *，** and ***, 
respect ively . 
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Table 6.3 Ordered Probit Estimations of the Determinants of Positional Level 
Examining the Sorting Function of the Pay-by-Position System 
Dependent variable: position level 
(positional level = 0 - 9 ) 
Independent variable 
� (2) (3) (4) 
1999-2003 1999-2003 2001-2003 2001-2003 
Proxy of ability 
Years at prev ious academic rank -0 .01*" - -0.04*** 
( -7 .50) ( -15 .52) 
Past performance 
Se lec ted to take pilot posit ion in 0 . 3 7 … 0 . 8 7 … 
1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 (1 = yes; 0 = no) (12 .33) (17 .42) 
C h a n g e o f the posit ional level 0 . 2 4 … 0 . 2 8 … 
in last year - (7 .62) (8 .90) 
Personal characteristics 
S e x (1 = male; 0 = female ) -0 .03 -0 .02 0 . 1 8 … 0 . 1 6 … 
( -1 .22) ( -0 .81) (5 ,12) (4 .55) 
Ethnicity (1 = han; 0 otherwise) 0 .08 0 .07 -0.01 0 .07 
(1 .56) (1 .31) ( -0 .12) (0 .86) 
C o m m u n i s t Party M e m b e r 0 . 0 7 … 0 . 0 8 … 0.31 … 0 . 3 4 … 
(1 = y c s ; 0 = no) (3 .57) (3 .93) (9 .24) (10 .03) 
Democrat i c party (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.08* 0.09* 0 . 2 0 … 0 . 1 9 … 
(1 .80) (1 .93) (3 .00) (2 .71) 
Educational background 
P o s s e s s i n g a degree from case 0 . 0 7 * " 0.05** 0.42*** 0.45*** 
universi ty (1 = yes; 0 = no) (3 .34 ) (2 .34) (11 .49) (12 .19) 
P o s s e s s i n g an oversea doctoral degree -0.07* -0 .06 0.16** 0 .08 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( -1 .74 ) ( -1 .47 ) (2 .46) (1 .26) 
P o s s e s s i n g a doctoral degree 0.05* 0 . 1 0 … 0 . 3 8 … 0.17"* 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) (1 .69) (3 .25) (7 .81) (3 .31) 
Experience 
A g e -0 .06 … -0 .06 … -0 .08*" -0 .07"* 
( -4 .50 ) ( -4 .89 ) ( -3 .68 ) ( -3 .16) 
A g e squared 0 .001 … 0.001 … 0.001 … 0.001 … 
(6 .37 ) (6 .26 ) (4 .45) (4 .92) 
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(Table 6.1.1a continued) 
Years s ince acquired highest degree -0.01* - 0 . 0 1 " 0.01 0 .002 
( -1 .69) ( -2 .30) (1 .01) (0 .25) 
(Years s ince acquired highest degree) 0 .0001 0 .0001 -0 .0001 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 
squared (0 .87) (0 .92) ( -0 .40) (0 .19) 
Ever e m p l o y e d by an overseas - 0 . 1 1 " -0 .05 0 .09 -0 .03 
organizat ion (1 = yes; 0 = no) ( -2 .31) ( -1 .02) (1 .09) ( -0 .41 ) 
Ever e m p l o y e d by a domest ic -0 .03 0 . 1 0 … 0 . 1 5 … - 0 . 2 2 … 
institution (1 = yes; 0 = no) ( -1 .07) (3 .68) (3 .53) ( -4 .41 ) 
Professional characteristics 
B e l o n g i n g to professorial rank series 0 .24*" 0 . 2 3 … 0 . 4 3 … 0 . 3 7 … 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) (10 .73) (10 .11) (11 .38) (9 .62) 
A s s o c i a t e academic rank - 0 . 4 6 … - 0 . 4 2 … - 1 . 2 5 … - 1 . 4 3 … 
(1 = y c s ; 0 = no) ( -15 .03) ( -14 .09) ( -24 .66) ( -27 .29) 
Midd le academic rank (1 = yes; 0 = no) - 1 . 1 5 … - 1 . 0 7 … - 2 . 7 7 … -3.01 … 
( -29 .32) ( -27 .95) ( -40 .29) ( -42 .20) 
Junior a c a d e m i c rank (1 = yes; 0 = no) - 1 . 3 3 … - 1 . 2 8 … -3 .64*" - 3 . 9 4 … 
( -22 .87 ) ( -22 .45) ( -33 .93) ( -35 .98) 
Doctoral supervisor (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.91 … 0 . 8 9 … 1 . 3 5 … 1.41"* 
(25 .49 ) (25 .13) (22 .61) (23 .00) 
Adminis trat ive head (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0 . 4 6 … 0 . 4 5 … 0 . 7 8 … 0 . 8 8 … 
(12 .57 ) (12 .40) (13 .54) (14 .88) 
Join the university after 1999 - 0 . 0 6 ' - 0 .02 -0 .03 -0 .06 
(1 = y e s ; 0 = no) ( -1 .78 ) ( -0 .73 ) ( -0 .49) ( -1 .20) 
Year dummies y e s y e s y e s 
School/department dummies y e s y e s y e s 
N 14904 14957 5575 5571 
L R c h i 2 1 0 1 4 3 . 9 8 ' " 10284 .28*" 8 1 4 1 . 0 5 … 8 6 6 9 . 4 0 … 
P s e u d o R 2 0 . 1 6 3 2 0 . 1 6 4 9 0 .3618 0 .3856 
N o t e 1: t-statistic is in parenthesis; S igni f i cance level o f 10%, 5% and 1% are marked as *, ** and ***， 
respect ively . 




This study examines the effects of incentive change in a top-tier university from 
China on its faculty productivity in teaching and research. The incentive reform at 
the case university provides a natural experiment for us to investigate the incentives 
for academics under the framework of the tournament theory. By using the 
institutional data on personnel, compensation and performance information obtained 
from field survey, this study finds strong evidence that it is the convex pay structure 
in the pay-by-position scheme that provides effective incentives and has both 
improved faculty productivity and sorted faculty on the basis of ability. The findings 
support what the theory of tournament predicts by providing new evidence from 
academics to the still small empirical literature. Also, the findings provide 
encouraging results for policy makers to assess their policy and to carry forward their 
ongoing reform. 
The pay-by-position system compromises a convex pay structure with nine 
positional levels, which reflects the main characteristic of the tournament model. The 
positional pay rises at an increasing rate when one moves upward along the 
positional hierarchy. The marginal reward to the rise of position level is increasing. 
Especially, at the top ranks for responsible professors who fall under positional levels 
8 and 9，the pay spread jumps obviously. The marginal increase in the spread of 
positional pay between adjacent positional levels is RMB 1,000 Yuan for levels 
lower than level 8. At level 8 and beyond, the positional pay becomes steeper and the 
marginal pay spread leaps from RMB 1,000 Yuan to 3,000 Yuan. Obviously, such an 
institutional characteristic provides pay-by-position system a self-evident convex 
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incentive structure. Convexity of the pay structure is considered to be the main 
feature of the tournament theory, which maintains the incentives to inspire workers to 
increase efforts and climb higher positions. 
Our findings support the general hypothesis that the incentive reform improves 
teaching performance. Teaching evaluation score has increasingly risen with 
considerable magnitude and statistical significance after the introduction of the 
incentive compensation reform in 1999. In comparison with the base year 1999, after 
controlling for individual effect，the teaching evaluation score increased on average 2 
points in 2001, 3 points in 2002, and 4 points in 2003. 
Our findings support the predictions of the theory of tournament with strong 
evidence. The tournament theory suggests that it is not the increase of individual 
wage level but the change of pay structure that delivers the incentives for academics 
to increase their efforts and outputs. Especially, incentives come from the convexity 
in the pay structure. To measure the incentives driving from the convexity in the pay 
structure, we employ alternative variables of pay dispersion such as gini coefficient, 
coefficient of variation and relative mean deviation as explanatory variables. The 
empirical results show that coefficients of all pay dispersion variables are 
consistently positive and significant in all estimations. More dispersed pay structure 
leads to higher output in both teaching and research. We also use pay spread, the 
marginal return at the adjacent positional levels, as explanatory variable. The results 
give the consistent conclusion that the increasing pay spread leads to higher efforts 
and hence higher productivity in both teaching and research. 
The tournament theory also predicts that the pay-by-position system should play 
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a role in selecting and sorting individual faculty members to the positional ladder on 
the basis of their ability, which is kept in the mind of policy makers of the university. 
The findings of our ordered probit model support such hypothesis. The university 
does sort staff to positions in the pay-by-position system according to their ability 
and past performance. The greater the number of years at previous academic ranks 
implies lower ability and thus will lower the probability for the individual to be 
selected into the position system and less likely to get the top levels. Being selected 
as a pilot-pay receiver or being promoted to higher positional levels during the 
previous academic year will increase the probability to win higher positions. 
Our findings have important policy implications for rewarding academics in a 
transitional economy. Because incentives do not come from simply the raise of salary, 
but the change of pay structure from a compressed one into a convex one, it should 
be considered first how to design the pay structure when reforming the rewarding 
system for academics. Changing the egalitarian and compressed pay structure into a 
toumament-type pay structure can be an effective option. Further, the encouraging 
results provide support for policy makers in universities in China to carry forward 
their ongoing reform. When changing the traditional academic rank system at the 
next reform stage, the university policy makers should make efforts to maintain the 
tournament features in the new academic rank system. 
The limitation of this study is obvious, which comes mainly from the restriction 
of data for the research. In this study, the research data is obtainable from only a 
selected sample, i.e. the responsible professor group. Although the selection problem 
has been addressed by employing the Heckman two-stage method, such sample is not 
sufficient to test the incentive effect on research for faculty across the whole 
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positional ladder. According to the tournament theory, the convex pay structure 
should provide incentives for all incumbents at each pay slot, not merely restricted to 
those at the top. For polishing up the study, we need to obtain additional data on 
research for faculty covering all positional levels. 
Finally, we would like to suggest that further research could go ahead along two 
avenues, theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, to explain the pay-by-position 
system in more depth, the simple two-player tournament model could be extended to 
multi-player and multi-level model. A more systematic theory will be helpful to 
capture the institutional properties in the nine-level tournament pay-by-position 
structure and will have more general explanatory power. Empirically, the full faculty 
sample should be added to the research data if we conduct this case study further. 
Also, efforts should be made to get data for more universities so that the implications 
of the theory of tournament can be tested in a broader horizon. Also, other aspects of 
the theory can be examined. Such as the pay structure will vary with the size of the 
pool of the competitors and other institutional characteristics like the noisiness of the 
random factor in the competition. At the same time of this study proceeded, the 
Ministry of Education of China conducted a nation-wide survey on the faculty 
compensation. Approximately 100 universities and 12,000 individuals participated in 
the survey. For further empirical research, it is worth investigating such survey data. 
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